Iraq’s Oil Ministry has released the official export figures for April, and they land below even the cautious projections we published two weeks ago. Where our reconstruction pointed to somewhere between $1.2 and $1.4 billion in total hydrocarbon revenue, the confirmed figure is $1.087 billion on 9,844,130 barrels — a daily average of roughly 328,000 barrels, against the pre-crisis norm of around 3.5 million.

The official breakdown is where the real story sits.

A Reversed Export Geography

In any normal month, Basra dominates Iraq’s export ledger by an overwhelming margin. April’s figures invert that entirely.

Kirkuk exports, at 4.96 million barrels, slightly exceeded Basra’s 4.59 million. That has not happened in any recent comparable period. It reflects the specific logic of the crisis: with the Strait of Hormuz closed, southern seaborne operations were reduced to two exceptional tanker cargoes – the Agios Fanourios I and the HELGA, each loading around 2 million barrels – while the northern pipeline to Ceyhan became the primary lifeline, carrying predominantly Kirkuk crude.

The KRG figure is equally striking in the other direction. Of the roughly 160,000 to 200,000 barrels per day moving through the Ceyhan pipeline, only around 11,000 bpd came from KRG production itself – 339,064 barrels for the month. The pipeline was serving almost entirely as a federal conduit for Kirkuk crude, with KRG fields producing a fraction of their normal output amid security pressures.

Lower Than Projected, and the Gap Is Larger

Our earlier reconstruction estimated April revenue at $1.2 to $1.4 billion, using route-level flow data and commodity benchmarks. The official figure of $1.087 billion falls below that range, implying a realised price of around $110 per barrel – slightly below the April Brent average of roughly $116, consistent with Basra crude discounts and the below-benchmark pricing on fuel oil volumes trucked through Syria.

The budget implications, covered in detail in our previous piece, are if anything slightly worse than projected. Against a state payroll obligation of roughly $5.45 billion per month – salaries, pensions and welfare transfers – April oil revenue covered barely a fifth. Including non-oil revenues, total April cash inflows were likely around $1.4 to $1.5 billion, leaving a monthly gap of around $4 billion before capital spending is counted.

Iraq’s Oil Ministry notes that exports remain affected by the US-Iran war and Hormuz closure, and that Iraq is among the most severely affected countries in the region. That assessment is borne out by the numbers: a 91% collapse in daily export rates from February, with the country’s export geography effectively redrawn around whichever routes remained physically accessible.

The Budget Gap

Iraq’s monthly current spending obligation, as of January 2026 Ministry of Finance data, was 8.35 trillion dinars, including 5.09 trillion for salaries, 1.6 trillion for pensions, and 458 billion for social welfare. In dollar terms, salaries, pensions and welfare alone came to roughly $5.45 billion per month.

Non-oil revenues help at the margin but do not move the needle. Customs figures from the first four months of 2026 imply roughly 250 billion dinars per month, around $190 million. Even with taxes and other fees added, total non-oil revenue for April was unlikely to have exceeded $300 to $400 million.

That leaves total April cash inflows of perhaps $1.4 to $1.5 billion, against a state payroll obligation of $5.45 billion. The monthly gap, before capital spending and broader operations, was around $4 billion.

The government is aware of the arithmetic. A senior adviser to the prime minister acknowledged in late April that monthly revenues may not exceed 4 trillion dinars while operational expenditures run to around 8 trillion dinars, framing the response as a combination of domestic borrowing and eventual external financing. The Central Bank governor held a direct meeting with PM-designate Ali al-Zaidi on May 2 specifically on the salary question.

The mechanisms being discussed, operating under a monthly one-twelfth spending rule, passing an emergency financing law modeled on the 2022 Food Security Law, or accelerating the next government’s budget process, are all bridges. None replaces the missing revenue.

How Long Can This Hold

Officials are publicly saying salaries will be paid, and that assertion is currently credible. Iraq’s foreign-exchange reserves stand at around $97 billion, covering roughly twelve months of imports. The state can borrow domestically, compress discretionary spending, and delay contractor payments to protect the salary line.

But those buffers are not unlimited, and using them aggressively carries its own risks: pressure on the dinar, inflation, and a confidence dynamic that can convert a fiscal crisis into a currency one. S&P placed Iraq’s sovereign rating on CreditWatch negative in direct response to the oil shock, citing fiscal and external pressure through the rest of 2026.

The government adviser’s own March warning was that the cash-flow impact would become visible after roughly two months, meaning May and June. If exports remain at April levels, June is the first month where bridge financing becomes genuinely strained, while analysts are treating July as the point where the gap can no longer be managed through internal cash management alone.

None of that is a fixed countdown. A partial resumption of southern exports would change the arithmetic quickly. But Iraq is currently earning, from all hydrocarbon sources combined, barely a fifth of what it needs just to pay its employees and retirees. The margin for delay is narrowing.