The KRG’s recent multi-billion-dollar energy agreements with two U.S.-based companies—Western Zagros and HKN Energy—have garnered attention, primarily for their potential impact on Erbil-Baghdad relations and broader geopolitical implications. These deals involve oil and gas fields located deep within Sulaimani province, territory controlled by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). While the prevailing narrative often emphasizes the Barzanis’ ties to energy policy due to their dominance in KRG power structures, our research indicates that the PUK’s Talabani family has been intimately involved in these latest deals.

Around 20 days before the deals were formally signed in the US capital, PUK president Bafel Talabani traveled to Washington for a series of undisclosed, behind-the-scenes meetings. Although Talabani publicly stated before his departure that his discussions would mainly cover military and security affairs, no concrete details about his meetings or interlocutors have emerged in the media. Notably, Talabani had met three times prior to his trip with KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, who currently heads a caretaker administration but is expected to lead the next cabinet. While public messaging framed these meetings as focused on cabinet formation, it is likely that the energy file was a central—if undisclosed—topic in their one-on-one conversations.

Despite ongoing political deadlock over the cabinet, both sides have already reached agreements on lucrative commercial projects such as the MyAccount domiciliation service and the Ronaki Project, aimed at providing 24-hour electricity. Ostensibly, the PUK had initially voiced reservations about MyAccount; however, in practice, banks such as RT and Cihan, linked closely to the KDP and previously heavily favored by Erbil and Duhok employees, have now been excluded from domiciliation forms in Sulaimani. Similarly, the Ronaki electricity initiative, although criticized by opposition for its high costs, has reportedly been strategically divided: about one-third for PUK-linked companies, one-third for KDP-linked companies, and the remaining third to businessman Ahmed Ismael’s Mass Company, close to both parties.

Evidence of Deep PUK Involvement

There are several indicators that suggest the PUK is likely to stand to gain more from these deals than the KDP, and that their involvement runs deeper than it initially appears.

First, Masrour Barzani’s delegation to the United States included not only a PUK minister but also Amanj Raheem, a key confidant of both Qubad and Bafel Talabani. As secretary of the KRG prime ministry with expertise in energy deals, Raheem’s presence—uncharacteristic for Barzani’s typical US visits—signals the PUK’s central role in these negotiations.

Furthermore, PUK-affiliated service companies have secured positions as local partners in both the Miran and Topkhana-Kurdamir field contracts, embedding the party’s interests directly into the operational structure of these projects.

Talabani’s U.S. trip almost certainly included meetings with the two firms involved. Western Zagros, which had previously operated in the Kurdamir field, is now expanding into the adjacent Topkhana field—a site with both oil and gas reserves. Talabani has a longstanding relationship with Jamal Daniel, the Syrian-American owner of Western Zagros. Since 2011, Daniel has partnered with Talabani-linked Tigris Energy, primarily through operations at the Dukan oil refinery and other ventures, well before acquiring Western Zagros.

While the Talabanis’ connection with Texas billionaire Ross Perot Jr., the principal shareholder of HKN Energy, is less documented, what makes HKN’s entry into the PUK-controlled zone notable is its partnership with the PUK-linked Onex Group. The CEO of Onex, Saad Tayeb Hasan, is the former chairman of Qaiwan Group—one of the PUK’s major economic arms. HKN and Onex have formed a joint venture named “Miran” for the development of the Miran Gas Field.

A deeper node connects Jamal Daniel and Ross Perot Jr.: both have longstanding ties to the Bush family and are based in Texas. These relationships helped them enter the KRG oil scene post-2003. For example, Neil Bush, brother of former President George W. Bush, is co-chair with Daniel of Crest Investments, Western Zagros’s parent company. The Perot family’s links to the Bushes are similarly well documented and run deep.

Further embedding these deals in the current U.S. political landscape, both companies maintain ties to Trump administration figures. Mark Rollins, president of HKN Energy, is married to Brooke Rollins, currently Secretary of Agriculture in Trump’s administration. Additionally, former US Army Colonel Nabb, previously a key military liaison to Kurdish forces, and Matthew Zais, former Deputy Assistant Secretary at the US Department of Energy during Trump’s first term, hold roles at HKN.

Strategic Repositioning

These connections likely influenced Bafel Talabani’s approval of the deals. Since the Assad regime’s collapse, the weakening of the Iranian axis, and Trump’s return to power in early 2025, Talabani’s rhetoric has shifted subtly but significantly. He appears determined to distance the PUK from perceived alignment with the Iranian axis while seeking deeper integration into the U.S. orbit.

This balancing act isn’t entirely new for the PUK. In early 2024, well before Trump’s electoral prospects solidified, Bafel Talabani called in Baghdad for U.S. troops not only to remain but to increase their presence in Iraq—directly contradicting pro-Iran Shia militias. The PUK’s anti-terror forces have served as key partners to U.S.-led coalition forces in Iraq. Yet Talabani has simultaneously maintained strategic relationships with pro-Iran groups, building coalitions with their allies in the Nineveh provincial council and partnering with the Babylon Movement, a U.S.-sanctioned pro-Iran Christian group, in Kirkuk.

The deals serve two crucial purposes for the PUK. First, they provide a shield against rapid regional changes as the balance of power shifts away from Iran, even as Tehran remains a significant regional player. Second, they promise to better integrate the PUK into American power networks—an area where the party has lagged behind the KDP, which enjoys more established lobbying connections, commercial ties, and relationships with Israel.

The timing and location of these deals suggest a deeper strategic shift. By significantly expanding U.S. company involvement in Sulaimani—a province traditionally viewed as within Iran’s sphere of influence—the PUK may be signaling a break from its perceived Tehran alignment while seeking enhanced U.S. political backing.

Although the PUK’s geographic proximity and border connectivity necessitate continued amicable relations with Iran, these deals, especially concerning natural gas, could provoke unease in Tehran due to their direct threat to Iranian gas exports to Iraq. This directly challenges Iranian gas supplies, which have been Iraq’s primary source for electricity production. This concern manifested in attacks on the KorMor gas field under PUK control, later attributed to pro-Iran militias in Kirkuk targeting areas slated for field expansion, suggesting Iranian displeasure with increased gas production in the predominantly PUK zone.

Local Energy Ambitions

On the domestic front, these deals aim to dramatically boost gas production to expand electricity generation in the Kurdistan Region. Currently, about 900 MW of electricity are sold from the region to the rest of Iraq, but the new strategy is to significantly increase output. Plans reportedly involve extending a gas pipeline to the Bazyan power plant, owned by Taurus Energy—another subsidiary of Onex Group.

The PUK reportedly plans to extend a gas pipeline to the Bazyan power plant, owned by Taurus Energy—another Onex Group company. The strategy involves expanding Bazyan’s electricity production in three phases, selling portions to Iraq while also expanding the nearby Tasluja power plant. Additionally, the plan includes powering manufacturing facilities in the Bazyan-Tasluja area, including cement and iron factories. This industrial development underpins Qubad Talabani’s recent optimistic statements about reviving Sulaimani’s economy.

The PUK reportedly also plans to extend a gas pipeline to the Taza power plant in Kirkuk. Although this facility falls under Iraqi army control, the area represents a PUK stronghold, and the party seeks to better integrate it into the PUK zone. This ambition is facilitated by the PUK’s control of the Kirkuk governorship and the fact that Taza, where the power plant is located, sits in a Kurdish-majority area that serves as a PUK stronghold. Extending the pipeline would help further integrate Taza and its infrastructure into the PUK-administered zone, consolidating the party’s influence in a contested and symbolically significant region.

Bafel Talabani has repeatedly vowed publicly never to relinquish control over natural gas to the KDP, as occurred with oil, which became a strategic tool in KDP hands. A key aspect of Talabani’s opposition has been preventing gas exports to Turkey, which the KDP has repeatedly attempted but required PUK approval given the concentration of gas reserves in PUK territory.

The current arrangement ensures gas will be used domestically to power electricity plants, with surplus sold to Iraq, at least for the next decade until internal demands are met. Only then would exports be considered. This aligns with repeated American official statements that Kurdish gas should replace Iranian supplies to Iraq. The U.S. officials advised both parties to construct additional power plants for electricity sales to Iraq, recognizing that Baghdad would find it politically embarrassing to purchase what it considers its own gas directly. In practice, this already occurs—Iraq purchases KRG electricity from facilities powered by this natural gas.

The plan includes eventually linking gas supplies with the Chamchamal-Erbil pipeline, ensuring KDP benefits as well. This arrangement also provides an image boost to KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, who can claim credit for the achievement. It also represents a calculated response to Baghdad, given the provocative nature of signing these deals in Washington DC while the same companies and the KRG remain in negotiations with Baghdad about resuming KRG oil exports. As we’ve previously reported, export resumption appears unlikely under current terms, and both ruling parties are already profiting from the current status quo—with Masrour personally benefiting the most.

While the arrangement serves both parties, it is arguably a more significant breakthrough for the PUK. For the first time since the days of Jalal Talabani, the party is playing a central role in a major energy deal, signaling a potential rebalancing of power within the Kurdistan Region.

Success remains uncertain given the technical challenges of developing these new fields, where gas production costs exceed those at KorMor and demand more complex engineering. However, if development proceeds alongside Dana Gas’s current KorMor expansion, it could lead to a meaningful rebalancing of regional power dynamics, with the PUK’s gas assets as a counterweight to the KDP’s oil dominance, reshaping the internal balance of power in the region.