Newroz 2025 marks the first time in decades that Kurds across the region have been able to celebrate their traditional new year holiday on a massive scale and largely without violence. Major Newroz gatherings took place simultaneously in the largest Kurdish cities across Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria—all notably peaceful and well-attended. Such widespread, unhindered celebrations are unprecedented in recent decades, as Kurdish public gatherings have historically faced heavy restrictions or outright suppression.

While celebrations in Syria following Assad’s collapse are not entirely surprising, and in Turkey they represent a significant shift from years of repression and violence during Newroz celebrations—especially now that the Turkish state has entered peace talks with the PKK and its leader Abdullah Ocalan—the clear surprise is in Iran. There, large-scale Newroz celebrations were not only organized but permitted with remarkably relaxed rules, even regarding women attending without wearing the mandatory hijab.

The scale of Newroz celebrations across Kurdish areas in northwestern Iran—from Ilam to Urmia—has been unprecedented this year. What’s particularly striking is the regime’s relatively tolerant stance, allowing festivities to proceed mostly peacefully. In many gatherings, a significant number of women appeared without the hijab, something rarely tolerated before.

Interestingly, this shift has already created tensions in Urmia, a mixed Azeri-Kurdish province, where large Kurdish Newroz celebrations triggered subsequent protests by Azeris. These protesters claimed the regime deliberately allowed Kurdish celebrations in Urmia as an attempt to diminish or erase the province’s Azeri identity. This reaction reflects growing Azeri nationalism, which has intensified especially since the 2020 Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. While Azeris have been an important pillar of power in Iran for centuries, they have increasingly prioritized their Turkic identity by building political and cultural ties with Turkey and Azerbaijan—a development that is becoming an increasingly significant challenge for Iran.

Why Would Iran Allow Such Celebrations?

The key question emerges: why would Iran permit such large and largely secular Newroz celebrations across Kurdish areas?

This relative openness comes against the backdrop of sweeping geopolitical shifts across the region—including the Israel-Gaza war, the collapse of the Assad regime, the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, and broader regional and global realignments.

The Iranian regime has faced a series of significant setbacks in the region: from the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria to the near-total dismantling of Hezbollah in Lebanon, the assassination of dozens of senior Iranian military commanders, and recent strikes that have destroyed Iran’s air defense systems.

These developments have left the regime exposed at a time when the prospect of conflict with Israel is increasing, and what the Trump administration calls “maximum pressure” is further complicating matters. With more difficult days ahead, the regime appears to be strategically relaxing its repressive tactics to relieve some internal pressure by providing limited freedoms that allow people to express themselves.

This approach seems particularly necessary given that Newroz celebrations have been permitted in unprecedented ways in Turkey and Syria, not to mention Iraq. If Iran had maintained its heavy-handed approach, it would have further highlighted their repression and potentially fueled greater resentment among the Kurdish population—something the regime can ill afford. Although Kurds are the third largest ethnic group in Iran after Persians and Azeris, they are politically and militarily much better organized than the Azeris, who have historically been a pillar of the Iranian state.

The regime may calculate that, with Iranian Kurdish militants still present in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, allowing cultural expressions might lessen the potential for collaboration between these militants and the local Kurdish population in the event of a wider conflict.

A Double-Edged Strategy

However, this strategy represents a double-edged sword, especially in mixed areas such as Urmia. A rejuvenated sense of nationalism has emerged simultaneously among Kurds, Azeris, and Persians—driven by unprecedented economic hardships and as reactions to each other, with each group’s nationalism feeding the others.

The regime has already been playing these tensions strategically. In the last three years, for the first time, it appointed a Kurdish (albeit Shia) governor to Urmia, or what is officially called Western Azerbaijan province, as well as allowing more Kurds than Azeris for the first time to win in the local council. Previously, the province had Azeri governors, with Shiism serving as the binding identity between Persians and Azeris. This shared religious identity has been gradually weakening, especially since the Karabakh war in 2020, when many Azeris became angered by the Iranian regime’s response, which largely sided with Armenia due to Azerbaijan’s close collaboration with Turkey.

The challenge for the regime is that this apparent divide-and-conquer strategy intended to pit Azeris and Kurds against each other is actually intensifying nationalist sentiments in both groups, strengthening rather than diminishing their respective ethnic identities.

The Religious Dimension

There is also another significant dimension to consider: Iranians in general, including Kurds, are increasingly secular and irreligious. To understand this better, it’s instructive to compare Iranian Kurds with those in Iraq.

The contrast with Iraq’s Kurdistan Region is stark. Since Newroz now coincides with Ramadan, there have been minimal celebrations in Iraqi Kurdistan—mostly small, formal events. Traditionally, people mark Newroz with picnics and outings, but this year, resorts and public spaces have remained largely empty as people observe the holy month. Many are postponing celebrations until after Ramadan. Meanwhile, in Iranian Kurdish areas, spontaneous and large-scale festivities continue despite Ramadan, reflecting a more secular outlook and much less strict religious observance.

This serves as a symbolic illustration of the diverging roles religion plays in the lives of Kurds across the border. Ironically, Iranian Kurds—despite (or because of) living under an Islamic regime—tend to be far less religious than their Iraqi counterparts, who have grown more religious in recent decades. This shift is widely recognized among ordinary people and is fueling a growing stereotype that Iranian Kurds are atheists or lack conservative values—an emerging narrative that remains underreported in mainstream analysis.