While the immediate catalyst for the Iraqi government’s escalating pressure against the KRG—which has now reached the point of suspending public employee salary payments—stems from Barzani’s recent threats and the signing of oil contracts with two American companies (actions Baghdad perceives as provocative and unacceptable), the underlying causes cannot be reduced to a single factor. Rather, the dynamics at play are numerous, complex, and interconnected, particularly given Iraq’s approaching elections and the intense political rivalry between Nouri al-Maliki and Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, the current Iraqi Prime Minister.

Al-Sudani seeks to secure substantial parliamentary representation to maintain his position, while Al-Maliki is working systematically to undermine Sudani’s standing, openly accusing him of favoritism towards the Kurdistan Region and buying electoral seats for personal gain. Among the primary criticisms leveled against Sudani is his perceived leniency toward the regional government.

Whether KRG’s May salaries will be disbursed before the upcoming Eid holiday remains uncertain, but this timing is not the crux of the issue. The fundamental problem lies in the fact that until new parliamentary elections conclude, regional employee salaries have become a political bargaining chip manipulated by competing Iraqi factions.

Sudani’s decision to halt salary payments has triggered threats from Barzani and other Kurdish factions. If Sudani reverses his decision, he will face growing populist rhetoric against him from political rivals who could portray any concession as weakness or favoritism toward the Kurds. Conversely, maintaining his stance invites significant pressure from the KRG, potentially prompting him to defer the matter to the judiciary, thus distancing himself from direct responsibility.

The KDP’s threats offer limited leverage beyond boycotting elections or withdrawing from Iraq’s government. Their reliance on American support remains tenuous since the U.S. primarily views the region as a strategic counterbalance to Baghdad and is unlikely to support unilateral Kurdish actions. It is anticipated that U.S. officials will diplomatically intervene, urging Iraq to keep employee salaries out of political disputes, which does not equate to endorsing unilateral Kurdish moves.

Compounding these challenges, the Trump administration appears indecisive and inconsistent, with frequent policy reversals that have occasionally resulted in a hardened stance toward Iraq under pressure from pro-Israeli lobbying groups. These influential lobbies actively work against Iraqi groups perceived as aligned with Iranian interests.

Further complicating the scenario are Barzani’s threats, despite it remaining unclear whether he holds any substantial leverage or viable options beyond mere rhetoric against Baghdad.

Another potential reason for the escalation is that the recent energy contracts have notably irritated Iran, which remains firmly opposed to allowing the Kurdistan Region’s natural gas to become an alternative to its own exports.

The Kurdistan Region’s recent energy contracts and high-level meetings with American officials are unlikely to provide immediate relief from the current crisis. These agreements, focused primarily on natural gas development with secondary oil components, face a fundamental timing mismatch: even under optimal conditions, their implementation timeline extends far beyond the urgency of the salary crisis. Even if implemented, these deals are in their early stages and face significant legal, technical, and geopolitical hurdles.

More critically, the nature of the Kurdistan Region’s engagement with the Trump administration reveals structural limitations in this strategy. The regional government’s approach has relied substantially on professional lobbying firms to facilitate access and advocacy, rather than emerging from established strategic partnerships or mutual defense commitments. While lobbying represents a legitimate diplomatic tool, it fundamentally differs from the institutionalized relationships that generate sustained American support.

This distinction proves crucial: lobbying-mediated engagement tends to be transactional and contingent on immediate political calculations, whereas strategic partnerships endure through policy shifts and electoral cycles. Consequently, the Kurdistan Region’s current American outreach, however well-executed, lacks the structural foundation necessary to counterbalance Baghdad’s fiscal pressure or guarantee long-term protection of Kurdish autonomy.