The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has led the longest ongoing armed insurgency in recent history, has held an extraordinary congress to initiate its dissolution and begin the process of disarmament. The congress is said to have taken place at the group’s headquarters in the Qandil Mountains within the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

Context: This development follows a months-long process that began publicly in October 2024 with a symbolic handshake between Devlet Bahçeli, the ultranationalist leader of Turkey’s MHP and an ally of President Erdoğan, and MPs from the pro-Kurdish DEM Party in the Turkish parliament. In February 2025, imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan issued a public call for the PKK to convene a congress to disband and lay down arms as part of a broader peace initiative with the Turkish state.

Analysis: While the congress marks a historic turning point, concrete details remain scarce. What is clear, however, is that the Turkish government appeared closely informed about its timing. Just days before the event, a spokesperson for the ruling AKP stated that the congress would take place within days, and President Erdoğan declared yesterday that the PKK would “dissolve itself today or tomorrow.”

Reports indicate that parallel meetings were held in Qandil and in Europe. A leftist Turkish news outlet claimed that Öcalan sent three separate letters—addressed to the leadership in Qandil, to the Syrian Kurdish administration in Rojava, and to the PKK’s European branch—urging them to proceed with the congress in his absence. Some sources suggest that Öcalan may have participated via a phone call, while unconfirmed reports allege that a senior PKK figure detained with him in İmralı was permitted to travel to Qandil on his behalf.

Despite the symbolic weight of the congress, the Turkish government has yet to take visible reciprocal steps. The entire process remains opaque, raising questions about the framework and conditions of the agreement. What is clear is that the PKK has significantly scaled back its demands—from autonomy to calls for broader “democratization”—yet the political climate in Turkey has grown more repressive, not less, since Öcalan’s appeal.

According to limited sources, the disarmament plan entails the PKK handing over its weapons at designated points in the Kurdistan Region, Syria, and possibly Turkey. Turkish authorities reportedly possess detailed inventories of the PKK’s arsenal, and the process would involve verification of serial numbers and identification. In return, the Turkish government is expected to pass legislative measures leading to the release of 40,000 to 60,000 Kurdish political prisoners. There is also speculation that Öcalan’s prison conditions may be eased—possibly even leading to house arrest or eventual release.

Another unresolved issue is the future of senior PKK leaders: whether they will be permitted to remain in the Kurdistan Region or relocated to a third country, likely in Europe. The term “dissolution” itself may be misleading—while the PKK may disband in name, it is likely to reconstitute as a political entity, especially given the entrenched presence of its ideological affiliates in the DEM Party, which is already a key player in Turkish politics.

If successful, the process could reshape Turkey’s political landscape, normalizing Kurdish actors as legitimate political stakeholders rather than perpetual outcasts. The implications could be profound, potentially altering longstanding power dynamics through new political alliances.

What remains crucial to watch are the broader regional ramifications—particularly in Syria, where developments are likely to become intertwined with the Turkish-Kurdish peace process, and in Iran, where the PKK’s offshoot, PJAK, may soon come under pressure to follow suit.