The Shia militias and their allies have performed strongly in the Iraqi elections, with US-designated militias alone winning 80 seats and their Shia allies collectively securing nearly 170 seats. Before the elections, the US explicitly threatened Iraqi factions not to pass a PMF bill that would codify it as an IRGC-style parallel force in Iraq. While the US has remained officially quiet about the Iraqi election results, the militias’ ascent has ironically made them softer and more willing to engage with Washington to find a compromise.

Context: In the Iraqi elections, Asaib Ahl al-Haq won 27 seats, Badr Organization 18 seats, Kataib Hezbollah 6 seats, Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada 7 seats, with combined seats of all US-designated FTOs reaching 80 seats. They quietly regrouped under the Coordination Framework, which won some 170 seats. All major Shia factions, including current Iraqi PM al-Sudani’s coalition and those perceived as moderate leaders such as Ammar al-Hakim, have militias that contested inside their coalitions and won seats.

Analysis: The militias’ electoral success has had the opposite effect of what mainstream analysis usually predicts. Rather than simply emboldening them, it has made them more exposed to US pressure now that they have more to protect and more to lose. Larger militias such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Badr have shown greater willingness to accommodate Washington. Asaib’s leader Qais Khazali is increasingly positioning himself as a “moderate” voice, seeking meetings with Western diplomats as he lays the groundwork to be considered for the prime minister’s office in the next term.

This shift reflects both opportunity and constraint, but also internal Shiite calculations that have little to do with American pressure. Shiite parties that possess armed wings, particularly those more engaged in government institutions, have reached the conviction that the continuation of the PMF in its current state has become a danger to them. Party leaders have begun complaining about the exploitation of the PMF in internal power struggles between allies and opponents, with the organization increasingly serving as a tool in destructive conflicts over influence rather than as a unified force. The dispute over the position of PMF chairman has been one of the most prominent features of recent internal Shiite conflict, with competition among factions to control the post revealing how fragmented command has become. Each unit takes orders from its own faction leader with minimal coordination, and units often bypass the PMF chairman entirely, creating what Shiite leaders describe as uncontrolled security decision-making that different parties manipulate for their own purposes.

Even figures deeply invested in the militia structure have grown critical. Former prime ministers Nouri al-Maliki and Haider al-Abadi have both publicly criticized the PMF, and despite their different motivations, their positions reflect broader elite Shiite anxiety about an institution that has become as much liability as asset. One prominent Shiite leader who was previously among the strongest defenders of the “axis of resistance” now states flatly that “Iraq will not need to use weapons in the coming phase,” signaling how dramatically elite calculations have shifted. This internal pressure combines with mounting regional factors, particularly the collapse of Iran’s “axis of resistance” following Assad’s fall in Syria, to create what insiders describe as a moment when “factors are converging” on the militia question.

The militias have put a headline proposal to the United States: they will surrender heavy weapons while keeping light arms. Proposals emerging from Shia political circles now span a spectrum of restructuring options, each reflecting different calculations about power, survival, and the delicate balance between Baghdad, Tehran, and Washington.

At the heart of current discussions is a straightforward trade: heavy weapons for light arms. Shiite factions have presented this to the United States as a compromise that would see militias relinquish tanks, artillery, and advanced weaponry while maintaining small arms. The pitch is designed as assurance that armed groups would no longer pose threats to American or Israeli interests in the region, yet could continue what they frame as “protecting their interests” through a reduced arsenal. It’s a proposal born from necessity, responding directly to U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s explicit demands in October 2025 that Iraq disarm its militias.

Beyond this headline offer, however, lies a complex menu of technical restructuring options that Iraqi political insiders have been refining for years. The most ambitious path calls for complete absorption of the Popular Mobilization Forces into formal state structures, eliminating any parallel command. But even supporters of this approach are divided over whether fighters should be integrated as individuals stripped of their factional identities, or as intact units that would bring their internal cohesion with them.

A second option focuses on reduction rather than reorganization. This approach would dramatically shrink the number of fighters operating under the PMF umbrella, cutting forces down to levels that Iraq’s Commander-in-Chief could realistically control. Proponents argue this would simultaneously ease the crushing financial burden these forces place on the national budget while making command and control manageable.

The third path, seen by many as the most politically achievable, would preserve the PMF’s institutional structure but sever its most politically toxic ties: the direct links between armed units and their sponsoring parties. Under this model, PMF brigades would continue to operate but would answer only to professional military officers reporting directly to the Commander-in-Chief. At present, each brigade effectively obeys its faction leader, producing a fragmented command system where coordination is weak and loyalty to the state is secondary.

Several Shia leaders now argue that any real solution will blend all three approaches into a hybrid formula: integrating parts of the PMF into state forces, cutting overall numbers, and professionalizing command structures at the same time. Crucially, this vision makes room for prominent militia leaders to follow the path of Hadi al-Amiri—moving from militia command into politics after their forces are absorbed, as Amiri did when Badr was folded into the Interior Ministry two decades ago.

Running parallel to these Iraqi debates is a distinct American strategy that goes beyond simple disarmament demands. Washington’s current approach centers on economic co-optation rather than direct confrontation.

The core US theory rests on what one source summarised as “the cats got too fat to fight.” Rather than trying to purge militia leaders from the political system, Washington aims to lock them into it—tying their fortunes to state institutions and making them economically dependent on stability. An adviser to Prime Minister al-Sudani captured this logic neatly, saying al-Sudani wants the militias “to invest. I want them to get busy with prosperity. I want to divert them from violence.”

This strategy starts from the reality that groups like Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Badr have become deeply embedded in Iraq’s formal economy. Their patronage networks now depend on state contracts and business deals. Many militia leaders already control companies that actively bid for government projects, shifting from purely military actors into businessmen with political protection. Washington’s bet is that these actors will hesitate to risk everything if credible economic sanctions loom, making financial pressure more potent than military confrontation.

But the model has a hard limit. Hardcore IRGC proxies, especially Kataib Hezbollah, are far less susceptible to economic co-optation because of their structural role as direct instruments of Iranian power. Unlike Asaib or Badr, which have built independent financial interests inside Iraq, Kataib Hezbollah’s loyalty and funding flow more directly from Tehran, making it far less vulnerable to Baghdad-centred economic inducements or US financial pressure.

The appointment of a US special envoy signals that Washington expects the next Iraqi cabinet to take formal steps on integrating militias into state security forces. Yet beneath the diplomatic language, the real strategy is clear: to make the use of violence economically irrational for those Shia armed groups that now have the most to lose.