The Syrian Kurdish unity conference was held in the city of Qamishli in northeast Syria. The event lasted around four hours, and in its final declaration, it adopted “decentralization” as the guiding principle for the future governance of Syria.

Context: The conference took place after years of rivalry and repeated delays between Syrian Kurdish factions, which are divided along the ideological lines of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). About 400 participants attended, including representatives from political parties as well as civil society organizations. However, contrary to earlier expectations, no delegation was formally established to negotiate with the Syrian government in Damascus.

Analysis: The mere fact that the conference was held after years of postponement renders it symbolically historic. The final declaration advocated for a “democratic, decentralized state.” However, the ambitions and scope of the conference were notably scaled back to ensure it could proceed — largely thanks to American mediation.

Despite this, the full document agreed upon — as reported by media outlets close to both the SDF and KDP — included a call for federalism, proposing the “unification of Kurdish regions into an integrated political-administrative unit within the framework of a federal Syria.” This highlights a clear discrepancy between the final declaration read aloud at the press conference and the written document later published by affiliated media.

It is possible, however, that — as some reports suggest — the real demand remains decentralization, but federalism was included in the written document as a maximalist opening position to be negotiated with Damascus, with the expectation of ultimately settling for decentralization.

Beyond this, two other notable points stand out in the demands: first, the call for the constitutional recognition of Kurdish as an official language; and second, the demand to “reverse the political consequences” of the Arab Belt project — language that closely mirrors the issues surrounding disputed territories in northern Iraq.

The final declaration also vaguely stated that “the conference decided to form a joint Kurdish delegation as soon as possible,” without offering a clear timeline or mechanism for doing so.

Several compromises were necessary to make the conference possible. For instance, the contentious issue of which flag should represent Syrian Kurds — a major point of division between pro-PKK and other factions — was carefully managed. Only four flags were displayed: the Kurdistan flag (associated with the KDP), the KCK flag (representing the umbrella organization of PKK-aligned groups), the Rojava flag, and the Syrian national flag. This symbolic compromise reflects the underlying divisions that persist.

Beyond this point, there are two other interesting points in the demands, which are recognition of Kurdish as an official language and demanding “reversing their political consequences” of the Arab belt, which reads in a way like the ongoing issues in disputed territories in northern Iraq.

The final declaration vaguely stated that “the conference decided to form a joint Kurdish delegation as soon as possible,” offering no clear timeline or mechanism for doing so.

The conference itself was brief. The first hour was devoted to speeches by SDF commander Mazloum Abdi, an envoy of KDP leader Masoud Barzani, representatives of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and Turkey’s pro-Kurdish DEM Party. Actual negotiations and proceedings only began once the American representative arrived. Notably, no French delegation was present — an absence that suggests France’s influence over Syrian Kurdish affairs may sometimes be overstated, while the United States remains the only Western power capable of meaningfully influencing dynamics among rival Kurdish factions.

Importantly, the conference was intended to select a negotiating delegation to engage with Damascus and advocate for decentralization. However, the rushed nature of the event risks prolonging the process of forming that delegation, potentially delaying negotiations by months or longer. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the SDF and the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria already maintain two separate delegations engaged in talks with the Syrian government regarding the future of the region. Progress on those fronts may continue independently of the Qamishli conference outcomes.

The Kurdish Unity Conference Political Document

The Kurdish Unity Conference Political Document

Full text as obtained by North Press

Syrian National Framework

1

Syria is a country of multiple nationalities, cultures, religions, and sects. Its constitution guarantees the rights of all Syrian components — Arabs, Kurds, Syriacs, Assyrians, Circassians, Turkmens, Alawites, Druze, and Yazidis.

2

The state is committed to international covenants and treaties, human rights, and the principle of equal citizenship.

3

The system of governance in Syria is parliamentary, adopting political pluralism, the peaceful transfer of power, and the separation of powers, and relying on regional councils within a decentralized system.

4

Syria is decentralized, ensuring the fair distribution of authority and wealth between the center and the regions.

5

The state prohibits ethnic and religious discrimination against any national or cultural component of Syrian society.

6

The state guarantees freedom of religions and beliefs, the practice of religious rites, and recognizes the Yazidi faith as an official religion.

7

A unifying national identity that respects the specificities of different entities.

8

Ensuring equality between women and men in Syria and their representation in all institutions.

9

Ensuring economic policies issued by the state and regulating international contracts, while supporting and assisting regions according to their nature and capabilities, taking into account their specific needs compatible with their nature and age.

10

Revisiting the current administrative divisions to account for population density (demographic clusters) and geographic area.

11

The restoration of looted Syrian antiquities and artifacts that were transferred inside or outside the country to their original locations.

12

The annulment and cessation of the effects of demographic change in Kurdish areas and all Syrian areas, ensuring the safe return of displaced and forcibly displaced persons to their homes, including those from Sere Kaniyeh (Ras al-Ain), Tel Abyad (Gire Spi), and Afrin.

13

The formation of a constitutional body under international auspices, including representatives of all Syrian components, to draft democratic principles and establish a government comprising all Syrian spectrums and components with full executive powers.

14

The right to express, teach, and learn in the mother tongue, and the practice of culture as a right for all components.

15

The declaration of March 8 as Women’s Day.

Kurdish National Framework

1

The unification of Kurdish regions as a single, integrated political and administrative unit within a federal Syria.

2

Recognition of the national existence of the Kurdish people in Syria as an indigenous people, and constitutional guarantee of their national rights in accordance with international covenants and treaties, including their right to freely and equally exercise their political, cultural, and administrative rights.

3

Appreciation of the sacrifices of the martyrs of the Syrian revolution, the Syrian Democratic Forces, the security forces, and detainees who died in prisons, as well as the martyrs who fell resisting ISIS and its atrocities, with support for their families and the guarantee of their rights through legal provisions.

4

Considering youth as the active force in society, and ensuring their participation and fair representation in all state institutions.

5

Constitutional recognition of the Kurdish language as an official language alongside Arabic, and guaranteeing education and learning in it.

6

Establishment of centers and administrations concerned with the Kurdish language, historical heritage, and culture; launching Kurdish-language media outlets including radio and television stations; publishing books, magazines, and printed materials; and opening research and studies centers.

7

Guaranteeing Kurdish participation in legislative, judicial, executive, and security state institutions.

8

Adoption of March 21 (Newroz) as an official holiday in the country, and March 12 as a day of remembrance for the Qamishli Uprising.

9

Ending the exceptional policies, procedures, and laws enacted against the Kurds, such as the Arab Belt project, reversing their political consequences, ensuring the return of the displaced, restoring balance to development policies, and reinstating canceled agreements that affect Syrian sovereignty and Kurdish existence.

10

Restoring Syrian citizenship to Kurdish citizens who were stripped of it under the exceptional 1962 census, including “muqayideen” (those registered but noted with restrictions) and “maktoumeen” (unregistered individuals).

11

Developing the infrastructure of Kurdish regions and allocating a share of their natural resource revenues for development and reconstruction, in light of the deliberate marginalization and neglect they suffered in previous periods.

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