In an election year marked by mounting pressure from the new Trump administration, internal rifts among Iraq’s Shiite factions over legislation governing the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) have escalated. Ostensibly, the proposed law aims to codify service terms, retirement provisions, and financial entitlements for PMF personnel. However, its deeper significance lies in redefining the organization’s institutional identity, command structure, and operational character. Functioning as a parallel entity to Iraq’s formal military apparatus, the PMF has long blurred the lines between state and non-state armed power.

This analysis unpacks the core disputes surrounding the proposed PMF legislation and situates them within Iraq’s evolving political context.

The Proposed Legislation

In 2024, the al-Sudani government, in coordination with key Shiite factions, drafted the “PMF Service and Retirement Law,” a sweeping legislative proposal comprising 78 articles—some drafts exceed 80. Significantly, the bill classifies PMF members as “mujahid,” whether fighters, officers, civilian employees, or religious guides. This terminology infuses the law with sectarian and religious undertones, creating a symbolic and legal distinction from regular Iraqi army personnel.

The bill standardizes salaries and allowances and outlines provisions for wounded personnel, missing members, retirees, promotions, leave, and health coverage. It stipulates maximum age limits of 63 for First Lieutenants and 50 for Captains, with a five-year extension for those who joined before the law’s enactment.

But the legislation’s ambitions extend far beyond pensions. It proposes an institutional overhaul—creating a military academy to formalize ranks and embed the PMF more deeply within Iraq’s legal architecture. According to Falih Fayyad, the commission chairman, a primary motivation for advancing this legislation is the consensus among state institutions that the previous law (No. 40 of 2016) is inadequate and insufficient to address the PMF’s current circumstances, particularly regarding service conditions, retirement provisions, and financial entitlements. The brevity of the previous law—consisting of merely three articles—precludes effective amendment.

Notably, the current law remains largely unimplemented. Provisions prohibiting political affiliations within armed groups and mandating demographic balance are routinely ignored. PMF brigades maintain partisan allegiances, and the organization’s diversity—featuring Christian and Sunni tribal components—is widely seen as superficial. 

This draft law has been proposed against a backdrop of two significant factors influencing Iraq’s political landscape: mounting pressure from the Trump administration on Iraq and Shiite armed factions, including the PMF and the anticipated general election in Iraq scheduled for October 2025, which has fragmented Shiite political blocs in various directions.

U.S. Pressure on Iraqi Government

Prior to the Biden administration’s departure, Secretary Blinken allegedly urged Sudani to exploit Iran’s weakened regional position following Assad’s fall to weaken Iranian-aligned Shiite militias. Following Trump’s return in early 2025, the new U.S. administration emphasized comprehensive restructuring or potential dissolution of the PMF, viewing it as a parallel ideological and sectarian military force. Shiite political leaders universally reject U.S. demands, with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei emphasizing PMF preservation during discussions with Sudani.

The current proposals and pressures regarding the PMF’s future can be categorized as follows:

1. Complete Dissolution: This narrative predominates in right-wing Israeli media and allegedly reflects demands from the Trump administration to Iraq. This position has gained traction particularly because certain PMF elements are subject to US sanctions or designated on terror lists, and following October 7, 2023, participated in operations against Israel. Proponents argue these elements should face consequences similar to Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Yemen’s Ansarullah group.

2. Integration with the Iraqi Army: This approach involves integrating PMF forces with the Iraqi army and appointing a senior officer (such as Abdul-Amir Yarallah) to oversee the PMF structure. According to reports, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force commander Ismail Qaani proposed this approach to PMF groups on January 7, 2025. This strategy would aim to shield the PMF from external targeting by having PMF personnel adopt Iraqi army uniforms.

Some reports also suggest that certain factions within the Shiite political spectrum support integrating the PMF with other military security institutions to avoid becoming targets of US sanctions, economic blockades, and military strikes. However, this position is primarily advocated by parties with limited influence over PMF decision-making processes.

3. Parliamentary Approval of New Legislation: Such legislation would create legal barriers to targeting the organization. This represents the preferred option among Shiite factions, who have prepared a draft law (Service and Retirement Law). Available indicators suggest that the Trump administration’s policy toward Iraq has further motivated Shiite groups to advance this legislation, with the objectives of: securing greater legitimacy; embedding the institution within Iraq’s legal framework; and establishing retirement procedures and promotion mechanisms for fighters and staff to safeguard their rights.

Intra-Shiite Rivalries and Leadership Disputes

The Shiite parties’ preferred strategy for protecting and developing the PMF involves passing new legislation to restructure it. Within this legislation, the most contentious issue concerns determining retirement age. Implementation of this provision would fundamentally alter the PMF’s institutional identity, as it would not only necessitate the retirement of current commission chairman Falih Fayyad (aged 68), but would similarly affect numerous first-echelon commanders. Reports indicate approximately four thousand commanders and senior personnel would face mandatory retirement—a prospect that has generated significant discord within the Shiite political framework because it would dramatically reshape the PMF’s organizational structure.

The most significant Shiite disagreements regarding this issue can be summarized as follows:

1. Nuri al-Maliki’s Position: al-Maliki considers himself the PMF’s founder; he adamantly rejects external pressure to dissolve the PMF or even integrate it with other security institutions. In his assessment, “if it is integrated with other security institutions, it means the ‘end of PMF’.” However, Maliki provoked controversy when he publicly acknowledged the existence of “ghost employees” within the PMF and advocated purging the organization of phantom personnel and those operating outside its institutional framework. Consequently, Maliki supports expeditious passage of the law regardless of political costs.

2. Asaib Ahl al-Haq: The Asaib movement insists on protecting the PMF while simultaneously supporting the new legislation and replacement of its current chairman, Falih Fayyad. In this regard, their interests align with Nuri al-Maliki’s position. Reports widely circulate that Asaib has identified a potential successor to Fayyad and aspires to secure this strategic position.

3. Badr Organization, Hikma Movement, Haider al-Abadi: oppose replacing PMF chairman Falih Fayyad and using the legislation to restructure current PMF leadership. These parties fear the PMF falling under more extremist control, which would make Iraq more vulnerable to external intervention.

4. Iranian Influence: some Shiite factions have implicated Iran in PMF-related disputes, particularly as Tehran’s interests favor maintaining individuals sympathetic to Iran in PMF leadership positions. If these individuals face mandatory retirement under the new legislation, it would complicate Tehran’s efforts to maintain influence. To resolve this dilemma, discussions have emerged regarding extending retirement age limitations, although this provision does not apply to other security institutions, where personnel retire at statutorily defined intervals. Notably, the previous law (No. 40 of 2016) emphasized that the PMF should adhere to standard military procedures. Meanwhile, PMF chairman Falih Fayyad visited Tehran and, according to intelligence sources, sought assurances for retaining his position through Iranian intervention.

5. PMF Chairman’s Defense: the PMF chairman, currently fighting to preserve his position, contends that political factions have inappropriately interfered in PMF legal matters and seek to restructure the organization to serve their partisan interests. Fayyad portrays the PMF as the guardian of Iraq’s political system against those who sought to subvert it through extra-constitutional means (specifically, the October protesters). He further asserts that the PMF defends Iraqi state unity and opposes territorial fragmentation. This represents a novel institutional identity that Fayyad attributes to the PMF—one that extends beyond Law No. 40 of 2016, which emphasized counterterrorism operations against ISIS.

6. Prime Minister’s Maneuvers: prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, who maintains significant influence regarding the PMF law and reportedly intends to form a political alliance with its chairman for upcoming elections, withdrew the PMF legislation from parliamentary consideration—temporarily halting moves by Maliki and Asaib to push it through. Sudani advocates extending retirement age provisions for PMF fighters and staff.

Shiite internal conflicts over PMF legislation fracture the Shiite “Coordination Framework,” directly impacting al-Sudani’s political and electoral prospects. Shiite leaders have tentatively agreed to replace Fayyad based on age and his past electoral involvement violating PMF regulations. Nevertheless, provisions allowing al-Sudani to extend service tenure could postpone key leadership changes until after the election.

The draft legislation will likely authorize Prime Minister Sudani to extend PMF commanders’ service tenure, which would effectively postpone current disputes until after elections. To facilitate smooth passage of the PMF legislation, cooperation from Sunni and Kurdish parliamentary blocs is essential. To secure this support, discussions have emerged regarding a quid pro quo legislative package that would include: the PMF law for the Shias; amendments to the “Accountability and Justice” law (which primarily affects former Baathists, predominantly Sunni); and legislation establishing Halabja as a province (addressing Kurdish interests). The stakes are high: this moment provides Sunni and Kurdish blocs leverage to extract concessions on long-standing grievances in exchange for backing a law that could reshape Iraq’s internal power structure.

As Iraq approaches a pivotal election year, the push to institutionalize the PMF has fractured the Shiite Coordination Framework. At its core, the proposed law is not merely an administrative reform—it is a battleground for the future of Iraq’s security architecture and state sovereignty. With the Trump administration seeking to curtail Iran’s influence, and internal Shiite divisions deepening, the PMF’s future will likely be decided not only in Baghdad’s parliament but also through complex regional and international calculations.