The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has recently restated its position on oil production and revenue amid growing public frustration over unpaid salaries and persistent concerns about transparency. This follows an official statement by Rebaz Hamlan, the Prime Minister’s Advisor for Economic Affairs and former Finance Minister, whose remarks broadly reflect the government’s official stance.

According to the latest data from the Runbeen Organization—which monitors transparency in the Kurdistan Region’s oil sector—daily oil production stands at approximately 300,000 barrels, translating to 8.991 million barrels over a 30-day period. Total monthly revenue from this production reached $297.507 million, of which $213.425 million (roughly 71%) was allocated to the KRG, and $84.082 million (just over 28%) to contracted oil companies. These proportions are consistent with the Region’s existing contractual framework.

However, in his public remarks, Hamlan presented a different set of figures. He stated that current production stands at 280,000 barrels per day, with 100,000 barrels allocated to oil companies, 65,000 barrels refined domestically, and 115,000 barrels sold on the open market—generating, according to him, approximately $85 million in monthly revenue. He further explained that this amount is divided as follows: 40% to electricity production companies, 30% to cover refinery costs, and 20% toward outstanding debts owed to oil companies.

This framing has drawn criticism from analysts and transparency advocates, who argue that the figures significantly understate the Region’s actual revenues and omit key components of the oil income stream.

Hamlan’s production figure appears to reflect a temporary drop during the Israel–Iran war, when exports via Iran were disrupted and production was reduced due to limited storage capacity. Yet data from Runbeen and previous KRG–federal oversight reports show that the Region has consistently produced between 310,000 and 320,000 barrels per day over the past 18 months. Even during Q2 2025, production averaged 299,000 barrels per day—around 20,000 barrels more than cited by the advisor. It is likely that Hamlan referred to a narrow two-week window, rather than a representative monthly average.

Similarly, his claim that 100,000 barrels per day are allocated to oil companies does not match field-level data, which indicates the figure is closer to 84,000 barrels. This 16,000-barrel discrepancy raises questions about the accuracy of the government’s official figures—or whether certain volumes are being misreported or diverted.

Perhaps more significantly, Hamlan did not address the revenue generated from the 65,000 barrels refined domestically each day. Based on Runbeen’s estimates and public pricing benchmarks, refining this volume yields around 315 million liters of oil products per month. Even at subsidized rates—650 dinars per liter for gasoline, 400 dinars for diesel, and 150 dinars for black oil—these products generate over $2.3 million per day, or more than $70.6 million monthly. This does not include additional revenues from kerosene, aviation fuel, or LPG. The complete omission of these figures from the government’s public narrative distorts the overall picture of available income.

Hamlan’s claim that 115,000 barrels sold on the open market yield just $85 million per month also raises concern. This would suggest a price of only $24.63 per barrel—well below prevailing market rates. Shaikan, the Region’s lowest-priced field, currently sells at around $27 per barrel. Other fields range from $30 to $40, with Tawke priced at $35 and Sarsang and Sarqala closer to $40. At those rates, the same volume of oil should generate roughly $114 million—nearly $29 million more than the amount stated by the advisor.

The undervaluation becomes more concerning in light of the identities of the main buyers: Business Unicorn (part of North Light Holding, owned by Prime Minister Masrour Barzani), Kar Group (closely linked to the KDP), Lanaz (owned by the PM’s brother Mansour Barzani), and Qaiwan (affiliated with the PUK). These politically connected firms are reportedly purchasing oil at heavily discounted rates, even as public sector employees go months without salaries. This raises serious questions about whether public assets are being sold far below market value to benefit a narrow circle of elites.

The advisor also stated that $26 million per month—30% of the reported $85 million revenue—is allocated to refinery costs. Based on the government’s own figures, 1.982 million barrels are refined monthly, placing the per-barrel refining cost at $13.11. This is unusually high. Past contracts between the KRG and the federal government show that refineries in the Region have historically charged far lower rates. If the refining cost were adjusted to a more standard $5 per barrel, the government would save $16 million each month—funds that could be redirected to address the ongoing salary crisis. It’s also worth noting that the three largest licensed refineries—Lanaz, Qaiwan, and Kar—are all under the control of the aforementioned politically connected entities.

Finally, Hamlan claimed that 20% of the reported revenue—around $17 million per month—is being used to repay debts owed to oil companies. However, the Kurdistan Oil Industry Association (APIKUR) has explicitly denied that these debts, estimated to exceed $1 billion, have been repaid. The group also stated that no agreement had been reached with the KRG on past entitlements—contradicting the advisor’s assertion.

According to the official breakdown, only $8 million in monthly revenue remains for the KRG after all expenses—a figure that is neither plausible nor consistent with available data. Even by using conservative market prices for oil and adding only the known revenue from refined fuel sales, the actual income could be over $184 million per month. This includes at least $113.85 million from open-market oil sales (if priced at a modest $33 per barrel) and $70.6 million from the sale of refined products such as gasoline, diesel, and black oil—figures that were omitted entirely from Rebaz Hamlan’s statement.

Even if we were to accept the government’s proportional breakdown of expenses—40% for electricity, 30% for refining, and 20% for oil company debts—those same percentages applied to the real revenue figures would still leave more than $11 million in net revenue from oil sales alone. But if we adjust for more realistic refining costs (e.g. $5 per barrel instead of the inflated $13.11), question the lack of debt repayments as confirmed by APIKUR, and include refining revenues, the net amount available to the government rises dramatically—potentially up to $140 million per month.

Taken together, these findings suggest a pattern of underreporting, preferential pricing, and poor fiscal governance within the KRG’s oil sector. Public wealth appears to be diverted to a small group of politically aligned actors, while ordinary citizens bear the brunt of a deepening financial crisis.