In its quarterly report on northeast Syria, the US Inspector General has warned that tensions are “expected to rise now that U.S. forces are not in place” between local Arab tribes and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The report further cautioned that “it is likely that tensions could escalate between Arab tribal leaders and the SDF in the near term.”

Context: As The National Context reported earlier, the US has fully withdrawn from Deir Ezzor province, where it maintained three bases—a development now confirmed by the quarterly US Inspector General report. The report notes that “U.S. forces have frequently mediated between the SDF and Arab tribes during heightened tensions,” and that “Arab communities have expressed frustration and impatience with the SDF, a group they see as occupiers who consistently demonstrate cultural preference when dividing resources and protections.” However, now “U.S. forces are not in place to bridge differences.”

Analysis: The report begins by noting that the U.S. withdrawal included bases in areas where Arab–SDF relations were already strained. It also touches on the broader geopolitical picture, particularly threats from Turkey, which complicate the SDF’s position further. One important thread that connects various sections of the report is the idea that the relative calm in northeast Syria has been contingent on the SDF’s ongoing talks—encouraged by the U.S.—to integrate into the Syrian army. However, the report acknowledges that “CJTF-OIR said that it was unlikely the SDF will relocate forces away from the front lines,” suggesting the negotiations are unlikely to yield significant territorial concessions.

The US assessment suggests that the SDF is unlikely to relinquish much of its territory, especially its heartland near the Turkish border where Kurdish populations are concentrated. This implies growing strain between the SDF and Arab tribes on one front, and between the SDF and Turkey on another. The US appears to be managing these tensions through talks it has been encouraging and mediating between Damascus and the SDF. However, if these talks collapse—which seems likely based on the assessment that the SDF is unlikely to “relocate forces away from the front lines”—there is a high probability of clashes, as various sections of the report suggest without explicitly stating. The report also clearly states that “Coalition forces are not providing any support to the SDF against the Turkish military or the Turkish-backed fighters.”

In the near term, both the report and ground-level developments suggest the primary threat comes from Arab tribal mobilization. Recently, many Arab tribes in northeast Syria—where they constitute majorities in both East Deir Ezzor and Raqqa provinces under SDF control, as well as in some towns in southern Hasakah province—have issued statements that echo the US report’s portrayal of Arab tribal sentiment toward the SDF: “expressed frustration and impatience” and viewing the SDF as “occupiers.”

As The National Context previously noted in relation to tribal attacks in Suwayda, the dynamics of such mobilizations could easily serve as a model for similar movements against the SDF. The situation in northeast Syria may be even more favorable to tribal insurgency, particularly in Deir Ezzor, where the Arab population is dominant and SDF governance is already seen as tenuous, and their long-term rule appears unviable.

However, Arab tribal relations with the SDF contain important nuances—not all tribes are equally hostile, and even hostility levels vary significantly. For instance, tribes such as Tayy (based in parts of Qamishli) and Al-Baggara and Al-Aqidat (based in Deir ez-Zor Province) are far more openly hostile to the SDF than the sheikhs of the Al-Afadleh tribe in Raqqa, who take a more pragmatic approach. The Shammar tribe, based in northeastern Hasakah province closer to Kurdish areas, maintains the closest relationship with the SDF and operates its own militia within SDF ranks called the Al-Sanadid Forces.

Yet even this alliance poses challenges for SDF autonomy prospects. The Shammar maintain direct communication lines with US coalition forces, and their alliance with the SDF remains pragmatic. In their territories, SDF affiliation is largely nominal—tellingly, even though they are supposed to be part of the SDF, they display only their Al-Sanadid flag alongside the new Syrian flag, pointedly omitting the SDF banner entirely.

The demographic and geopolitical complexity of the region becomes even more apparent through unconfirmed reports suggesting the US may be developing a friendly Arab tribal force, recognizing the dim prospects for long-term SDF rule over Arab areas while attempting to build ties with Damascus’s new government. According to UAE-based Erem News, the US is reportedly working to create a new all-Arab force of 25,000 fighters by combining the Shammar tribe’s Al-Sanadid Forces (estimated at 7,000 or more fighters) with Free Syrian Army units stationed at the Al-Tanf Garrison (approximately 500 US-trained tribal fighters from the al-Tanf area). This new force would align with the US’s shifted priorities: avoiding withdrawal due to Israeli concerns about expanding Turkish influence while addressing Turkish concerns through an all-Arab tribal structure.

The SDF appears to grasp the gravity of its situation. Unconfirmed reports suggest the SDF might make a bold geopolitical realignment by seeking Turkish protection in exchange for localized autonomy. However, this rumor originates from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, now widely believed to be close to the SDF, and may represent an attempt to influence ongoing SDF-Damascus negotiations by driving a wedge between Ankara and Damascus on the SDF issue. Given the SDF’s mounting pressure on multiple fronts, it has every incentive to drive wedges between its adversaries.

Whether either of these rumors materialize, their very circulation underscores how volatile and multilayered the situation in northeast Syria has become. The U.S. report does not state explicitly that conflict is imminent—but when its various assessments are read together, they strongly imply that renewed clashes between Arab tribes and the SDF are increasingly likely. And with U.S. troops no longer in place to mediate, the potential for escalation is all too real.