The Kurdistan Region’s two main parties, the KDP and PUK, remain deadlocked over cabinet formation as a full year passes since the October 2024 elections. This makes the Kurdistan Region the only state or federal region in the world where elections were held in 2024 but no government has yet been formed as of late 2025.

Context: The Kurdistan Region managed to hold parliamentary elections on October 20, 2024—more than two years behind schedule—but a full year later, the government remains unformed. Significant gaps persist between the two main winners, the KDP and PUK, over cabinet formation, making the KRG unique globally in this regard among regions that held elections in 2024.

The Kurdistan Region’s parliament expired on October 9, 2022, but was controversially extended for one year. However, the Iraqi federal court ruled in May 2023 that the extension was “unconstitutional,” declaring that “all decisions issued by the regional parliament from the date of its term extension on Oct. 9, 2022 were therefore null and void.” Despite this, the KDP and PUK failed to agree on election rules, delaying the vote for more than two additional years until it was finally held in October 2024.

Analysis: There is only one other place in the world where 2024 elections have not yet led to government formation: the Brussels-Capital Region in Belgium. But that case involves a local administrative body with limited jurisdiction over urban planning and municipal affairs. By contrast, the KRG is a quasi-state, with its own army, foreign relations, and political structures. The KRG cabinet deadlock is therefore noteworthy for three main reasons:

First, it demonstrates how unique the KRG is as a polity with no real parallel worldwide. It functions almost as a country, with its own army and foreign policy, yet internally comprises two distinct zones—the KDP and PUK areas—nominally unified only following the 1996 civil war under US pressure. For years, the region appeared to be gradually unifying under KDP dominance while the PUK was mired in internal power struggles. However, since taking over the PUK in July 2021, Bafel Talabani and his brother Qubad have consolidated control over the PUK zone through force, improved patronage networks, and strengthened external relations. They have enhanced their electoral position to the point where the KDP can no longer sideline the PUK and form a cabinet by allying with smaller parties—this is at the heart of the current deadlock.

For instance, when Masrour Barzani formed the current cabinet in June 2019, the parliamentary seat distribution and the PUK’s internal divisions allowed the KDP to proceed without much regard for the PUK. The KDP, along with the Gorran movement and the quota system, secured more than enough seats to pass the cabinet in parliament, leaving PUK positions vacant until the PUK had no choice but to participate without wielding much power. In contrast, following the October 2024 elections, the parliamentary arithmetic makes it nearly impossible to form a government without the PUK, giving them considerable leverage to demand a better deal.

Mathematically, the KDP could potentially reach the 51 seats needed to vote for the cabinet and leave PUK posts vacant as in 2019, but this is practically unfeasible. New Generation, the main opposition group with 15 seats, has refused to join the cabinet. Given that its headquarters is in Sulaimani, joining the KDP could spell their end in the PUK zone, so they will likely refuse to become entangled in KDP-PUK politics. Even though Shaswar Abdulwahid, the movement’s leader, is now imprisoned in Sulaimani, he will likely still refuse to further escalate against the PUK.

Other groups with significant numbers include the Islamic Union with 7 seats, which has categorically refused from day one to participate in the cabinet under any circumstances, and the Halwest movement with 3 seats, which has also refused and is unlikely to participate. This leaves the KDP, which along with its quota seats holds 42 seats. There are six other seats that might potentially be swayed: one from a Halwest movement splinter in Erbil that the KDP can likely secure, along with two seats from Lahur Sheikh Jangi’s People’s Front. However, the others are more difficult—one is from a Justice Group splinter but is Sulaimani-based, so she may hesitate to side with the KDP. Meanwhile, both the Socialist movement’s and Gorran’s sole seats will very likely remain neutral, as voting—even if they receive good positions—would be seen as siding with the KDP. Realistically, the KDP has no viable path to form the government without the PUK.

Second, at the heart of the current impasse are the security posts in the cabinet. The PUK insists it should receive the interior ministry, which has been KDP-dominated for decades, since the KDP holds both the prime minister and regional president positions. But the KDP has categorically rejected relinquishing either the interior ministry or the Kurdistan Security Council, another key security post.

Beyond the fact that the PUK now has significantly better numbers in the Kurdistan parliament than in 2019 (23% plus 2% via quota seats versus 19% in 2019), while the KDP’s numbers have declined (from 41% plus 10% via quota seats to 39% plus 3% via quota seats), the internal power struggle within the PUK since 2021 has proven that official KRG security positions still matter. For instance, despite being effectively expelled from their posts, Lahur Sheikh Jangi and later the PUK’s intelligence agency chief Azhi Amin remained members of the Kurdistan Security Council because the KDP, which controls it, refused to expel them. This has given them legal cover and political weight, even though the PUK controls its own security and intelligence agencies.

Third, government formation in Erbil is unlikely before Iraq’s national elections on November 11, 2025, which could shift the balance of power between the KDP and PUK. Historically, the Kurdistan presidency has been linked to the Iraqi presidency, which the PUK has controlled since 2005. A stronger showing by either party at the federal level will bolster its position in cabinet negotiations.

Ultimately, U.S. pressure will likely play a decisive role. The KRG’s institutions have been paralyzed since 2023, and Washington views cabinet formation as critical to preserving the region’s political legitimacy at a time of mounting regional instability. This external pressure, combined with electoral outcomes in Baghdad, will shape the next KRG cabinet.