The current process follows a clear sequence: political declarations to halt hostilities, verifiable steps on the ground, certification by state security institutions, and finally a legal settlement in Parliament. Each phase is tied to concrete acts and specific bodies, which is why the file is advancing even as formal politics catches up.

Context: The process began with symbolic gestures and declarations. In October 2024, Nationalist Movement Party leader and Erdoğan ally Devlet Bahçeli shook hands with pro-Kurdish DEM Party MPs on the floor of Parliament. On 27 February 2025, Abdullah Ocalan publicly called for the PKK to lay down its arms, convene a congress, and dissolve itself. The organisation then held its 12th Congress on 5–7 May and announced self-dissolution. On 11 July, a group of PKK militants burned their weapons in north Sulaimani as a goodwill gesture. In early August, a parliamentary committee in Ankara began consultations to draft the necessary legal changes. These were not merely cosmetic; taken together, they started the clock on demobilisation and created benchmarks against which the state could test intent.

Analysis: The PKK says it has dissolved itself. It staged a farewell-to-arms ceremony, burned weapons, and has decided to withdraw all its fighters from inside Turkey to bases in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Yet the status of its members will be determined by law, not declarations. Until Parliament passes a statute, those fighters are expected to remain in camps as cadres of an entity that no longer uses the PKK name and says it has laid down its arms. They have nowhere else to go, and no one is urging them to melt away into the mountains.

Every public step rests on a round of negotiations; what appears at press conferences is the end of a round, not its start. Even so, the state’s record in talks with the PKK does not inspire confidence, especially after the last peace-process attempt, which both the PKK and the state effectively abandoned as the Syrian war reshaped incentives on both sides. That experience led Ankara to seek not only an Ocalan call to disarm but also an explicit decision to dissolve, and to tie disarmament to a formal verification regime. The 26 October press conference formed part of that verification.

Verification rests with the National Intelligence Organisation (MİT) and the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). These institutions are monitoring the disarmament process and will report whether “the PKK is following through on its declared will to lay down arms.” As the Speaker of the Turkish Parliament, Numan Kurtulmuş, indicated, once that confirmation is in hand the file goes to the National Security Council (MGK), chaired by President Erdoğan and other key decision-makers. The MGK is then expected to recommend removing the dissolved PKK from the list of terrorist organisations, a step officials describe as formal certification. Parliament, through its relevant committee, has already completed much of the legal groundwork and, in its 30 October sitting, heard the foreign and justice ministers; earlier sessions also invited the interior and defence ministers.

The Turkish state expects three steps from the PKK. The first, already announced, is the withdrawal of militants from Turkish territory. This should not be underestimated: the PKK attempted withdrawals in 1999 and 2013 after Ocalan’s calls, and neither fully succeeded. The remaining steps are intended to consolidate confidence that the organisation has, in practice, ended armed activity inside Turkey. They are expected shortly.

Once those steps are verified, the confirmation phase ends and Parliament moves to legislate a package specific to a defunct organisation. Notably, Sabri Ok’s recent language mirrors Ankara’s legal framing. He referred to a “Transitional Law” and to “freedom and democratic integration laws” needed to enable lawful political participation without delay, phrasing that echoes public remarks by Turkish presidential legal adviser Mehmet Uçum and Turkish nationalist movement or MHP vice-chair Feti Yıldız about the shape of a forthcoming bill, suggesting off-camera talks are well advanced.

At the 26 October press conference, Kurdish outlets pressed Ok about the process and Ankara’s sincerity, and he kept his answers measured and positive. Asked about a “return-home law,” he said: “Legal steps tailored to the uniqueness of this process are needed. As reciprocal steps are taken, the process will gain momentum. We want process-specific laws, not a general amnesty. A fifty-year struggle has brought us here; thanks to Leader Apo (Abdullah Ocalan), we are at a very important stage. There can be special, one-off arrangements limited to this context. We hope the authorities will fulfil their responsibilities.”

Since the May congress at which the PKK says it dissolved, senior figures have also changed how they identify themselves and no longer speak as PKK officials. At the 26 October event, Ok spoke as part of the “Leadership of the Kurdish Freedom Movement.” Their claim is that the PKK no longer exists after its 12th Congress, and leaders have stopped using the PKK title. Two weeks earlier, for example, Duran Kalkan was introduced as a member of the Abdullah Öcalan Academy of Social Sciences. And yet, in practical terms, the fighters’ status will remain unresolved until the legal framework is in place, precisely the sort of one-off, transitional statute that presidential legal adviser Mehmet Uçum says the process requires.

Crucially, the movement has not made the parliamentary law a precondition for disarmament. It first declared dissolution and a decision to lay down arms; legislation is required to complete demobilisation and reintegration. The state, for its part, wants verification before it moves. That is the phase now underway: monitors are present, weapons are being recorded, and units are under restraint until verification is complete and the law is on the books.