The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian government have held their first technical meeting following the preliminary agreement signed in March. According to Saudi-owned Al-Arabiya, citing “special sources,” the Trump administration has given the SDF until August to integrate into the new Syrian army. While the details remain fluid, Trump’s Syria envoy, Tom Barrack, indicated that the method of integration, whether as a unified bloc or as individuals, will be left to the negotiating parties.

Context: This meeting follows Turkish President Erdoğan’s accusations that the SDF was “wasting time,” and comes on the heels of a flurry of diplomatic activity involving Turkish, American, and Syrian officials. These included meetings between Erdoğan and Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, discussions between al-Sharaa and Tom Barrack, and a follow-up phone call between Barrack and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi.

Strategic Outlook: Barrack’s interview with Turkish outlet NTV revealed key elements of the US vision for post-war Syria. He stated that both the SDF and Damascus must have “realistic expectations” that the US won’t serve as a security “guarantor” to anyone, and that SDF integration is in its “final phase—it must happen.” However, he also acknowledged that “The SDF is an ally who fought alongside our troops against ISIS.”

Two key points from Barrack’s interview reveal the underlying strategy: When asked about the intra-Kurdish conference in Qamishli, Barrack described the SDF-Damascus talks as resembling “commercial negotiations,” characterised by give-and-take dynamics. More significantly, they view resolving this issue as part of a broader regional realignment that supports a Sunni axis comprising Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, with Syria positioned as a central node in this emerging alliance. This framework anticipates a gradual US troop withdrawal, delegating regional responsibilities to this new coalition. Barrack’s assertion that SDF integration is in its “final phase and must happen” appears to confirm Al-Arabiya’s report of an August deadline.

Crucially, the integration of the SDF into the Syrian army intersects with deeper questions about Syria’s future political structure. The SDF is the military wing of a political movement advocating decentralization, a position formally advanced through a US-backed intra-Kurdish conference that brought together rival Kurdish factions. This decentralization agenda therefore enjoys indirect US support.

When Barrack was questioned about this conference, he linked it to the broader SDF-Damascus negotiations, approaching it with the same commercial mindset he brings to business deals (reflecting both his and Trump’s business backgrounds). The apparent goal is to leverage the conference as a tool in the SDF’s push for autonomy.

However, this must be considered within the context of al-Sharaa’s strengthened position, now backed by both Turkey and Saudi Arabia—both likely favoring a more centralized Syria under Sunni Arab leadership. Local dynamics within al-Sharaa’s Sunni Arab constituency also matter, as most oppose decentralization. Equally important is the fate of demographically Arab towns currently under SDF control.

As the talks progress, the most plausible outcome may be a bifurcated arrangement: Kurdish-majority areas receive informal autonomy under a decentralized framework, while Arab-majority areas revert to full central government control. Damascus, which remains rigid on this issue, might offer concessions in return for the SDF relinquishing control over Arab areas. Under this framework, the SDF’s Kurdish forces could be consolidated into two brigades within the Syrian army, while Arab components would be fully integrated into the regular forces.

Some sources suggest that the SDF has already hinted at accepting the relinquishment of control over Raqqa and eastern Deir Ezzor, both overwhelmingly Sunni Arab, in exchange for Damascus accepting decentralization for Hasakah province as a whole. However, this scenario seems unlikely, given that some majority-Kurdish areas such as Kobani and Afrin are not in Hasakah, while some districts within Hasakah have majority Arab or mixed populations, potentially triggering popular backlash.

Ultimately, the negotiations may hinge on defining the geography of Kurdish-majority areas—a complex task given the patchwork demography of northeastern Syria. The extent and contiguity of decentralization zones will likely be the next flashpoint in talks that, while framed as technical, carry major implications for Syria’s post-conflict order.