As the Iran war continues and geopolitical alignments across the Middle East undergo a profound transformation, an important but largely overlooked realignment is emerging among Kurdish political actors. These developments are interconnected, directly or indirectly, and understanding them requires examining the regional transformation that began after 7 October 2023.

The 7 October attacks triggered a systemic geopolitical earthquake that culminated in the current Iran war. One consequence was the renewed peace process between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Domestic Turkish considerations drove this process in part, but it also coincided with a shift in the threat perceptions of both Turkey and Israel, which increasingly came to view each other as strategic rivals and potential threats.

This shift produced a convergence between Turkey and the PKK, given the historically anti-Israel positions of the PKK’s founder, Abdullah Ocalan, and the party’s broader regional outlook. Their interests remain far from identical, yet some of their geopolitical calculations increasingly overlap.

Iran is central to this convergence. Turkey continues to regard Iran as a strategic rival, yet it has little interest in seeing the Iranian state collapse, fragment or fall under the control of actors closely aligned with Israel. From Ankara’s perspective, a weakened regime whose regional influence can be contained and managed may be preferable to a post-Islamic Republic order dominated by pro-Israel forces or accompanied by territorial fragmentation. Turkey’s preferred outcome, in other words, is an Iran weakened enough to lose regional influence without becoming a new strategic threat.

The PKK approaches Iran from a different historical position. It has maintained relations with Tehran and has at times benefited from a degree of accommodation with the Iranian state. Yet it has no fundamental interest in preserving the Islamic Republic, and equally little reason to support its replacement by a strongly centralist, pro-Israel order associated with figures such as Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran’s last Shah, given what that would mean for Kurdish political aspirations. Its calculations therefore converge with Turkey’s, even though their motivations differ.

A further dimension is Israel’s apparent interest in Iranian Kurdish opposition groups as instruments of pressure on Tehran. The contradiction is that weakening the Islamic Republic through Kurdish armed groups does not necessarily translate into support for Kurdish aspirations once it is gone. If the ultimate objective is a government led by figures such as Pahlavi, whose centralist positions are deeply unpopular among many Kurdish political actors, Kurdish groups could end up contributing to an outcome at odds with their own interests. This has generated opposition among Kurdish actors wary of being instrumentalised in a confrontation with Iran without meaningful political guarantees for Kurds.

These dynamics help explain the changing positions of the major Kurdish parties in Iraq. One of the most significant developments has been the PUK’s rapidly improving relationship with Turkey. Until recently, relations were deeply strained. Ankara imposed a flight ban on Sulaimani International Airport in 2023 and repeatedly accused the PUK of facilitating PKK activity. Relations have since improved markedly, and Turkey lifted the ban in October 2025 at the request of Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani, suggesting a strategic reassessment on both sides.

Part of this rapprochement follows from the Turkey-PKK peace process. As Ankara’s relationship with the PKK evolves, some of the reasons for its hostility towards the PUK may be fading. The realignment may also extend beyond the Kurdish question in Turkey. The PUK and Ankara appear to share growing concerns about the future of Iran, particularly the risk of the Iranian state fragmenting or of a political order closely aligned with Israel emerging there. The interests of the PUK, Turkey and the PKK are far from identical, yet their calculations appear to be converging on several important regional questions.

Perhaps the most significant part of this realignment is the apparent divergence within the KDP, particularly between Nechirvan Barzani and Masrour Barzani, the KRG Prime Minister. Nechirvan appears closer to Turkey’s approach, favouring non-intervention in Iran, caution towards Iranian Kurdish opposition groups and the avoidance of any action that could draw the Kurdistan Region directly into the war. Masrour, by contrast, appears to favour a more hawkish position on Iran and to be more closely aligned, at least in strategic outlook, with the UAE-Israel camp.

The figures associated with Masrour make this distinction clearer. Azhi Amin reportedly handled the Iran file within PUK intelligence during the 1990s, before his expulsion and subsequent confrontation with the party. He now lives in Erbil and is closely associated with Masrour’s camp. Iranian authorities have accused him of assisting Mossad-linked activities, and his relevance lies in the network of contacts inside Iran he reportedly built through intelligence work dating back to the 1990s.

Some relatives and associates of Lahur Sheikh Jangi, the ousted PUK co-president, previously worked within the PUK’s intelligence establishment but have since turned against the party. Some are based in the UAE and are reportedly aligned with networks hostile to Tehran and close to Masrour.

Taken together, these relationships raise the possibility that Masrour is cultivating, or has become the focal point of, a distinct regional network, one that departs from the more cautious approach of Nechirvan and other Kurdish actors.

A smaller but revealing example was Masrour’s meeting on 13 November with Mithal al-Alusi, a former Iraqi MP known for his advocacy of normalisation with Israel and his long-standing opposition to Iranian influence in Iraq. Al-Alusi lives in Erbil amid legal disputes with Baghdad linked to his political positions. A single meeting proves little on its own. Alongside Masrour’s other relationships, however, it indicates the kind of actors gravitating towards his orbit.

The most consequential episode concerns reports of a possible operation involving Iranian Kurdish opposition groups during the war. Nechirvan has publicly criticised the conduct of these groups, warning that their actions came dangerously close to causing serious problems for the Kurdistan Region. His remarks carry particular weight given accounts that some of these groups were preparing to take part in operations against Iran. Reports in March said they could cross into Iran through areas near the Haj Omran border crossing, in the KDP-controlled zone, where Masrour’s political and security network exercises substantial influence over key military and intelligence structures.

According to accounts that still require independent corroboration, a planned operation was cancelled at the last moment after extensive intervention by Nechirvan and Qubad Talabani, the KRG Deputy Prime Minister and a senior PUK figure, including contacts with Turkey. If substantiated, this would suggest that Nechirvan and Qubad were coordinating with Ankara to prevent an escalation that could have drawn the Kurdistan Region more directly into the conflict with Iran. It would also fit the earlier pattern of the airport ban, when Nechirvan’s channel to Ankara worked in the PUK’s favour, and it would help explain the increasingly visible divergence between Nechirvan and Masrour over Iran.

Iranian diplomatic engagement with the Kurdistan Region offers another indicator. Senior Iranian officials visiting Erbil appear increasingly to prioritise meetings with Nechirvan over Masrour, as with the visit by Iranian official Musakkarian. Such patterns are not conclusive, since Iranian officials may have institutional or protocol reasons for prioritising the presidency. Kurdish authorities also said drones launched from Iran targeted Masrour’s private office on 17 August. Considered alongside the wider developments, these signals raise the question of whether Tehran increasingly sees Nechirvan as its principal interlocutor within the KDP and regards Masrour as less reliable or potentially hostile. That reading would be consistent with diverging strategic orientations within the party.

The cumulative picture suggests that Kurdish politics may be undergoing a realignment that the traditional KDP-PUK rivalry cannot explain on its own. There are indications of two overlapping regional orientations. The first broadly aligns with Turkey’s preference for a weakened but territorially intact Iran, the avoidance of direct Kurdish involvement in the war, and opposition to a postwar order dominated by Israel-aligned actors. Nechirvan, the PUK and, in important respects, the PKK appear to share elements of this outlook, despite their different political histories and interests. The second, more closely associated with Masrour and some of his political and intelligence partners, appears more hawkish towards Iran and potentially more compatible with the UAE-Israel approach to the regional confrontation.

These are emerging strategic tendencies with fluid boundaries, and they should not yet be read as formal alliances or rigid blocs. Their significance lies in the fact that the division appears to run through the KDP itself. Nechirvan and the PUK may now be closer on major regional questions than Nechirvan and Masrour, despite belonging to historically competing parties.

The Turkey-PKK peace process, the future of the Iranian state, Israel’s regional strategy, the UAE’s expanding influence and the internal power struggle within the Kurdistan Region are therefore interconnected parts of the same geopolitical transformation. The central question is whether these converging interests will remain temporary responses to the Iran war or harden into durable alignments that reshape Kurdish politics across Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria.