As Iraq’s political arena gears up for the November parliamentary elections, the intensifying rivalry between current Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani and former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is directly impacting Kurdish parties, pushing them toward polarization and dividing them into two competing camps.

Context: At its core, this rivalry is a struggle for control over Iraq’s political future. It has forced political forces in the Kurdistan Region to reassess their positions within the evolving balance of power, resulting in an unprecedented split in their approaches to Baghdad.

Analysis: Although both al-Sudani and al-Maliki belong to the Shiite Coordination Framework that brought the current government to power, diverging ambitions have brought them into open competition. Al-Maliki, who sees himself as a key architect of al-Sudani’s premiership, now perceives the Prime Minister as building an independent base of power. This concern has grown with al-Sudani’s recent electoral preparations: he has pulled together a broad but politically varied alliance built around his own al-Furatayn movement, joined by figures such as Falih Fayyad and former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi. While his allies publicly predict a commanding result, many observers expect more modest numbers, noting that the coalition relies heavily on smaller, less influential forces. Still, al-Sudani hopes to capitalise on his incumbency and the visibility of infrastructure and service projects completed under his tenure.

For Maliki, the stakes are equally high. His State of Law coalition remains anchored in disciplined electoral machinery and a loyal base, supplemented by allied Shiite factions with deep patronage networks. Al-Sudani’s independent profile—and outreach to former adversaries such as the Sadrists—poses a direct threat to Maliki’s position as the dominant powerbroker within the Coordination Framework.

This rivalry has drawn Kurdish parties into Baghdad’s intra-Shiite contest:

KDP has moved closer to Maliki, driven by worsening budget and salary disputes with al-Sudani’s government. Viewing Maliki as a more dependable partner in future negotiations over the Kurdistan Region’s constitutional rights, it has aligned tactically with his camp.

PUK has opted for neutrality, seeking to protect its hold on the Iraqi presidency in the next term. Avoiding full alignment with either side preserves its flexibility in post-election deal-making.

New Generation, led by Shaswar Abdulwahid, has openly thrown its weight behind al-Sudani, signalling a readiness to join a future government—an approach that contrasts sharply with its oppositional stance at home.

Halwest Movement, headed by Ali Hama Salih, is keeping channels open to both sides. Focused on securing credible assurances from Baghdad over electoral integrity, it is withholding any commitment to join the next government until the political landscape is clearer.

The contest is not confined to domestic politics. Iran, wary of deep fractures within the Shiite camp, will work to prevent divisions from escalating into a political rupture, seeking to unify Shiite factions after the elections much as it did under the Coordination Framework. The United States, by contrast, appears more inclined toward al-Sudani, seeing him as pragmatic and potentially capable of strengthening state authority, curbing armed groups, and fostering economic stability.

Ultimately, the Kurdish split over the al-Sudani–al-Maliki rivalry underscores how deeply Kurdish politics in Baghdad are now tied to the shifting balances within the Shiite political house. The positions taken in this phase will not only shape each faction’s role in Iraq’s next government but may also carry long-term consequences for the Kurdish cause and the country’s broader stability.