On 11 November 2025, Iraq faces another constitutional test whose outcome will, as in every cycle, redistribute power, positions, and decision-making. What matters most will unfold after ballots are counted: the struggle over the premiership and, this time, the fate of Iran-aligned Shia armed groups.

The first knot is the premiership. Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani has warned that the upcoming parliamentary cycle will bring either stability or regression and the loss of recent gains. His warning is not rhetorical. The record since 2003 shows how elections can trigger crises rather than resolve them: in 2010, the dispute over the “largest bloc” produced the longest government-formation delay of the new Iraq despite Iyad Allawi’s plurality; in 2021, the push for a “majority government” precipitated fierce intra-Shia tensions, clashes in the Green Zone, and Muqtada al-Sadr’s eventual withdrawal from parliament. Under the 2005 constitutional order, the prime minister is de facto head of the executive, and custom dictates a Shia nominee because Shia forces typically hold more than 180 of the 329 seats. Yet Shia numbers are not sufficient on their own. Any nominee still needs Sunni and Kurdish consent; the blessing—or at least non-objection—of Najaf’s supreme religious authority; a tolerable Tehran–Washington balance; and attention to Sadr’s posture, remembering that his list won more than 22% of the vote in 2021.

Article 76 requires the president to task the candidate of the largest parliamentary bloc with forming a cabinet. Whether that bloc is the one that wins the election or a coalition assembled afterward remains contested. The 2010 sidelining of Allawi’s winning list in favor of Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law (91 to 89 seats) bent the principle toward post-electoral aggregation, while in 2021 the electoral victor—Sadr—did not form the government at all. That ambiguity will again open multiple pathways the morning after the vote.

Al-Sudani aims to place first where it matters most: Baghdad, with roughly four million voters and nearly 70 seats. Nationally, he leads the Construction and Development list. But his vehicle’s core vulnerability is structural. It was assembled for the election, not built as an ideological party. It mixes technocrats, government officials, tribal leaders, and figures connected to armed groups. In the hard bargaining that follows polling day, such coalitions are susceptible to pressure, inducements, and defections. Even if he emerges with a strong tally, the dispersion of successful candidates—through security leverage or political incentives—remains a real risk.

Major Shiite Electoral Alliances

Iraq Parliamentary Elections • November 11, 2025

329

Total Seats

29M

Eligible Voters

10-15

Shiite Lists

69

Baghdad Seats

Development & Construction

Mohammed Shia al-Sudani

60-100

Projected Seats

Key Components

Al-Furatayn, al-Aqd al-Watani, al-Wataniya, tribal & civil forces.

Incumbent Advantage Infrastructure Focus

State of Law

Nouri al-Maliki

Strong

Outlook

Key Components

Dawa Party, Fadhila Party, Muntasirun, Sayyid al-Shuhada.

Veteran Leadership Strong Networks

Sadiqun List

Qais al-Khazali

Rising

Outlook

Key Components

Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Salahuddin tribal components, gov positions.

Military Wing Iraqi Identity

Badr Organization

Hadi al-Amiri

Security

Outlook

Key Components

Badr wing, Interior Ministry networks, Hashd leadership.

Military Networks Security Sector

State National Forces

Hakim-Abadi Axis

Moderate

Outlook

Key Components

Hakim legacy, Abadi experience, protest allies, civil society.

Moderate Civil Society

Tasmeem Alliance

Asaad al-Eidani

Regional

Outlook

Key Components

Basra base, economic figures, potential Sadrist support.

Basra Rights PM Ambitions

His most direct rival is Nouri al-Maliki, who has framed his campaign around “correcting the course of the political process” in contrast to Al-Sudani’s Construction and Development project. Maliki’s ceiling is visible. Najaf’s 2014 veto still hangs over his name; his rift with Sadr is deep; and his legacy is entangled with the 2014 collapse that ushered in ISIS’s advance. For these reasons, he may be more potent as a Shia power broker and kingmaker than as a broadly acceptable consensus prime minister—especially now that Al-Sudani has moved beyond the Dawa Party’s orbit to craft his own project.

Beyond these two camps, political salons circulate a familiar, multi-name bench: Qasim al-Araji (Iraqi National Security Advisor), Adnan al-Zurfi (PM designate for two weeks in 2020), Hamid al-Shatri (Iraqi intelligence chief), and Abdul-Hussein Abtan (president of a smaller Shia party) are often cited, alongside such names as popular current Basrah governor Asaad al-Eidani, Abdul-Amir al-Shammari (current Minister of Interior), Faleh al-Fayyad (PMF chief), Naeem al-Aboudi (Minister of Higher Education), Hadi al-Amiri (head of Badr Organization), Haider al-Abadi (former Prime Minister), and Mohammed al-Mayahi (governor of Wasit). Such a crowded list tends to prolong negotiations, magnifying the underlying contest between Shia currents that want to re-empower a party-quota operating model and those defending Al-Sudani’s more personalized executive style. Many within the first camp view Al-Sudani’s approach as a structural threat to the system they built: where governments once belonged to parties and component bargains, the current arrangement, in their eyes, concentrates authority in the prime minister’s person and project. Their objective after the vote is to re-anchor the choice of premier in Shia party arithmetic, not in personal performance.

All of this unfolds under an external overlay that cannot be bracketed out. The post-Gaza regional realignment and the wider U.S.–Iran equation will weigh heavily on the timing and shape of the deal. Even within Al-Sudani’s camp there is an expectation that these dynamics will delay closure on the premiership.

The second file is the armed groups. In a recent phone call with the prime minister, the U.S. Secretary of State pressed for the rapid disarmament of Iran-aligned factions, a demand echoed publicly by Senator Marco Rubio, who argues that militias undermine sovereignty, endanger Iraqis and Americans, and deter investment. Washington is increasingly tying the pace and scope of economic cooperation to curbing these groups. The response from the ‘Axis of Resistance’ was not subtle: Quds Force commander Ismail Qaani reportedly warned Coordination Framework leaders against allowing Al-Sudani to trade a second term for restrictions on Shia armed groups. Many Shia actors also bristled at the publicity around the call, treating it as a breach of sovereignty. Yet with the campaign in full swing, few have the incentive—or bandwidth—for an escalatory political response. The timing matters: two weeks before the government’s term ends, sanctioned and sanction-exposed factions are inclined to raise their price, not lower it. One way through this impasse now being discussed in Shia circles is to select an independent, economy-focused prime minister to deflect pressure, especially amid rumors that U.S. sanctions lists on Iraqi figures could expand.

Into this picture steps Washington’s special envoy, Mark Savaiya, appointed in lieu of an ambassador. Savaiya is a Chaldean Christian of Iraqi origin, close to Donald Trump, with a business background that includes the marijuana industry. He frames his mission as rebuilding trust and strengthening the strategic partnership while supporting an independent Iraqi government with decision-making capacity, not imposing an American agenda. Competing readings of his mandate already exist. One sees him as a transactional deal-maker tasked with loosening Iraq’s ties to Iran through a broad bargain with major Iraqi forces—an interpretation reinforced by Trump’s blunt remarks in Sharm el-Sheikh about Iraq’s failure to capitalize on its oil wealth. Another portrays him as a pragmatic interlocutor acceptable to Al-Sudani and influential Shia actors, pointing to his perceived leniency in the Elizabeth Tsurkov affair as evidence that he can keep channels open. Either way, the choice of a special envoy suggests a tilt toward deal-making over conventional State Department process. After the vote, his role will likely be clearest on three fronts: the premiership negotiations, Iraq’s regional positioning, and the parameters of any understanding on the armed-groups file.

In sum, Al-Sudani warns of a fork between stability and regression because the premiership is no longer a purely arithmetic exercise. Shia plurality remains necessary but is insufficient without Sunni and Kurdish consent, Najaf’s posture, Sadr’s stance, and a workable Tehran–Washington balance. Al-Sudani wants a second term, but he must defend his heterogeneous list against fragmentation while contending with Maliki’s enduring leverage and a long bench of alternative names that could stretch formation talks. Parallel to that, the United States is pressing to tie economic engagement to curbing or disarming Iran-aligned groups, while Qaani has cautioned Shia leaders against conceding on that file as the price of the premiership. To reduce pressure, some within the Shia spectrum are weighing an independent, technocratic candidate. The likely result is protracted bargaining in which the armed-groups dossier and the identity of the next prime minister become a single negotiation, shaped as much by regional dynamics and U.S.–Iran bargaining space as by Iraq’s internal seat counts.