The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—which has led one of the world’s longest-running armed insurgencies—has announced that it will disarm and dissolve itself under its current name. On May 9, the group confirmed that it held an extraordinary congress from May 5 to 7 in response to a call by its imprisoned founder, Abdullah Öcalan, who urged the organization he created in the 1970s to disband.

Context: This development follows a months-long process that began publicly in October 2024, with a symbolic handshake in the Turkish parliament between Devlet Bahçeli—the ultranationalist leader of the MHP and a key ally of President Erdoğan—and MPs from the pro-Kurdish DEM Party. In February 2025, Öcalan issued a public call for the PKK to convene a congress to dissolve and lay down arms as part of a broader peace initiative with the Turkish state.

Analysis: It is telling that the PKK’s dissolution congress—held with the knowledge of the Turkish state—was convened in two separate locations in the Kurdistan Region due to “security reasons,” as the safety of participants could not be guaranteed. Notably, between May 1 and 10, Turkish authorities declared a fully closed zone near Şırnak, along the Iraqi border, where even aerial activity was suspended. This has widely been interpreted as a sign of Turkish intelligence involvement in facilitating the movement of PKK officials from inside Turkey to the congress locations.

An intriguing detail from the PKK’s statement is that it has ended its activities “under the current name”—a formulation that suggests the struggle may continue, potentially in a new, peaceful, and rebranded form.

The process has been unusually shrouded in secrecy. Very little is known about the substance of any negotiations between the Turkish state and Öcalan. However, the fact that the main public face of the initiative is Bahçeli—not Erdoğan—implies that this is more than a government-led initiative. It marks a departure from the 2009–2015 peace process, which was driven entirely by Erdoğan’s administration. Bahçeli’s role is significant: he is now the most veteran political figure in Turkish politics and is held in high regard by powerful segments of the state establishment, including the judiciary, military, and police. One explanation for the secrecy is that the process is being deliberately shielded from external interference.

The implementation of the PKK’s disarmament is expected to be the most complex and politically sensitive phase. According to some reports, the plan involves the PKK surrendering its weapons at three designated sites in the Kurdistan Region. However, it remains unclear whether additional handover points will be established in Syria—where PKK cadres remain—or within Turkey itself. Turkish authorities are said to possess detailed inventories of the PKK’s arsenal, and the process is expected to include verification of serial numbers and weapon identification. But how this will work in practice remains uncertain.

Analysts have interpreted the process in three main ways:

1. As part of a broader regional realignment;

2. As a calculated move by Erdoğan to extend his rule beyond 2027;

3. As a narrowly focused effort to address the PKK issue—not the broader Kurdish Question.

The timing is significant. The post–October 7, 2023, regional landscape—marked by Hamas’s attack on Israel, the fall of the Assad regime, and the weakening of Iran’s regional axis—has prompted Turkey to reorient its strategy. Hezbollah and Iranian-backed groups are increasingly operating independently. Meanwhile, the PKK issue has become entangled with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the evolving political dynamics in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

One interpretation is that Turkey is adjusting to a new regional reality where the traditional ethno-nationalist model of statehood is losing traction and beginning to constrain Turkish ambitions. With Kurdish populations concentrated along its southern border, Turkey may see the PKK issue as a strategic barrier to projecting regional influence. Another view holds that Ankara is concerned about growing Israeli influence over Kurdish actors, particularly as Kurdish factions in Iraq and Syria become more autonomous. A future conflict with Iran could draw Iranian Kurdish groups into the equation—potentially surrounding Turkey’s Kurdish heartland with empowered Kurdish entities.

Some speculate that a broader regional grand bargain may be underway, one that could involve Kurdish self-rule in parts of Syria. However, Turkey has thus far publicly rejected any such arrangement.

Domestically, while some argue that Erdoğan is using the process to extend his grip on power, that theory appears overly simplistic. The MHP—and particularly Bahçeli—is heavily involved, and there is little indication that Bahçeli is merely giving Erdoğan a blank check. In fact, the two have occasionally diverged on key issues, such as the ongoing legal case against Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, with Bahçeli publicly urging a swift resolution. If Erdoğan’s longevity is part of the equation, it would likely come at the cost of even greater dependency on divergent political factions—hardly a position of strength.

Lastly, it’s important to note that the process has largely focused on releasing PKK members and others deemed affiliated with the group. Even in official Turkish discourse, the initiative is framed as addressing a “terrorism problem”—not the broader Kurdish Question. As such, many view this less as a reconciliation process and more as a negotiated settlement with the PKK.

Given the veil of secrecy, it is unclear what concessions have been agreed upon—or how far the Turkish state is willing to go. What is unfolding appears to be a multi-layered process with implications that go beyond what is currently visible. For now, we will have to wait and see what comes next.