The commander of the SDF and the de facto leader of Kurdish-led Northeast Syria has set a new date of the 26th of April for the much-anticipated Syrian Kurdish unity conference, after it was abruptly delayed days ago due to technical differences. The conference is expected to bring together all Syrian Kurdish groups, including those aligned with the SDF represented by PYD and those aligned with the KDP. An official from the rival pro-KDP Kurdish National Council (KNC) has also confirmed this date.

Context: The conference has two primary objectives: first, to approve a roadmap detailing the Syrian Kurds’ collective vision and specific demands concerning their future relationship with Damascus; second, to establish a unified negotiating delegation to engage directly with the Syrian government on Kurdish rights and demands. The United States, and to a lesser extent France, has been actively working for years to unify the fragmented Syrian Kurdish factions. This effort gained renewed momentum following the collapse of the Assad regime in early December 2024, enabling the conference’s organization. U.S. officials are expected to attend the event.

The conference will involve all Syrian Kurdish political parties, including those seen as closely aligned with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), such as the PYD, and those closer to the KDP within the KNC, alongside over 30 other Kurdish groups representing a broad spectrum of Syrian Kurdish society.

Analysis: The conference is occurring amid a series of interconnected developments: ongoing PKK-Turkish peace talks, a Turkey-SDF ceasefire, Damascus-SDF agreement, and gradual US withdrawal.

Given that the reasons for previous delays included disputes over the number of seats and symbolic elements meant to score political points, a compromise appears to have finally been arranged, likely through American mediation. The fact that one reason cited for postponing the conference was awaiting clarity on the American delegation’s visit demonstrates how crucial American involvement is in making this conference possible.

The conference will likely be more symbolic and ceremonial in nature, with most topics already agreed upon behind closed doors. The conference will simply formalize these agreements, making technical details less important. Regarding the broader vision for the region, one point of contention is whether to demand federalism or decentralization. Reports indicate that federalism might initially be presented as a maximalist negotiating position to secure decentralization as a compromise outcome, given the firm rejection of a federal system by both Damascus and Ankara.

Another crucial aspect to monitor is the composition and level of representation within the negotiating delegation, as this will reveal internal power dynamics and the balance among Kurdish groups.

Overall, holding this conference also complicates the SDF’s claim of multi-ethnic representation. This is significant because two of the largest areas under SDF control—Deir Ezzor and Raqqa—have Arab majorities, in addition to Hasakah city, which has a more pluralistic demographic makeup. The fact that American withdrawal first began in Deir Ezzor, consolidating forces at bases further northeast, suggests that the future of Arab-majority areas might be used as negotiating leverage to guarantee some form of decentralization for Kurdish areas in exchange for the SDF accepting Damascus government’s return to Arab-majority regions.

However, more important than these details will be the extent and parameters of such decentralization, especially considering that Kurdish areas are not geographically contiguous. Also critical is the future of the SDF as a fighting force, particularly what will happen to Arabs who comprise half of its fighting force, and what will happen to the YPG, which forms the backbone of the SDF but remains Turkey’s key target.

There are numerous unknowns and significant details that make the conference and its subsequent developments worth monitoring closely.