Following the PKK’s recent congress, in which the group adopted a resolution to disarm and dissolve itself under its current name, the disarmament process has quietly gained momentum. Despite conflicting public statements from both PKK and Turkish officials regarding the scope and timeline, the process has largely remained behind closed doors, a deliberate choice to shield it from external interference or provocation.

Alongside these secretive negotiations, domestic legal reform discussions are underway in Turkey, championed by nationalist leader Devlet Bahçeli, while President Erdoğan has intensified calls for a new constitution. In parallel, a series of regional diplomatic moves has unfolded, each carrying implications for the PKK or its affiliates in Syria and Iran.

The first major step came on May 8, when the Iraqi Prime Minister visited Ankara. While a range of topics were discussed, the PKK disarmament process featured prominently—particularly because any demobilization would largely occur in Iraq, where most PKK militants are based in the Kurdistan Region. Turkey also raised the issue of repatriating ISIS-affiliated families from the al-Hol camp in Syria to Iraq, where approximately 12,000 Iraqis remain. Ankara views the camp as a key factor in bolstering the strategic relevance of the SDF, which currently oversees it.

On May 15, Turkey hosted a tripartite meeting with the foreign ministers of Syria and the United States. In addition to discussions on sanctions relief and the formation of the U.S.-Turkey Syria Working Group, the fate of the SDF was reportedly on the agenda. With the U.S. as the SDF’s main military backer, and following a March agreement to integrate the SDF into the Syrian army, the group’s future is deeply entangled in the broader disarmament roadmap.

Then on May 18, Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani visited Tehran. Known for his close relationship with President Erdoğan and his role in the broader Turkey–PKK peace effort, Barzani reportedly discussed the PKK disarmament process with Iranian officials. The talks also touched on PJAK, the PKK’s Iranian offshoot, long supported by elements within Iran. While a PJAK commander recently denied being part of the disarmament process, stating their fight is exclusively against Iran, the group’s future remains uncertain.

Further developments came on May 20, when Turkish intelligence chief İbrahim Kalın visited Damascus and met with former Syrian Vice President Farouk al-Sharaa. Reports suggest key discussion points included the integration of the SDF into the Syrian army and the future of the al-Hol camp, which still houses around 15,000 Syrian nationals.

That same day, Turkish Major General Ilkay Altındağ, Head of Defense and Security at the Turkish Ministry of Defense, led a military delegation to Damascus for talks with Syrian Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra. The two sides reportedly discussed military arrangements related to the SDF and its potential absorption into Syrian state forces.

Also on May 20, Turkish Deputy Minister Nuh Yılmaz met U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau in Washington, D.C., under the Turkey–U.S. Working Group on Syria. In addition to sanctions relief, their discussions focused on the possible handover of al-Hol camp to the Syrian regime and a potential redeployment of U.S. forces in northeast Syria—areas currently under SDF control.

A major complexity in the PKK disarmament process remains the fate of the SDF. While details on its possible integration into the Syrian army remain murky, the issue is quickly becoming central. Notably, the United States appears increasingly aligned with Turkey on managing the Syrian file. Trump’s personal confidant and current U.S. ambassador to Turkey, Thomas Barrack, is reportedly set to be appointed as special envoy for Syria, signaling closer coordination between Washington and Ankara as the process enters a decisive phase.