In the Kurdistan Region, international oil companies (IOCs) are producing an estimated 280,000 to 300,000 barrels of crude oil per day. But where that oil ends up—and who profits from it—remains obscured behind a murky network of political cronies, disposable companies, and off-the-books transactions that now constitute one of the Middle East’s most opaque energy trades.

Evidence uncovered by an investigation by The National Context reveals how oil produced by these companies is sold and who ultimately benefits. Rather than being traded on open markets, the crude is allocated to a handful of politically connected buyers at discounted rates—typically around $30 to $32 per barrel, far below global benchmarks.

A few major fields underpin this system. In Duhok, the Tawke field—co-shared by DNO and Genel Energy—produces more than 82,000 barrels per day. Gulf Keystone’s Shaikan field adds another 46,000, while ShaMaran Petroleum’s operations at Atrush and Sarsang yield around 65,000 combined. In Erbil, the Khurmala field, run by the politically favored KAR Group, outputs approximately 100,000 barrels per day—making it the region’s most productive single field. Additional production comes from the Garmian field, operated by Gazprom Neft and WesternZagros, and smaller fields like Forza Petroleum’s Erbil block.

But the real story begins after the oil leaves the ground. Rather than being sold through competitive tenders, the crude is funneled into a closed loop of local buyers, nearly all tied—directly or indirectly—to the Barzani or Talabani families, the two dynastic power centers of Kurdish politics.

The largest allocation—around 200,000 barrels per day—goes to a front company named Business Unicorn, a shadow entity linked to North Light Holding, which is owned by KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani. In recent months, North Light has begun registering a series of inactive shell companies, believed to be designed as disposable legal vehicles that shield financial activity from scrutiny. The holding’s CEO, Sarwar Pedawi, is widely seen as a key business surrogate for the prime minister.

An additional 45,000 barrels are sold to Lanaz Refinery, owned by Mansour Barzani, Masrour’s brother and the commander of the KDP’s elite forces. Lanaz is one of only three officially licensed refineries in the Kurdistan Region. Another 25,000 barrels are directed to KAR Group, the company that also operates the Khurmala field. Though formally owned by Sheikh Baz Barzinji, it remains deeply enmeshed with the Barzani family espcially Nechirvan Barzani. Meanwhile, 15,000 barrels are sold to South Kurdistan, a Sulaimani-based company affiliated with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). That firm profits both from refining at the Qaiwan refinery and from dominating the transport of oil between Erbil and Iran.

According to veteran opposition MP Ali Hama Saleh, who has monitored the KRG’s oil trade for over a decade, networks tied to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) are estimated to earn around $200 million per month from oil, while the PUK-linked operations bring in approximately $45 million. Though Saleh did not name individual beneficiaries, an analysis by The National Context—based on oil allocations, refining control, and known company ownership—suggests that the bulk of the KDP-linked income flows through Masrour Barzani’s Business Unicorn, Mansour Barzani’s Lanaz Refinery, and the Barzani-backed KAR Group.

Business Unicorn alone receives roughly 200,000 barrels per day and is estimated to generate $140–145 million monthly, based on margins from both crude exports and refined product sales. Lanaz, with a 45,000-barrel allocation, likely earns $30–35 million, while the KAR Group’s 25,000-barrel share yields $20–25 million. Combined, these Barzani-linked entities dominate the KDP’s share of the region’s oil economy—and control nearly all of the monthly revenue cited by Saleh.

Payments for these transactions are made either in cash or through RT Bank, a financial institution owned by multiple members of the Barzani family.

While roughly 75,000 barrels per day are refined to meet local demand, the majority of the oil flows into a vast and informal export network. Lanaz, KAR, and Qaiwan refine the crude they receive. But Business Unicorn’s oil is sent through a more clandestine route—some to unlicensed “backyard” refineries in Erbil and Duhok, the rest exported by road to Turkey and Iran.

At present, about 150,000 barrels per day are exported to Turkey, reversing last year’s trend when Iran was the primary destination. Now only 75,000 barrels reach the Islamic Republic. This shift is widely seen as politically motivated, with Erbil recalibrating its oil trade in response to the revived “maximum pressure” campaign on Iran under the Trump administration.

Erbil remains the nerve center of the trade. But in Sulaimani, the PUK-linked South Kurdistan company operates more than 400 tankers that shuttle oil between the KDP and PUK zones and across the Iranian border. Each crossing is taxed with military precision: during the day, it costs $600 to move a tanker from Erbil to Sulaimani; after midnight, the rates shift—$300 for crude, $500 for refined white products, and $600 for hydrocarbons. Return journeys into Erbil territory incur a flat $300 checkpoint fee. These payments are collected on the spot by obscure firms linked to the ruling parties.

Further charges apply as the oil nears Iran. The PUK levies an additional $46 per tonne and $1,400 per truck, disguised as a “manifest fee.”

This trade sustains a large and mostly invisible workforce: thousands of tanker drivers whose livelihoods depend on the region’s black-market oil economy. A driver might earn $25 per tonne transporting oil from Erbil to Tanjaro Square, near the Iranian border, before handing the load to another driver to complete the route. A similar system operates along the Duhok–Turkey corridor. An estimated 2,000 tankers make these trips each day.

In Turkey, the oil is either consumed locally or refined at facilities like Tüpraş Batman, Antakya, and Mersin. In Iran, crude is transported to Bandar Imam port and re-exported—often to buyers in the UAE.

And this only covers the oil. Gas exports, particularly from the Pearl Petroleum-led Khor Mor field, represent another lucrative and equally opaque revenue stream.

What emerges is a system that generates immense wealth each day, yet remains almost entirely disconnected from public institutions. Instead of funding salaries, services, or infrastructure, Kurdistan’s oil bounty continues to enrich a tight circle of elites—while the broader population bears the cost of a collapsing fiscal order.