A senior Syrian government official has revealed that Damascus, in coordination with the United States, has proposed a scaled-down “integration” model starting with Deir ez-Zor province. This pilot stage is intended to serve as a framework for the future integration of Raqqa and Hasakah provinces. However, pro-SDF media outlets have denied any plans to hand over the area or “integrate” into the Syrian state.

Context: Qatiba Idlibi, Director of the U.S. Affairs Department at Syria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told state media that there is a serious proposal to implement the March agreement between Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa and SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi. The proposal centers on the “integration” of all SDF-controlled areas in Deir Ezzor province into the Syrian government as both a model and first stage toward the full integration of all SDF territories.

Deir Ezzor province, predominantly Sunni Arab in demographics, is divided by the Euphrates River, with the western portion under Syrian government control and the eastern half controlled by the SDF. The Syrian Foreign Ministry announced in a July 25 statement that meetings with the SDF would take place in Paris “as soon as possible” to finalize implementation of the March 10 agreement.

Analysis: This is the most explicit and serious proposal to date concerning SDF–Damascus integration. Yet, Idlibi offered no details about what “integration” would actually mean in practice, leaving the process and its terms ambiguous.

Meanwhile, Ronahi TV, affiliated with the PYD (the political wing of the YPG, which forms the SDF’s core), has categorically denied reports that Deir ez-Zor would be handed over to the Syrian government. According to Ronahi, ongoing negotiations aim to establish a framework where residents of each region would assume responsibility for managing their own military, civil, and service affairs. In essence, Ronahi claims that even the Deir ez-Zor model under discussion would constitute a form of decentralization rather than full integration. The outlet also denies any “integration” of the SDF into the Syrian army.

Still, there are signs of serious movement. On Sunday, July 27, SDF commander Mazloum Abdi convened a high-level meeting in the town of al-Shaddadi in southern Hasakah with military commanders, local council leaders, and tribal elders from Deir ez-Zor. According to Enab Baladi, the meeting aimed to secure agreement on the SDF’s withdrawal from all areas of Deir ez-Zor under SDF control, paving the way for full Syrian government control. The outlet also reported that this decision came under direct pressure from the United States.

Notably, the U.S. has already withdrawn from its three military bases in eastern Deir ez-Zor and no longer maintains a presence in the province.

According to, Syria TV, an Istanbul-based channel with ties to the Syrian government, Mazloum Abdi told attendees during the same meeting that while the SDF does not intend to dissolve the Autonomous Administration or hand over areas under their control, a series of meetings with the Syrian government would soon begin. These meetings, Abdi reportedly said, would focus on transferring control of official state institutions—including military facilities—starting with Deir ez-Zor, followed by Raqqa and Hasakah.

Enab Baladi further suggests that this Deir Ezzor handover phase would serve as a trial period, limited to a maximum of three months. Based on the results, a final decision would be made regarding the future of Raqqa and Hasakah provinces—the SDF’s primary strongholds in northeastern Syria.

In a conference in April, Syrian Kurdish parties adopted a decentralization framework for Kurdish areas, seeking a format that would create contiguous Kurdish territories. Ilham Ahmed, co-chair of the Foreign Relations Department of the Autonomous Administration, told An-Nahar newspaper, “We seek genuine partnership in the Syrian state. We seek our role in shaping Syria’s future alongside all Syrians. Our core demand is a decentralized Syria.”

However, the ethnic and political landscape of SDF-held territory complicates this vision. Large parts of the areas under SDF control—especially Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, and southern Hasakah (e.g., al-Shaddadi)—are majority Sunni Arab. Many of the prominent tribal structures in these regions remain skeptical of the SDF’s political orientation and governance model.

Without broad-based Arab support, any attempt to implement a decentralized model risks remaining fragile and contested. Even if such a framework were put to a referendum, its prospects in Sunni Arab regions such as Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, and parts of Hasakah would be uncertain, especially given growing affinity in those areas with the reconstituted Syrian state, now led by a Sunni Arab president.

As talks progress, the most likely outcome may be a bifurcated arrangement: Kurdish-majority areas may receive a form of autonomy under a decentralized framework, while Arab-majority regions revert to full central government control. Damascus, which remains inflexible on this issue, will likely offer concessions in exchange for SDF relinquishment of control over Sunni Arab areas.

However, implementing such an arrangement will be complex. In Hasakah province in particular, Kurdish and Arab areas are deeply intertwined—geographically, demographically, and economically—making a clean division difficult to achieve without triggering new tensions.