The political order emerging in Turkey since 2016 has been built around the narrative of existential threats, emphasizing the idea that the Turkish state and nation were under siege from internal and external enemies. This narrative triggered a fundamental reshaping of Turkey’s political polarization, replacing the older “secular–religious” divide with a new dichotomy: “patriotic” versus “unpatriotic,” or aligned with versus opposed to the state-defined national cause.

This framework dominated political discourse from 2015 to 2024. By late 2024, however, it became increasingly clear that a version of nationalism that excluded Kurds was no longer sustainable. What is now emerging, as the peace process with the PKK unfolds, is an attempt to redraw the boundaries of national belonging toward a new, Kurd-inclusive form of state-sanctioned nationalism or what is framed as patriotism.

2015–2016: From Secular–Religious to Patriotic–Unpatriotic

President Erdoğan first introduced the phrase yerli ve millî — often translated as “homegrown and patriotic” — on September 20, 2015, ahead of snap elections called after his party lost its parliamentary majority that June. While the phrase initially described Turkish-made defense products, it quickly acquired deeper ideological significance. It became a litmus test for political legitimacy, applied broadly to individuals, parties, and institutions deemed loyal to the Turkish state and its vision.

This was not merely rhetorical. The phrase became central to Erdoğan’s political strategy, instrumental first in regaining parliamentary majority in November 2015 and later in consolidating political power. Erdoğan and his allies continually reiterated the phrase, solidifying it as a guiding political doctrine.

Between the two elections, escalating domestic violence and regional instability allowed Erdoğan to reframe the November vote as a referendum on national survival. The narrative proved effective: within five months, the AKP’s vote share increased by 10 percentage points, restoring its parliamentary majority.

It was clear that the secular–religious divide could no longer sustain political dominance. Instead, a new polarization emerged: patriotic (millî) versus unpatriotic (millî olmayan), defined by loyalty or opposition to the state’s nationalist agenda.

This framework began forming even earlier. From 2013 onwards, Erdoğan portrayed the Gezi protests and the December 17–25 corruption investigations as foreign-backed conspiracies. After September 2015, this rhetoric intensified, positioning state-defined patriotism as the primary benchmark for political legitimacy.

Political legitimacy increasingly depended on alignment with state-defined patriotism. The main opposition CHP, traditionally criticized for rigid secularism and association with the old elite, became cast as unpatriotic. Pro-government columnists urged “true Kemalists” to reclaim the CHP to restore its patriotic credentials. A “patriotic CHP” was framed as vital for national cohesion; an unpatriotic CHP was portrayed as a threat.

The Erdoğan government redefined Turkey’s “main contradiction” — no longer between secularists and Islamists, but between patriots and non-patriots, as determined by the state. This redefinition compelled secularist factions to reconsider their positions.

Remarkably, Kemalist-nationalist circles, historically fierce critics of Erdoğan, softened their stance. Retired generals who once accused the AKP of undermining secularism now supported its hawkish approach to the Kurdish issue and its defiance of Western powers — viewing these positions as aligned with national patriotism. Even the ultra-nationalist Vatan Party, which had fought bitterly against the AKP during the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials, began viewing Erdoğan’s government as a necessary ally against unpatriotic forces.

All this occurred before the July 15, 2016 coup attempt. After the failed putsch, the existential threat narrative became sacrosanct. Everything the government did was framed as patriotic; all dissent was cast as unpatriotic. This framework dominated political life through the end of 2024.

The Limits of Exclusionary Patriotism

By late 2024, both internal calculations and regional shifts had exposed the limitations of this exclusionary framework — particularly its marginalization of Kurds.

A turning point came on October 1, when MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli publicly shook hands with MPs from the pro-Kurdish DEM Party during parliament’s opening session. On October 22, he issued an unprecedented public call to jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. These symbolic gestures signaled a major recalibration of the nationalist agenda.

Bahçeli linked his outreach to rising regional instability, particularly in Syria. In December, the sudden collapse of the Assad regime gave added urgency to his appeal and clarified that national cohesion — including the Kurdish population — had become a strategic imperative.

Erdoğan initially maintained distance from Bahçeli’s initiative, uncertain about its implications for his power. However, the political calculus was straightforward: to push through a new constitution and maintain long-term rule, Erdoğan would need the support — or at least the neutrality — of the Kurdish political movement. The existing People’s Alliance (Cumhur İttifakı), rooted in Turkish nationalist exclusion, no longer possessed the strength to govern alone.

The key question became whether Bahçeli’s initiative could be integrated into Erdoğan’s strategy. After Bahçeli declared, “This is now a state project, and the head of state must carry it forward,” Erdoğan shifted course. In a subsequent speech, he referred to the AKP, MHP, and DEM collectively as “we” — a powerful signal of alignment and strategic recalibration.

Toward a Kurd-Inclusive Nationalism

What Erdoğan and Bahçeli are now pursuing is a redefinition of patriotism — one that includes Kurds as legitimate political actors within the state-aligned national consensus. In this new configuration, the CHP would likely be cast as the primary unpatriotic force — once again positioned outside the bounds of acceptable politics.

While Erdoğan successfully shifted Turkey’s political axis from secular-religious to patriotic-unpatriotic, this next transition — constructing a Kurd-inclusive nationalism within the same state-aligned framework — will likely prove far more complicated to manage.

What is emerging in Turkey represents not merely a tactical rapprochement between the state and the Kurdish movement, but the early contours of a new ideological framework — one that we might call civilizational patriotism.

This new phase reframes Turkish-Kurdish relations not in terms of minority inclusion or multicultural reform, but as the revival of a shared civilizational alliance that long predates the modern nation-state. It represents a nationalism redefined by historical memory, strategic necessity, and regional realignment.

In a February 2025 letter calling for the PKK’s disarmament, Abdullah Öcalan advanced a powerful reinterpretation of Kurdish-Turkish history. He argued that the modern system of nation-states — particularly over the past 100 to 200 years — artificially divided Kurds and Turks. In contrast, he highlighted a thousand-year history of cooperation, dating back to the 1071 Battle of Manzikert.

“Turks and Kurds,” Öcalan wrote, “found it necessary to remain in this voluntary alliance to maintain their existence and survival against dominant powers.”

His emphasis on a “voluntary alliance” marks a significant ideological departure. Rather than pursuing separatism, Öcalan’s framing appeals to a deeper civilizational logic: that Kurds and Turks historically coexisted as strategic partners — a model now worth reviving.

This discourse has found surprising resonance not only within Kurdish circles, but among key Turkish nationalist figures. Both Erdoğan and Bahçeli, since launching the new peace process, have repeatedly invoked the idea that “Turks and Kurds have been allies for a thousand years — excluding only the last hundred.” The alignment of this message across political camps suggests a deliberate attempt to craft a unifying historical narrative as the foundation for a new national ethos.

The emerging framework blends patriotism — defined as alignment with the Turkish state — with civilizational belonging, grounded in a shared Islamic and imperial past. In this new formulation, to be millî (patriotic) is no longer limited to ethnic Turks; it extends to those who affirm a common legacy and regional destiny. It represents a flexible but state-centric vision — civic in rhetoric, yet selective in inclusion.

Another central element driving this ideological transformation—and potentially defining the emerging political axis—is a convergence around shared perceptions of regional threats, notably concerning Israel’s expanding influence. Bahçeli’s outreach to Öcalan and the DEM Party in October 2024 coincided with rapid geopolitical shifts following the 2023 Gaza war. Leaked notes from Öcalan’s prison interviews reveal that he, too, views Israeli dominance as destabilizing to regional security. This mutual threat perception has become a unifying rationale across previously opposing ideological groups, forming a strategic basis for this new alignment that transcends purely domestic political considerations.

If the peace process with the PKK advances, these interconnected elements—shared civilizational heritage, strategic necessity, and mutual regional threat perceptions—are likely to usher in a new political era. This emerging model is neither liberal multiculturalism nor a revival of Kemalist assimilation policies; instead, it embodies a distinct form of civilizational patriotism. Its aim is to build a cohesive, diverse national coalition firmly aligned with an assertive Turkish state envisioned not merely as a national entity but as a rising regional powerhouse capable of benefiting both Turks and Kurds amid an increasingly fragmented Middle East.