While the HTS-led Syrian authorities recently announced the formation of a new government, an equally significant—if not more consequential—development is the establishment of the Syrian Supreme Fatwa Council. This religious body merits particular attention because, unlike the new government (where key ministries such as defense, interior, foreign affairs, and intelligence remain controlled by HTS loyalists), the Fatwa Council represents a genuine coalition of diverse Islamic scholarly traditions.

The Council brings together scholars from two traditionally competing theological schools: the Salafi movement and the Ashari-Sufi tradition. Given that the emerging Syrian state appears poised to embrace a strong Islamic orientation, the primary contestation will not be whether the state should have an Islamic character, but rather which interpretation of Islam will guide its development. This ideological battleground will have profound implications for Syria’s future trajectory, particularly for minority communities including Syrian Kurds.

This report is based on dozens of Arabic-language sources and local media reports published over the past decade, tracking the public positions, statements, and affiliations of each of the Council’s members. These materials provide critical insight into how theological identities and political alignments have evolved during the conflict.

The Council is dominated by traditional Sunni scholars, with seven of the fifteen being Ashʿari and Sufi-leaning, and another four adhering to traditional Ashʿari theology. The remaining four—nearly 27%—are Salafi. Despite their theological differences, these scholars have largely converged in support of Turkey’s role in Syria. All members have adopted positions opposing the SDF and Kurdish autonomy, though with varying degrees of nuance. Particularly noteworthy is the inclusion of at least one former regime-aligned cleric and several HTS-affiliated scholars alongside mainstream opposition figures—forming a complex and pragmatic coalition of religious authority.

This composition illustrates how doctrinal divides between Ashʿari and Salafi scholars have been subordinated to political pragmatism in post-Assad Syria. While the Council members’ stances on Kurdish issues generally align with their past positions over the last decade, some may have softened now that they serve on the state’s highest religious authority. The Council’s decisions will carry significant implications for Syria’s religious landscape, legal system, and treatment of minorities, including Syrian Kurds, in the years ahead.

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Council Members’ Profiles and Stances

Sheikh Osama Al-Rifai (Grand Mufti)

Doctrinal Background: Sheikh Osama al-Rifai is a traditional Sunni scholar of the Ashʿari creed and Sufi Naqshbandi orientation. He hails from the influential Rifai family of Damascus and led the “Zayd” Islamic movement founded by his father. A jurist of the Shafiʿi school, he embodies mainstream Sunni orthodoxy, emphasizing a moderate, anti-extremist approach. Al-Rifai has openly condemned extremism and denounced Al-Qaeda and ISIS as deviant. However, he has maintained close working relationships with Muslim Brotherhood circles and Sufi networks in Turkey and in Turkish-protected areas of northern Syria.

Views on Turkey: Al-Rifai has been a key ally of Turkey during the Syrian conflict. After being forced into exile for opposing the Assad regime, he settled in Istanbul in 2012 and co-founded the Syrian Islamic Council in 2014 with Turkish government support. President Erdoğan appointed him head of this council as part of Ankara’s effort to consolidate Sunni religious support for the Syrian opposition. Al-Rifai has publicly praised Turkey’s role as a protector of Syrian people and was part of a high-profile delegation of Muslim scholars received by Erdoğan in Ankara.

Views on the SDF: Al-Rifai has taken a hardline stance against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and their main component, the PYD/YPG. He was one of the signatories of a February 2018 fatwa that unequivocally declared jihad against the SDF, labeling them a “separatist project hostile to the people” and “a group of fitna (sedition),” accusing them of atheism and enmity toward Islam. He endorsed Turkey’s 2018 “Operation Olive Branch” in Afrin, considering military action against the Kurdish YPG militia not only permissible but a religious duty.

Sheikh Alaa al-Din al-Qasir

Doctrinal Background: Alaa al-Din al-Qasir is one of Aleppo’s prominent Sunni scholars, known for his early opposition to the Assad regime’s repression. While detailed doctrinal statements are scarce, al-Qasir is associated with the orthodox Syrian scholarly approach (likely Ashʿari in creed and Shafiʿi or Hanafi in jurisprudence). There is no indication that al-Qasir is a Salafi; rather, he appears to be a mainstream cleric rooted in Syria’s traditional scholarly traditions.

Views on Turkey: As a religious figure who sided with the opposition from the start, al-Qasir has implicitly welcomed Turkey’s involvement in Syria. He has served in opposition-held territories and his participation in institutions backed by Turkey indicates a generally positive stance. The collective fatwas he co-authored indicate no objection to cooperating with the Turkish government militarily, especially against the SDF.

Views on the SDF: Al-Qasir’s stance on Kurdish forces mirrors the consensus of the Turkish-backed Syrian Islamic Council. As a member of the Fatwa Council, he presumably co-signed the February 2018 fatwa deeming combat against the SDF a legitimate jihad. That fatwa characterized the SDF as a “separatist militia with dubious alliances with the regime and the U.S., seeking to partition the country.” His position is uncompromising: the SDF are considered “corrupters on earth” whom it is a duty to fight to preserve Syria’s unity and Islamic identity.

Khairallah Talib

Doctrinal Background: Dr. Khairallah Talib is a founding member of the Syrian Islamic Council whose academic work focuses on Quranic studies and Dawah. His theological orientation has not been explicitly labeled in public sources, but given his role in the Syrian Islamic Council and lack of association with Salafi-jihadist groups, he likely subscribes to the orthodox Sunni (Ashʿari/Maturidi) creed.

Views on Turkey: Like others in the Syrian Islamic Council, Dr. Talib views Turkey as a crucial ally. Working in opposition religious bodies that largely operate out of Turkey or Turkish-protected zones, Talib cooperates closely with Turkish authorities. He has praised Turkey’s support for the Syrian people and helped author council statements explicitly sanctioning partnership with Turkey against common enemies.

Views on the SDF: Dr. Talib has been a signatory to the Syrian Islamic Council’s major statements on the SDF. In late February 2018, he and fellow council members issued a fatwa obligating jihad against the SDF, calling them a “separatist, secular militia” with “dubious ties to the regime and U.S.” that “fought the revolution and aided Assad.” He considers the SDF’s project illegitimate given its alliance with foreign powers and hostility to Arab Syrian rebels, and supports military action to defeat them while distinguishing between the fight against militant leadership and the treatment of innocent Kurdish civilians.

Anas Ayrout

Doctrinal Background: Dr. Anas Ayrout is a Sunni scholar and preacher from Baniyas (coastal Syria) known for being “the first sheikh to join the Syrian revolution in 2011.” Ideologically, Ayrout leans toward the Salafi da’wa current. His Salafi inclination is more on the reformist, political side rather than hardcore jihadism, though his fiery speeches sometimes took on sectarian tones, reflecting Salafi-jihadi rhetoric during the war’s peak.

Views on Turkey: As an early opposition leader and later a member of the Syrian Interim Parliament, Anas Ayrout has been strongly supportive of Turkey’s role in Syria. He frequently praises Turkey for assisting the Syrian opposition and hosting refugees, and has defended Turkey’s interventions in Syria as necessary to save civilians from both Assad and ISIS. During Operation Olive Branch, Ayrout stood in solidarity with Turkey and FSA factions, viewing the campaign as a continuation of the revolution.

Views on the SDF: Ayrout’s stance on the Kurds is shaped primarily by his opposition to the PYD/YPG and SDF, rather than antipathy toward Kurds as an ethnicity. In line with the Syrian Islamic Council’s fatwa, which he publicly supported, Ayrout considers “fighting SDF an obligation in defense of the revolution.” In interviews, he has accused the SDF of ethnic cleansing of Arabs and Turkmens and of atheism. At the same time, he distinguishes the PYD leadership from ordinary Kurdish citizens and has called on Syria’s Kurds to reject the SDF leadership.

Anas al-Mousa

Doctrinal Background: Anas al-Mousa is a scholar from Hama who exemplifies classical Syrian Islamic scholarship. He earned an Ijazah in Hadith from Al-Azhar University and studied under renowned Damascene ulema. Al-Mousa is firmly Ashʿari in creed and Shafiʿi in fiqh, with a deep Sufi influence from his teachers.

Views on Turkey: Having pursued graduate studies in Turkey and lived part of the conflict years there, Anas al-Mousa has a favorable view of Turkey. He took part in the formation of the Syrian Islamic Council in exile, which was encouraged by Turkey. In sermons and lessons, al-Mousa frequently prays for Turkey and its leaders who “stand with the Syrian people.” He likely sees the Turkish state as a successor to the historic protectors of Ahl al-Sunna in the region.

Views on the SDF: Sheikh al-Mousa subscribes to the collective scholarly view that distinguishes between Kurdish aspirations and the PYD/YPG-led SDF. As part of the Syrian Islamic Council, he co-authored the fatwa condemning the SDF, labeling them as an insidious coalition working to fragment Syria. Being from Hama (a city with painful memories of regime suppression), al-Mousa is highly sensitive to any group seen as dividing Syria. However, his rhetoric is careful; the fatwa he signed urges fair treatment of non-combatant Kurdish women, children, and elderly if encountered.

Ibrahim Shashou

Doctrinal Background: Dr. Ibrahim Shashou is an Aleppine Islamic scholar identified with the Salafi trend, particularly the Salafi-jihadist or Salafi-reformist current. During the conflict, he emerged as a leading Sharia figure in rebel-held Aleppo and later Idlib. Notably, Dr. Shashou served as the Minister of Justice in the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG), the administration established by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Idlib. His doctrinal outlook is Salafi, with an emphasis on implementing Sharia in governance.

Views on Turkey: Ibrahim Shashou’s relationship with Turkey is pragmatic. As a senior figure in HTS’s administration, he operated in Idlib under a de-facto understanding with Turkey. Shashou and his colleagues ruled it permissible to cooperate with Turkish forces against common enemies (the Assad regime and Kurdish separatists), invoking the fiqh principle of maslaha (public interest). By joining the new Supreme Fatwa Council alongside pro-Turkey scholars, Shashou has signaled an acceptance of Turkey’s leadership in shaping post-war Syria.

Views on the SDF: Dr. Shashou has been outspoken against the SDF and the PYD. In his view – which parallels HTS’s official line – the SDF is simply another adversary of the Sunni revolution. He has accused the SDF of oppressing Arab Syrians and collaborating with “Crusader” (American) forces. As Justice Minister in Idlib, Shashou oversaw Sharia courts that tried and sentenced SDF/PKK fighters for crimes against Syrian rebels. He views the SDF as an extension of the Assad regime and Western intervention – to be fought militarily and legally.

Abdul Rahim Atoun (Abu Abdallah al-Shami)

Doctrinal Background: Sheikh Abdul Rahim Atoun, also known as Abu Abdallah al-Shami, is the leading Sharia authority of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and previously of Jabhat al-Nusra. He is firmly in the Salafi-Jihadi ideological camp, having studied under Sheikh al-Albani in Jordan. Colleagues describe Atoun as “one of the most ideologically hardline figures in HTS with strict Salafi doctrinal views.” He has written treatises denouncing democracy, Shi’ism, and secularism from a Salafi-jihadi perspective.

Views on Turkey: As a jihadi ideologue, Abdul Rahim Atoun has had to reconcile his pan-Islamist ideals with the pragmatic reality of Turkey’s influence. His stance evolved to pragmatism after 2017 as HTS sought to survive and govern in Idlib. Atoun has articulated that Turkish forces in Idlib are “Muʿaahadin” (under an agreement) and must not be harmed, providing HTS religious cover for the de-facto ceasefire with Turkey. By joining the Supreme Fatwa Council, Atoun demonstrated a significant shift toward embracing Turkey’s role for Syria’s benefit.

Views on the SDF: Sheikh Atoun has been vehemently anti-PKK/PYD throughout his career. From a Salafi-jihadi perspective, the Kurdish YPG are seen as “Marxist atheists” allied with the enemies of Islam. He has described the SDF-held project of Rojava as “Taghut” (illegitimate tyranny) imposed by Western powers. The fatwa’s instruction that “there is no harm in cutting off (striking) the necks” of SDF combatants fits Atoun’s jihadist ethos perfectly. For Kurdish civilians, he likely applies the doctrine of al-wala wal-bara (loyalty and disavowal) – extending loyalty to faithful Kurds and enmity to those who align with atheist militias.

Muhammad Ratib al-Nabulsi

Doctrinal Background: Muhammad Ratib al-Nabulsi is one of Syria’s most famous contemporary Islamic preachers and scholars. His doctrinal orientation is solidly Ashʿari and Sufi-inclined, and often disliked by Salafis. Al-Nabulsi’s background includes a degree in Arabic literature from Damascus University and decades of delivering lectures on Quranic exegesis. He is a representative of the traditional Damascene Islamist intelligentsia – learned, apolitical in style, Ashʿari in creed, and influenced by Sufi morality.

Views on Turkey: Muhammad Ratib al-Nabulsi enjoys a very cordial relationship with Turkey. He spent several years of exile in Turkey and was involved in educating Syrian refugees there. In 2017, President Erdoğan received al-Nabulsi along with other Muslim scholars at the Presidential Complex in Ankara. Al-Nabulsi has lauded Turkey’s hospitality, stating that “Turkey kept the flame of knowledge alive” by hosting Syrian Islamic institutions in exile. By 2025, al-Nabulsi’s return to opposition-held Damascus symbolized how intertwined his journey is with Turkey’s support.

Views on the SDF: al-Nabulsi endorsed and is a member of the Turkish-backed Syrian Islamic Council’s fatwa deeming combat against the SDF a wajib (obligation). In a lecture in 2018, al-Nabulsi alluded to the situation, warning Syrian Kurds against secession. After Afrin was taken by Turkish-backed forces, al-Nabulsi welcomed it as “a step toward restoring justice to an oppressed region.” However, he also appealed for the protection of Kurdish civilians and their properties, backing the Council’s stance that looting homes in Afrin is religiously forbidden.

Abdul Fattah al-Bizm

Doctrinal Background: Abdul Fattah al-Bizm is a seasoned Damascene scholar with a strong Ashʿari-Sufi orientation who formerly served as the Mufti of Damascus under the Assad government. His training and career place him firmly in the traditional Sunni establishment of Syria – influenced by the late Grand Mufti Sheikh Ahmed Kaftaro’s Naqshbandi Sufi school. Before defecting to the opposition’s side in 2025, al-Bizm was known for his cautious, regime-loyal rhetoric.

Views on Turkey: During his tenure as Mufti of Damascus under the now-fallen Assad regime, Abdul Fattah al-Bizm echoed the official line on Turkey, publicly criticizing Turkey and labeling its military presence in Syria as “Turkish aggression” or “Ottoman occupation.” Following Assad’s defeat and upon joining the new Supreme Fatwa Council in 2025, his tone shifted dramatically. In Council meetings, al-Bizm acknowledged that Turkey had provided refuge for millions of Syrians and even quipped that “our Turkish brothers helped preserve our religion when the former regime wanted to erase it.”

Views on the SDF: In his earlier role as a mufti under the former Assad regime, al-Bizm toed the official line regarding the Kurds and the SDF. After the regime’s collapse and his subsequent alignment with the victorious opposition in 2025, al-Bizm has likely tacitly agreed to the Supreme Council’s established stance on the SDF.

Mazhar al-Weis

Doctrinal Background: Mazhar al-Weis is a younger-generation Islamist who rose to prominence during the revolution. He is identified as coming “from the Salafi current” and is now among the most influential men in Syria, considered one of the closest allies of the current Syrian leader, Ahmad al-Shara’a. Al-Weis is a medical doctor by initial training, but the war pushed him into religious leadership. He has been associated with groups like Ahrar al-Sham and later gravitated towards HTS-dominated Idlib. He is from Deir ez-Zor Governorate in eastern Syria and has also been appointed as the justice minister in the new Syrian government.

Views on Turkey: Al-Weis has generally viewed Turkey as an indispensable ally, albeit with some cautious critique common among Syrian Salafis. When Turkey launched Operation Euphrates Shield (2016), al-Weis publicly endorsed it, calling it “a blessed operation to cleanse Syria of extremism and separatism.” However, he was also critical of the Turkish attempt at rapprochement with Assad in 2023.

Views on the SDF: Al-Weis has been one of the harshest critics of the SDF among Syrian Sunni scholars. He has accused the SDF/YPG of persecuting Arab tribes in the east and working as proxies for the U.S. and Russia. In 2017, when the SDF took Raqqa, al-Weis lambasted them as “PKK invaders” and issued a fiery statement urging all Syrian factions to “unite to expel the atheist separatists.” He has shown little sympathy for the SDF’s predominantly Kurdish fighters, considering them traitors to the Syrian nation and apostates from Islam if they espouse Marxism or secularism.

Sheikh Sahl Junaid

Doctrinal Background: Sheikh Sahl Junaid is a Syrian scholar and preacher, originally from Homs, who has been active in the revolutionary context. He is a member of the Association of Syrian Scholars (Rābita ʿUlamā’ Sūriyā) and is noted for his early support of the uprising. Junaid’s doctrinal leaning is towards the traditional Ashʿari theology with Sufi influences. Described as “influenced by Ashʿari and Sufi creed”, he fits into the category of moderate Syrian Sunni clerics who prior to the war might have been local imams or teachers unaffiliated with Salafi extremism. Since 2011, Sheikh Sahl’s profile rose as he signed numerous declarations calling for reform and an end to regime violence. These were often in conjunction with prominent Islamic figures, indicating he was part of the mainstream Islamist opposition.

Views on Turkey: Sheikh Sahl Junaid, like most opposition clerics, views Turkey very favorably. He has lived in Istanbul for over a decade and has been active in the Turkish-controlled areas of northern Syria. On social media and at public events, Junaid has thanked Turkey for supporting the Syrian revolution. Notably, he was part of an ulema delegation in 2017 that met Turkish authorities to discuss refugee needs, where he praised Turkey’s “noble stance” toward Syrians. In his sermons, he occasionally cites the Prophet’s saying “Whoever does not thank people does not thank God,” then proceeds to thank Turkey for its help – a subtle encouragement for Syrians to remain grateful to their neighbor.

Views on the SDF: Sheikh Sahl Junaid was an early signatory of statements in 2011–2012 that called for national unity and rejected sectarian or ethnic division. He has always emphasized that the Syrian revolution is for all Syrians, including Kurds, and that the goal is to remove tyranny, not target any ethnicity. However, when it comes to the PYD/YPG and the SDF, Junaid’s stance aligns with the broader opposition: he opposes federalism or local autonomy. He participated in drafting the opposition-led Fatwa Council’s declarations against the SDF. For instance, the Council’s fatwa of Feb 2018 (labeling fighting SDF as “jihad fi sabilillah”) was co-signed by him. However, he was vocal in urging restraint in Afrin post-takeover by Turkish-backed forces He co-authored a Syrian Islamic Council ruling that forbade theft (ta’fīsh) of civilians’ possessions in Afrin and urged factions to remember “Islamic ethics even in enemy territory”.

Muhammad Na’im Arqsousi

Doctrinal Background: Sheikh Na’im Arqsousi is a veteran Damascene cleric known for his melodious Quran recitation and traditional scholarship. He is firmly in the Ashʿari-Sufi camp of Sunni Islam. Arqsousi was an imam at the venerable Umayyad Mosque in Damascus and a disciple of Damascus’s classical religious circles. Described as “Ashʿari Sufi, inclined to traditional Sufi practices and creed”, he emphasizes spirituality, moderate theology, and loyalty to the well-established jurisprudential schools. Even before 2011, Arqsousi was respected as an apolitical but principled scholar. When the uprising began, he subtly sided with calls for reform – which put him at odds with the regime.

Views on Turkey: Sheikh Arqsousi’s public statements on Turkey are limited, but his actions demonstrate a positive view. After leaving regime-controlled Damascus, he found refuge likely in Turkey, as did many opposition scholars. He has participated in events and conferences in Turkey aimed at supporting Syrian refugees and preserving Islamic education. Arqsousi’s Sufi orientation aligns well with Turkey’s own promotion of moderate Sunni scholars – indeed, Turkey has championed Arqsousi by facilitating his work in exile. Within the Fatwa Council, Arqsousi agreed that Turkey’s assistance is crucial for Syria. Notably, he did not object when the Council explicitly sanctioned cooperation with Turkey in the anti-SDF jihad.

Views on the SDF: Arqsousi’s perspective on the Kurds is filtered through his commitment to Syria’s unity and Islamic harmony. He does not have a history of anti-Kurdish rhetoric per se; Kurdish and Arab worshippers alike used to attend his Quran lessons in Damascus. However, he stands firmly against the PYD/YPG and SDF because of what is considered among this line of scholars of “secular, separatist agenda”. In the opposition-led Supreme Fatwa Council, Arqsousi joined the consensus declaring the SDF an illegitimate aggressor. The Council’s February 2018 statement – which he retroactively endorsed – castigated the SDF as “a group of corrupters on earth that must be combated to protect lives, property, and the country”.

Muhammad Khairullah al-Shukri

Doctrinal Background: Sheikh Muhammad Khairullah al-Shukri is a Damascene-born scholar (b. 1961) from a distinguished religious family in Damascus. Al-Shukri’s educational path combined traditional Islamic studies with formal secular education: he graduated from the Islamic Daʿwah College in Damascus and also earned a law degree from the University of Damascus. He later obtained a Master’s and doctorate in Islamic studies (fiqh and usul) from institutes in Pakistan and Lebanon. Doctrinally, al-Shukri aligns with the mainstream Sunni (Ashʿari-Shafiʿi) outlook common to Damascus’s ulema. Prior to the war, he held positions in Syria’s official religious institutions, but he quietly sided with calls for reform in 2011.

Views on Turkey: Sheikh al-Shukri’s collaboration with Turkey became evident after he left regime-controlled areas. He likely spent time in Turkey working with the Syrian Islamic Council. His stance on Turkey is positive, seeing it as a guardian of Sunni interests during the war. Al-Shukri was among the delegation of Syrian scholars who returned to Damascus under opposition auspices in early 2025 – a return made possible by Turkish-brokered security arrangements. In a recent statement, al-Shukri noted that “Turkey and the people of Anatolia opened their arms to us in our time of need”, framing Turkish support as something Syrians should remember with gratitude. Within the Supreme Fatwa Council, al-Shukri supported the decision to work hand-in-hand with Turkey in religious matters and military ones.

Views on the SDF: al-Shukri shares the consensus of the then opposition-led Supreme Fatwa Council in deeming the SDF/PYD project illegitimate and dangerous. He was a signatory of the Council’s fatwa that “fighting the SDF is a religious duty”. In that February 27, 2018 ruling, al-Shukri and colleagues outlined the case against the SDF: it is separatist, allied with the regime and America, guilty of fighting rebel forces, and aiming to carve out a state at the expense of Syria’s unity.

Muhammad Wahbi Suleiman

Doctrinal Background: Muhammad Wahbi Suleiman is a Syrian scholar from Damascus (b. 1964) known for his extensive knowledge in Islamic jurisprudence and principles. He is very much an Ashʿari traditional scholar. Before the revolution, Suleiman was the Dean of the College of Usul al-Din at the Sheikh Ahmad Kaftaro Islamic Complex in Damascus and headed the research department at Dar al-Iftaa. The Kaftaro Complex is associated with the state-sanctioned Naqshbandi Sufi order, meaning he was part of that circle – staunchly Ashʿari in creed, and Hanafi in jurisprudence. When the war broke out in 2011, Wahbi initially remained in his post under the regime, but he quietly disapproved of the bloodshed. By the time Assad’s government sidelined many old scholars, he slipped away to the opposition-held north.

Views on Turkey: During his time in Damascus’s official religious establishment, he had to maintain a polite distance from Turkey (given regime politics). However, even then, he engaged frequently with Turkish Islamic scholars through conferences and had a favorable view of Turkey’s religious education system. In 2022, he gave a lecture in Gaziantep (Turkey) where he recounted how the Kaftaro institute’s work was curtailed by the regime’s security apparatus, and he praised Turkey for allowing Syrians to teach freely again.

Views on the SDF: he co-authored the August 2018 fatwa that elaborated the handling of property in Afrin after its takeover by Turkish-backed force, decreeing that the property of “the separatist militia (YPG)” could be confiscated as it belonged to aggressors, but forbade harming the property of “peaceful Kurdish residents”. Earlier, in February 2018, he had agreed that fighting the SDF is a legitimate jihad due to their actions against the revolution. As a Hanafi jurist, he likely drew on classical rulings about rebels (bughat) to categorize the SDF, arguing that since the SDF took up arms against the legitimate Syrian revolution and sought secession, they fell under the category of bughat whom the imam may fight until they return to obedience.