Among the five biggest Shiite lists to emerge from the November 11 parliamentary elections, each included at least one Shiite armed faction that the United States has designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. In every case, those factions or their political wings won seats. Together, the five lists alone secured about 140 seats out of Iraq’s 329-seat parliament or 43% of the total seats.

Context: Of the ten leading electoral lists nationwide, five were Shiite, two Kurdish, and three Sunni. The seat figures used here come from the final results released by the Independent High Electoral Commission, including the names of winning candidates. That confirmation changes some earlier estimates that were based on preliminary returns, when the internal allocation of seats inside each coalition was not yet clear.

The Reconstruction and Development Coalition, led by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, formally won 46 seats. Two U.S.-designated militias competed within the coalition: Kataib Jund al-Imam, represented by its political wing Bilad Sumer under Ahmed al-Asadi, secured 6 seats. Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, represented by the Al-Awfiya Movement under Haider al-Gharawi, won 3 seats.

The State of Law Coalition, led by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, captured 30 seats. Within this list, Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada competed through its Muntasiroun (Victors) Bloc under Abu Alaa al-Wala’i, winning 7 seats.

The Sadiqoun list represents the designated militia Asaib Ahl al-Haq, led by Qais al-Khazali. The list secured 28 seats, though one belongs to a Taqaddum (Sunni bloc) candidate in Babil province.

The Badr Organization, representing the designated Badr militia led by Hadi al-Amiri, won 20 seats.

The National State Forces Alliance, led by Ammar al-Hakim and often viewed as a more moderate Shiite force, also included designated militias within its coalition. Saraya al-Jihad, represented by its political wing Jihad and Construction, won at least 1 seat. The Arak Party, a political wing of the Imam Ali Brigades, secured 3 seats.

This accounting excludes U.S.-designated militias that ran independently and won smaller numbers, such as Kataib Hezbollah, which took six seats through the Huquq bloc, and the main list of Kataib al-Imam Ali, which won five seats through the Khadamat bloc plus another four seats via its allied Wasit Ajmal list. It also excludes figures under U.S. sanctions who are not militia leaders in their own right, such as Faleh al-Fayyad, who won ten seats under Sudani’s coalition while serving as head of the PMF.

The takeaway is stark: U.S.-designated Shiite militias—whether running on their own lists or embedded within larger Shiite coalitions—now dominate the Shiite share of parliamentary seats and are well placed to shape a governing majority. This comes at a moment when Washington has been pressing Baghdad to fold the PMF into the state security apparatus, and after U.S. warnings in the months before the election that serious sanctions could follow any push by Shiite factions to pass legislation entrenching the PMF as a parallel force akin to Iran’s IRGC.

Now, with U.S.-designated factions embedded across every major Shiite list, policy proposals premised on isolating or excluding “specific groups” look increasingly unworkable. The results not only blur the line between militia-linked and non-militia Shiite politics, but also further complicate Washington’s push to pressure Iraq into keeping these factions out of government formation.