Manaa Hamidi al-Jarba, the chief of the Shammar tribe – the largest Arab tribal grouping in Hasakah province – met Syria’s President Ahmad al-Sharaa in Damascus yesterday evening. Al-Jarba had reportedly received an earlier invitation to meet al-Sharaa, which he welcomed and accepted, and the visit is said to have been coordinated with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), under whose umbrella the Shammar tribe’s Sanadid forces in Hasakah formally operate.

Context: While SDF-controlled northeast Syria is one of the most heavily tribal regions among Syria’s Sunni Arab population, the Shammar are the most prominent tribe in Hasakah. They maintain their own military force, Quwwat al-Sanadid, estimated at 3,000–5,000 fighters. Sanadid is nominally part of the SDF, but in practice operates with a high degree of autonomy.

Analysis: Roughly three weeks ago, Sanadid forces were involved in their most serious clashes to date with SDF units, after SDF stormed the Shammar-populated village of Kharhouk in rural Rmeilan, not far from Qamishli. The confrontation led to the killing of a Shammar notable and only ended after US-led Coalition forces intervened and pressed SDF to pull back. Even if the Damascus meeting is formally coordinated with SDF, the timing is telling and it is plausible that Coalition forces encouraged or at least quietly welcomed this channel.

To understand the gap in outlook between SDF’s largely Kurdish leadership and Arab tribal elites like Shammar, it is important to remember that tribal Arabs have long-standing social and kinship networks that reach deep into the Syrian “core”. Al-Jarba’s own movements underscore this: before arriving in Damascus, he was in Homs, meeting tribal leaders and being hosted by Abdullah al-Muhaysini, a close ally of al-Sharaa and a Saudi national. This speaks to two very different historical experiences – and two different visions of how to integrate into the Syrian state.

In addition to the points above, there are five reasons why this is the most important meeting so far outside the direct encounters between SDF commander Mazloum Abdi and President al-Sharaa:

Unique tribal militia: Shammar are the only tribe in SDF-held areas that fields its own private militia which is only nominally part of SDF; crucially, Sanadid is also the only non-Kurdish SDF-linked force with a direct line to the Coalition.

Autonomous area of control: They are the only organised Arab armed group in SDF territory with clearly defined areas of control—effectively an autonomous pocket within the northeast. More importantly, their populated areas are close to Rmelan, which hosts the US’s largest military base in northeast Syria and some of Hasakah province’s most important oilfields.

Geographic overlap with Kurdish core: Shammar areas overlap with, or sit immediately adjacent to, key Kurdish zones from Qamishli to Rmeilan to al-Yarubiyah, which together form the core of Syrian Kurdish territory in northern Hasakah.

Cross-border depth into Iraq: On the Iraqi side, the areas opposite Sanadid’s zone are also inhabited by Shammar from the same al-Jarba lineage, giving them a cross-border tribal depth and geographic reach unmatched by other Arab actors in SDF-held areas.

De facto local veto and symbolism: Following the recent clashes, pro-Shammar outlets claim Sanadid has reached an understanding with SDF that no SDF unit will enter or raid Shammar areas without prior coordination – effectively recognising Shammar’s local veto and autonomy. Notably, since the new Syrian government took office in December 2024, al-Jarba has appeared carrying only Sanadid and Syrian flags, with no SDF flags, in his public appearances.

That said, it remains unclear whether this meeting will translate into concrete, institutionalised arrangements. Any meaningful change will still have to pass, directly or indirectly, through the US-led Coalition.