The Syrian Kurdish national unity conference is scheduled to take place tomorrow. The conference — months in the making, with extensive Western involvement, particularly from the United States and France — aims to formalize a unified Kurdish demand for decentralization and to form a delegation tasked with negotiating this demand with the Syrian government in Damascus. However, even as preparations for the conference continue, two other separate delegations are already engaging with Damascus on two distinct yet interconnected issues: the future of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the future governance of Northeast Syria, a region that includes substantial Arab populations alongside other non-Kurdish communities.

Context: The SDF and the Northeast Syria administration are advancing negotiations on three parallel yet interrelated fronts:

1. A unified Kurdish delegation will emerge from the Syrian Kurdish national unity conference to demand political decentralization and to secure political and cultural rights for the Kurdish people. This delegation will negotiate with Damascus on behalf of the Kurdish population.

2. A second delegation will focus specifically on the future status of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). This group will include representatives from the SDF’s diverse ethnic makeup — Kurds, Arabs, and other communities.

3. A third delegation will address administrative issues relating to the governance structures of the broader Northeast Syria region, not limited to Kurdish-majority areas. This administrative delegation will similarly include Arabs and other non-Kurdish groups to negotiate the future of the Autonomous Administration, which currently governs the territory east of the Euphrates River.

Analysis: While the all-Kurdish conference is overshadowing discussions about Northeast Syria’s future, it also complicates the SDF’s claim of multi-ethnic representation. The current Syrian Kurdish unity conference concentrates on the future of Kurdish-majority areas rather than the entirety of SDF-controlled territory, which includes substantial non-Kurdish regions.

One particularly interesting and contentious issue is how “Kurdish-majority areas” will be defined. This is complicated by two major factors:

1. Some towns are ethnically mixed rather than clearly Kurdish or Arab. For instance, Hasakah city — the provincial capital of Hasakah Governorate, which contains several Kurdish-majority towns — has a diverse population where neither Kurds nor Arabs form an outright majority, with both likely constituting large pluralities. If Hasakah city were excluded from the decentralized Kurdish region, it would mean no provincial capital would fall under Kurdish-led decentralized governance.

2. There is geographic discontinuity between Kurdish-majority areas, further complicating the drawing of coherent boundaries.

The significance of these negotiations is amplified by the fact that two of the largest areas under SDF control—Deir Ezzor and Raqqa—have Arab majorities, in addition to the demographically pluralistic Hasakah city. The initial American withdrawal beginning in Deir Ezzor, with forces consolidating at bases further northeast, suggests that Arab-majority areas might serve as negotiating leverage to secure some form of decentralization for Kurdish regions in exchange for the SDF accepting Damascus government’s return to Arab-majority territories.

SDF commander Mazloum Abdi indicated in a recent Al-Monitor interview that Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa has demanded the SDF relinquish control of Arab-majority areas to the Damascus government, though Abdi suggested this would be subject to negotiations. Some reports even propose a potential settlement whereby the SDF-led forces would cede claims over Arab-majority areas in exchange for decentralization of non-SDF controlled Kurdish areas under Turkish influence, such as Afrin, along with the normalization of these regions and the return of their Kurdish populations.

Ultimately, perhaps the most critical of the three negotiation tracks is the one concerning the future of the SDF itself. In the long run, securing military arrangements may prove more consequential than securing political rights, because hard power often guarantees enduring political relevance. Yet, this track is also the most complicated: if the SDF relinquishes claims over Arab-majority areas, its Arab forces — which made up approximately 60% of its manpower, according to Pentagon estimates — would likely be absorbed into the Syrian army. What would remain of the SDF would largely be its Kurdish core, namely the YPG, the force that Turkey has long targeted. Even then, if the YPG were stripped of non-Syrian Kurdish fighters, a critical question would remain: could the YPG survive as a unified and coherent fighting force?

Even if the YPG persists after the removal of all non-Syrian Kurdish fighters, the question of whether it will maintain its unified fighting structure represents the most contentious issue between the SDF and Damascus. If this matter becomes entangled without resolution—especially as Damascus and Turkey push for settlement by year’s end—the situation becomes precarious, particularly as the US gradually reduces its troop presence and withdraws from the region.