The Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), the political wing of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), is preparing to organise a conference for Arab tribes in northeast Syria to promote its decentralization agenda. This initiative mirrors a previous conference held for Kurdish groups in Qamishli, where similar demands were articulated.

Context: The upcoming conference is expected to take place in Raqqa, the largest city under SDF control and a predominantly Sunni Arab urban center. The event is reportedly being led by Mahmoud al-Maslat, the Arab co-chair of the SDC. Al-Maslat, a former U.S. resident with tribal Arab roots, is said to maintain strong ties with American officials. The conference is seen as a political extension—or a bridging effort—linking the SDF’s Kurdish-centric conference in Qamishli with its broader, multiethnic strategy for governance in northeast Syria.

Analysis: As previously reported, the SDF is pursuing a three-pronged strategy in its negotiations with Damascus. The first aspect focuses on ethnic representation, emphasizing Kurdish national demands. The second centers on administrative decentralization, which aims to include Arab communities that make up a substantial portion of the population in SDF-controlled territories. The third prong concerns military negotiations, with the SDF seeking recognition and guarantees regarding its future as an organized military force.

While calls for decentralization from Kurdish leaders may resonate within Kurdish-majority areas, their credibility and viability hinge on meaningful Arab participation. The highly diverse demographic reality throughout northeast Syria—where Arabs constitute either a majority or a significant plurality in most major urban centers—makes it essential to secure Arab participation in any meaningful decentralization initiative, particularly in cities like Raqqa, Deir Ezzor, and parts of Hasakah province.

If the Arab tribal conference ultimately takes place and echoes the call for decentralization, it would serve as a further indication of direct U.S. involvement in shaping the political future of northeast Syria ahead of a gradual, though long-term, withdrawal. The U.S. role in the earlier Kurdish conference is already well known, with an American representative attending the event where the decentralization proposal was formally announced. Mahmoud al-Maslat’s position further reinforces this reading: he was appointed co-chair of the SDC through U.S. recommendation, having previously been aligned with the Syrian opposition and known for his secular orientation. He has no deep history with Kurdish political circles and is widely seen as pursuing his own agenda—one closely tied to both American and Gulf interests. That he would take the lead in pushing a decentralization initiative—not at the behest of Kurdish leaders but in alignment with his own political agenda—suggests U.S. support behind the scenes, pointing to Washington’s ongoing effort to leave behind a politically viable structure in the northeast as it plans a phased disengagement.

However, to grasp the complexity of Arab tribal dynamics, consider the case of the influential al-Jibour tribe. Mahmoud al-Maslat, the Arab co-chair of the SDC and the main figure organizing the upcoming conference, hails from this tribe. His uncle, Abdulaziz al-Maslat, is not only regarded as the head of the al-Jibour tribe but also plays a prominent role in the High Council of Syrian Tribes. That council has openly rejected the planned conference, denouncing it as a “secessionist project.” While Abdulaziz has not personally issued a statement, his association with the council—and the council’s public stance—casts serious doubt on the depth of tribal support for the SDC’s decentralization agenda. This reflects a broader challenge: many of the key Arab tribal structures, especially in regions where their influence is strongest, remain skeptical of the SDF’s political direction.

Ultimately, without broad-based Arab backing, any attempt to establish a decentralized governance model in northeast Syria is likely to remain tenuous and politically fragile. Even if the proposal were put to a referendum, its prospects would remain dim in key Arab regions such as Raqqa, Deir Ezzor, and parts of Hasakah, where ties to the newly reconstituted Syrian state—now led by Sunni Arabs—remain strong.

While regional geopolitics, including the roles of external powers like the U.S., will undoubtedly shape Syria’s future political order, the long-term sustainability of any governance model will depend on the agency and support of local populations.