Iraq’s incumbent Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani has reportedly announced his withdrawal from seeking a second term at the last meeting of the ruling Shia coalition, ceding the field to his longtime rival, former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. But the move may be less a concession than a political trap.

Context: Al-Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition won the most seats, 46, at last November’s parliamentary elections, and by conventional measures he should be the front-runner to continue in office. The obstacle is Maliki, the former two-term prime minister whose State of Law Coalition remains a powerful force within the Coordination Framework with around 30 seats. Maliki has been blocking al-Sudani’s path, and the two men represent competing visions over who should lead Iraq’s next government.

Analysis: Rather than fight a bruising internal battle, al-Sudani appears to have chosen a different approach: let Maliki try, and let him fail.

According to sources close to the Coordination Framework, al-Sudani agreed to step aside on a critical condition: al-Maliki must secure unanimous approval from all factions within the coalition. If he cannot, he must withdraw and allow the factions to choose another candidate. Some Shia leaders believe al-Sudani has deliberately placed Maliki before a test he cannot pass. When asked in their last meeting why he chose to withdraw, al-Sudani said it was an effort to end the Shia bloc’s habit of nominating prime ministers who lack real parliamentary weight.

That condition also intersects with the push by major Shia factions outside al-Sudani to impose constraints that would effectively reduce the premiership to a CEO role, forced to run major decisions through a political “board,” and hollowed out further by requiring the next prime minister not to contest the following election. By withdrawing, but tying his withdrawal to the principle that the prime minister should come from a political bloc, al-Sudani also seeks to undercut those constraints. If Maliki cannot satisfy the coalition, it becomes harder to argue that such conditions should be imposed on al-Sudani if he regains the upper hand.

The obstacles confronting Maliki are substantial. Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the most influential Shia cleric in Iraq, has previously declared that Maliki was “tried once and should not be tried again.” The Sadrist movement, a major veto power within the Shia-led power structure, remains bitterly opposed to him. Sunni leaders blame his sectarian governance for fueling the insurgency that preceded the Islamic State’s 2014 takeover of Mosul. Western governments view him as too close to Tehran.

If Maliki cannot clear these hurdles, the Coordination Framework may find itself returning to al-Sudani, who will have demonstrated both magnanimity and the weakness of alternatives.

The Coordination Framework convened yesterday in what was described as a decisive session on the prime ministerial question. After months of internal wrangling that saw nine candidates reduced to two, al-Sudani announced his withdrawal, telling assembled leaders that “Iraq’s interests are greater than party and personal interests.” The Dawa Party, Maliki’s political vehicle, immediately proposed their leader as the coalition’s consensus candidate. Most faction leaders voiced support, but Ammar al-Hakim, head of the more moderate Hikma Movement, suggested consulting Sistani before proceeding.

The response from Najaf was conspicuous in its restraint. Sistani declined to intervene, maintaining the distance from political affairs he has observed since 2015, when he closed his door to politicians in protest at the ruling class’s corruption and incompetence. His silence was not an endorsement. The cleric’s earlier admonition remains on the record, placing the Coordination Framework in an uncomfortable position: formalizing Maliki’s candidacy means openly contradicting the moral authority that most Iraqi Shia revere.

The coalition is scheduled to meet again tomorrow evening. If no faction raises objections, Maliki’s nomination may be approved. Officials from State of Law have already begun celebrating, though their confidence may prove premature. Al-Sudani’s withdrawal surprised observers who expected the election winner to press his advantage. The decision followed private negotiations with Maliki after it became clear neither man would voluntarily yield.

If the withdrawal is genuine rather than tactical, several factors may explain it. One concerns the Shia militias, which face mounting American pressure to disarm. They may trust Maliki, who cultivated close ties with militia commanders during his previous governments, to manage this process without turning against them. Al-Sudani, despite his credentials within the Coordination Framework, lacks that history.

Another factor is economic. Oil prices are falling, and whoever governs next will be forced to impose unpopular austerity measures given Iraq’s growing fiscal pressures. Al-Sudani has already become associated with new taxes and spending restraint. Allowing Maliki to inherit this burden, or watching him fail before reaching office, may serve al-Sudani’s longer-term interests.

But the most compelling explanation is strategic. By withdrawing conditionally rather than contesting the nomination directly, al-Sudani avoids appearing divisive while establishing clear terms for Maliki’s candidacy. He has shifted the burden of coalition-building onto his rival, knowing that Maliki must somehow reconcile Sistani’s opposition, Sadrist hostility, Sunni resistance, and international skepticism. If Maliki succeeds, al-Sudani can claim statesmanship. If he fails, al-Sudani returns as the only viable option.