The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan’s (PUK) assault on the compound of former co-president Lahur Sheikh Jangi marks one of the most dramatic escalations in intra-Kurdish conflict since the Kurdistan Region was established in 1991. The only other time a tank has appeared in a city within what is known as “Line 36”—the US-led coalition’s no-fly zone established in 1991—was in 1996, when Saddam Hussein’s forces rolled into Erbil to expel the PUK during the KDP–PUK civil war.

What makes this assault particularly significant is that it was carried out exclusively by three elite PUK units—forces now seen as the personal fiefdom of party president Bafel Talabani. No other PUK leader holds operational control over them. These three forces are also the only PUK formations that regularly conduct joint missions with US-led coalition troops against ISIS in Kirkuk, Diyala, and other disputed territories.

The Forces Involved

Commando Forces: Once a small formation of just a few hundred fighters, the Commandos were originally trained by French forces within the US-led coalition. In 2021, after ousting his cousin Lahur from the PUK leadership, Bafel Talabani assumed full control over the unit with the backing of veteran commander Sheikh Ja‘afar Mustafa. The Commandos have since become Bafel’s most important and heavily resourced force, now numbering around 6,700 fighters under the command of Diyar Omar.

They are among the best-equipped units in Kurdistan: each soldier typically carries a suppressed M4-pattern 5.56×45 carbine with optics, PEQ-type laser/illuminator, vertical foregrip, comms headset, NVG mount, and a hydration/assault pack. The force operates a drones unit that deploys improvised FPV suicide drones, several helicopters including Eurocopter Cougar-class, and an armored fleet that includes dozens of T-55 tanks and some T-62s. The Commandos frequently participate in joint anti-ISIS operations with both the coalition and Iraq’s Counter-Terrorism Service.

The Forces Involved

Forces Involved in the Lahur Sheikh Jangi Compound Assault

Commando Forces Logo

Commando Forces

Commander: Diyar Omar

Strength: ~6,700 Fighters

Once a small unit, now Bafel Talabani's primary force. Well-equipped and conducts frequent joint anti-ISIS operations.

Key Assets

  • Suppressed M4s, optics/lasers
  • FPV drones, Cougar helicopters
  • T-55/T-62 tanks, Bastion APCs and up-armored Humvees
CTG Logo

Counter-Terrorism Group

Commander: Wahab Halabjayee

Strength: ~5,000 Fighters

Iraq’s oldest counter-terror force, founded in 2002 with US/CIA support. Maintains ties with US Delta Force & UK 22 SAS.

Key Assets

  • M4s, Barrett M82s, NVGs
  • Eurocopters, Blackshape aircraft
  • APCs, Humvees, Dzik-3s
Sulaimani SWAT Logo

Sulaimani SWAT

Commander: Sarkhil Halabjayee

Strength: ~1,000 Fighters

Asayish special ops unit named in Pentagon's '26 budget for NATO weapons. Conducts urban raids with coalition forces.

Key Assets

  • M4A1 rifles, machine guns
  • Pistols and grenade launchers
  • Night-vision devices

Counter-Terrorism Group (CTG): Founded in 2002 with US and CIA support, the CTG is Iraq’s oldest dedicated counter-terror force. It was co-created by Bafel Talabani and Lahur Sheikh Jangi, who led it until his expulsion in 2021. The unit today has around 5,000 fighters under commander Wahab Halabjayee and enjoys direct training and equipping from US Delta Force and the UK’s 22 SAS, both of which remain stationed with the CTG at its Tasluja compound in Sulaimani.

CTG fighters are equipped with Multicam uniforms, M4 carbines, Barrett M82 sniper rifles, and night-vision gear. Their assets include Eurocopter and AutoGyro helicopters, Blackshape Prime ultralight aircraft based at Arbat Agricultural and Sulaimani airports, as well as tanks and a diverse fleet of armored vehicles—ranging from French APCs and US Humvees to Polish AMZ Dzik-3s, Dingos, and UAE-built IAG Guardians. The CTG has also played a role in training the SDF’s counter-terror units in Syria.

Sulaimani SWAT (Asayish Special Operations): This 1,000-strong force, commanded by Sarkhil Halabjayee, is notable for being the only Kurdish unit explicitly named in the Pentagon’s 2026 Iraq budget request. The request allocates NATO-standard weapons and ammunition—including M4A1 rifles, machine guns, pistols, grenade launchers, and night-vision devices—though the justification is listed as “refitting” rather than procurement of new arms. SWAT routinely conducts urban raid operations against ISIS in partnership with coalition forces.

How the Assault Unfolded

Although not all fighters from these formations took part in the direct assault, the scale of the operation went well beyond the compound itself. Units were deployed across Sulaimani and surrounding areas, erecting dozens of checkpoints to block reinforcements.

According to sources including Rudaw TV, Draw Media, and others, the attack involved: 120–150 FPV suicide drones; Nearly 1,000 mortar rounds; 9–15 tanks; and around 250 armored vehicles.

Lahur’s defenses consisted of roughly 150-200 men, divided into three main groups. The first, led by Scorpio militia commander Rebwar Hamid Haji Ghali (whose father remains a senior PUK commander), positioned themselves in high-rise buildings forming the first defensive line. The second, led by Ahmad Asaf—once a CTG officer but sided with Lahur—fought alongside Lahur’s older brother Aso before both reportedly escaped. Some accounts suggest they disguised themselves in CTG uniforms to slip out during the chaos. The third group, based closer to Lahur’s office, included Lahur himself and his brother Polad, the former de facto CTG chief after Lahur’s rise to the PUK presidency.

Fighting was concentrated on the two flanking buildings near Lahur’s office, which endured heavy tank and mortar fire. Open-source imagery afterward showed buildings riddled with impacts, suggesting enormous volumes of ammunition had been used. What ultimately broke the defense, however, appears to have been a swarm of up to 150 FPV suicide drones, reportedly piloted by a Commando special unit. These drones bypassed the forward high-rises and struck directly at Lahur’s core defenses.

The drones’ origin remains uncertain. Some speculate Iranian models were used, but given the relatively limited damage, it is more likely that improvised commercial FPV drones were deployed. A strike package of 120–150 Iranian-grade systems would likely have leveled much of the area.

The battle lasted roughly three and a half hours, from 3:00 a.m. to 6:30 a.m. Reports indicate Lahur’s fighters eventually ran out of ammunition—a fact supported by post-battle video showing only small quantities left behind in the compound.

Casualty figures remain unclear. Only two of Lahur’s fighters are confirmed dead, compared to three on the PUK side, though speculation persists that actual numbers were higher. One of the two confirmed dead was reportedly linked to Azhi Amin, the former PUK intelligence chief now in Erbil and in a de facto alliance with KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani. Crucially, this fighter had only recently been employed on the payroll of the KRG Interior Ministry (led by Rebar Ahmed, a key Masrour confidant)—despite the government’s public claim that new hiring had been fully frozen due to the financial crisis. This underlines not only the irregularity of his recruitment but also suggests a degree of cooperation between Lahur Sheikh Jangi and Azhi Amin, who remains active in Erbil under Barzani’s patronage.

Notably, similar FPV suicide drones struck Bafel Talabani’s residence twice on the same day, and a third drone targeted the PUK’s military compound in Tasluja, suggesting that the battle may have triggered retaliatory or diversionary drone attacks.