Written by
Turkey Expands Permanent Military Bases in Kurdistan Region to 136, an 89% Increase Since 2018

A new investigation has revealed that the number of Turkey’s permanent military outposts in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq has surged by 89% since 2018, increasing from just 15 to at least 136.
Context: According to satellite imagery analyzed by experts, alongside field reports and credible sources, the Turkish military had established at least 136 permanent bases in the Kurdistan Region by January 2024, as reported by the BBC. Notably, 89% of these outposts have been constructed since 2018. Through this expansive military infrastructure, Turkey has effectively asserted control over more than 2,000 square kilometers of territory in the Kurdistan Region and Iraq, forming a militarized buffer zone that stretches along nearly the entire border, reaching up to 40 kilometers deep in some areas. Satellite imagery also reveals the construction of approximately 660 kilometers of military roads connecting these outposts. However, in a March 2025 interview, Iraq’s national security advisor estimated the number of Turkish bases to be just over 100, suggesting a lack of transparency or definitional differences between “base” and “outpost.”

Analysis: While peace negotiations are currently underway between imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and the Turkish state, the statistics shed light on the dramatic transformation in Turkey’s counter-insurgency strategy against PKK during the 2018-2024 period compared to previous campaigns.
While Turkey has long maintained a presence in northern Iraq—most notably since 1992 when the U.S.-led coalition imposed a no-fly zone and enabled the formation of the Kurdistan Region—its earlier military bases, including the Bamarne air base, served both operational and political functions. They were used not only as forward operating posts against PKK fighters who used northern Iraq as a staging ground for attacks into Turkey, but also as a means to both support and contain the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).
Historically, Turkey launched several major incursions into northern Iraq during the 1990s and early 2000s, but these operations were largely temporary, with troops withdrawing ahead of winter due to harsh terrain, weather, and limited logistical capabilities. This began to change in the mid-2010s, as Turkey’s domestic defense industry advanced significantly—most notably in drone warfare, but also in ground surveillance and electronic warfare technologies. The collapse of the Turkish–PKK peace process further accelerated this shift. As the PKK adopted more urban warfare tactics, Turkey responded with a drone-enabled decapitation strategy, targeting high-ranking operatives and command nodes beyond its borders.
Simultaneously, Ankara moved to externalize the conflict by establishing a permanent and expanding military belt inside the Kurdistan Region. This strategy not only reduced PKK activity inside Turkey but also allowed the Turkish military to sustain pressure year-round, including winter operations, to deny the PKK time or space to regroup. As a result, the PKK now maintains fortified positions in only a few remaining strongholds, such as the Gara and Qandil mountains.
In 2024, both sides signed a memorandum of understanding to cooperate against the PKK, removing restrictions on Turkish forces operating inside Iraq. However, Turkey’s strategic calculations have been complicated by the emergence of PKK-aligned forces controlling northeastern Syria. Ankara had likely hoped to neutralize this front quickly, but U.S. military backing has made such an outcome more costly and elusive.
While the PKK conflict ultimately requires a political resolution due to its inherently political nature, Turkey’s apparent strategy has been to substantially weaken the PKK militarily to negotiate from a position of strength, minimizing necessary concessions. Nevertheless, given the challenging topography that directly connects to mountainous terrain in Turkey, coupled with evolving regional dynamics, a Turkish withdrawal from the Kurdistan Region remains highly improbable in the foreseeable future, even if the PKK were to disband.
PKK-Turkey Conflict Data


Fatalities in Turkey and Northern Iraq
According to Crisis Group's fatality tally, last updated on 20 January 2025, at least 7,152 people have been killed in clashes or attacks since 20 July 2015.
Breakdown by category:
* The Unknown category (2,126 fatalities) includes cases whose affiliation is ambiguous, falling between PKK militants and civilians.