As Israel’s war against Iran continues and discussions about Iran’s post-regime future become increasingly viable, Iranian Kurds have emerged as a focal point in deliberations over any prospective new order. Iranian Kurds represent the most diverse Kurdish population in the Middle East, both linguistically and sectarianly, making any unified perspective on their role particularly challenging to establish.

Unlike the Kurdish regions of Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, which were once part of the Ottoman Empire, Iranian Kurdistan has remained under consistent Iranian rule for at least four centuries. The Safavid Empire dismantled Kurdish principalities much earlier than the Ottomans did, enforcing centralization and Shia religious dominance. Moreover, most Iranian Kurds are Sunni Muslims in a predominantly Shia Iran, making them a double minority—a situation distinct from Sunni Kurds in Sunni-majority Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. Another important distinction is that in Iran, Kurds are the third-largest ethnic group after Persians and Azeris. This differs from the other three countries, where Kurds are the largest ethnic minority. This demographic positioning has influenced both their visibility and the nature of their relationship with the central state.

Iranian Kurds constitute approximately 10-15% of Iran’s population, yet their religious, linguistic, and social diversity has hindered unified action. Religiously, an estimated 60% are Sunni, while roughly 35% are Shia and nearly 5% belong to the Yarsani minority. Linguistically, speakers are similarly divided among the Kurmanji, Sorani, Gorani, and Feyli dialects of Kurdish.

Iran’s Kurdish provinces also exhibit varying degrees of integration into the Iranian state structure. According to the 2022 Human Development Index (HDI), among Iran’s 31 provinces, the majority-Shia Kurdish province of Ilam ranks in the top six, while Kermanshah, another Shia Kurdish province, places twelfth. In contrast, Kurdistan Province and West Azerbaijan Province, both with significant Sunni Kurdish populations, fall within the bottom five.

This disparity should not obscure the challenges facing Shia Kurds: Ilam and Kermanshah experience some of the highest youth unemployment rates in the country, and Iran’s current economic crisis has particularly impacted these regions. However, this development pattern differs markedly from other regional countries with Kurdish populations—especially Turkey, which shares a similar imperial history. In Turkey, Kurdish provinces are more uniformly disadvantaged.

Unlike Turkey’s stark west-east demographic divide, Iran’s demographic structure is centralized, with the Persian core located in central Iran, flanked by Azeris, Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, Lurs, and Baluch communities closer to the borders. Tehran, Iran’s most developed city, is geographically closer and better connected to Kurdish and Azeri cities in the northwest than cities in the east and south.

Another critical distinction is that Iran’s borders have remained relatively stable longer than Turkey’s, aligning more closely with historical imperial boundaries. Turkey experienced significant territorial trauma post-World War I, encapsulated by the term “Sèvres Syndrome,” describing deep-seated trauma caused by the divisive promises to Armenians and Kurds in the Treaty of Sèvres. Turkish handling of the Kurdish question has been influenced by this trauma, whereas Iran experienced only brief, less impactful separatist movements, such as the short-lived USSR-backed Azeri and Kurdish statelets in the 1940s.

Iranian Kurdish society has undergone significant transformations even prior to recent Israeli escalations, partly due to broader sociopolitical shifts across Iran. Despite internal diversities, Kurdish nationalist sentiments have recently seen a revival, including among Shia Kurds, historically targeted for assimilation by the Iranian state. This resurgence is driven by three primary factors: widespread nationalist sentiment among other ethnic groups (Persians, Azeris, Arabs), deepening economic distress driven by sanctions, corruption, and inflation, and inspiring Kurdish movements in Iraq and Syria, particularly in their fight against ISIS.

The most prominent Iranian Kurdish political organizations include:

• KDPI (Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran), founded by Qazi Muhammad, who led the short-lived Republic of Mahabad in 1946;
• Komala, a socialist party that has since split into two factions;
• PJAK, closely affiliated with the PKK;
• Organization of Iranian Kurdistan Struggle, a conservative and nationalist group;
• and PAK (Kurdistan Freedom Party), a Kurdish nationalist movement.

While Iranian Kurds have a more organized political framework than other minorities in the country, deep divisions persist. Historically, the KDPI and Komala dominated Kurdish political life. Today, PJAK, the KDPI, and—though to a lesser extent—Komala remain the most influential parties. However, the actual reach, popularity, and presence of these groups among the broader Kurdish population remain difficult to assess. Meanwhile, the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) is increasingly seen as a proxy of the Barzani-led KDP. In parallel, Islamist and Salafi currents are gaining traction in certain Sunni Kurdish towns, reflecting a broader ideological fragmentation.

Iranian Kurdish Political Spectrum

Interactive Analysis of 16 Political Organizations

📊 Click or use Tab and Enter on the dots to explore each organization.

Communist
Class Struggle

Socialist
Social Democracy

Democratic
Federalism

Nationalist
Autonomy

Separatist
Independence

Religious
Reform

Source: This is based on The National’s Context’s comprehensive research of sources including party websites, official statements, academic studies, and media reports.

Furthermore, due to pressure from Iraqi Kurds, Iranian Kurdish armed groups have largely suspended guerrilla activities against Iran, except for PJAK, which maintains active military operations despite complicated relations with both the PKK and Iran. Under a recent security agreement between Iran and Iraq, Iranian Kurdish opposition groups were relocated to UN-supervised camps in the Kurdistan Region. This agreement stipulates these groups be disarmed and transferred to civilian facilities under international oversight. Iran has previously launched missile attacks against these camps, raising fears they could again become targets if Tehran seeks to project strength in its response to Israel.

The regime’s push to disarm these groups intensified following the 2022 protests that erupted in Kurdish regions and expanded nationwide after the death of Jina Amini. Tehran accused the Kurdish opposition of fomenting unrest, reinforcing its perception of them as a destabilizing force. Nevertheless, Tehran’s approach toward its Kurdish population has not been uniformly repressive. Recently, Iran permitted unusually large-scale Newroz celebrations in Kurdish cities, an uncommon display of cultural tolerance. This might reflect a calculated effort to defuse ethnic tensions and diminish the risk of Kurdish insurgencies reigniting amid rising instability.

Should the Israeli campaign degrade the regime’s capacity further or create chaos, Iranian Kurdish groups could reemerge as active players on Iran’s periphery. This is precisely the scenario Tehran has tried to preempt by insisting on their disarmament and relocation under UN oversight.