A senior official from the SDF-backed northeast Syria administration has told The National Context that the SDF and Syrian government have so far only agreed to “engage in dialogue as two Syrian parties” and the “continuation of previous agreements,” including an all-out ceasefire on all fronts. The official also said negotiations now center on changes to Syria’s transitional constitution, mechanisms for integrating the SDF into the Syrian army, and the governing system. However, core differences remain, and no agreements have been reached on technical details beyond the commitment to continue dialogue.

Context: SDF commander Mazloum Abdi told AFP that the parties have reached a “preliminary agreement” to reorganize the SDF into three military corps and integrate Asayîş (internal security) into the Syrian interior ministry. This detail was also reported by the Istanbul-based Syria TV and confirmed by senior SDF-backed PYD official Foza Yûsif.

Analysis: As the year-end deadline approaches to implement the March 10 agreement on SDF integration into the Syrian army, Mazloum Abdi has a vested interest in promoting even modest verbal understandings with Damascus, given growing Turkish—and by extension American—pressure to take practical steps. However, discussions with Syrian Kurdish officials and conditions on the ground indicate the gap remains substantial and unlikely to be easily bridged.

The agreed-upon restructuring of the SDF into three corps is largely procedural and was anticipated once integration was accepted in principle. The real sticking points are command and control: Who will command these divisions? Will they answer to a single authority or different bodies? What is the future of the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), and who will direct their decision-making? How will the United States engage with this new structure, and with whom specifically?

These questions matter far more than the number of divisions because the core dispute centers on chain of command—which is directly tied to Syria’s governance structure. The SDF envisions its forces essentially becoming the de facto army of their region within a decentralized Syria. Damascus envisions the opposite: breaking up the unified SDF command while offering symbolic concessions, such as allowing SDF commanders to remain in the three divisions but under direct defense ministry control with no lateral coordination.

In reality, the SDF seeks not integration into the current Syrian army but a merger to create something new. As the former SDF representative in Sulaimani stated, “disagreements remain deep, because the issue goes beyond administrative arrangements—it concerns the re-founding of the Syrian state.” Damascus, meanwhile, offers only limited administrative autonomy restricted to majority-Kurdish areas. The Syrian foreign minister, a key negotiator with the SDF, has offered as little as three hours per week of education in Kurdish.

Developments on the ground also point to escalation. Despite a ceasefire following clashes in Aleppo between Syrian government forces and pro-SDF fighters in two Kurdish-led neighborhoods, the siege on these areas continues. Movement between SDF-controlled and government-controlled areas has been severely restricted in the past ten days, leading to food price increases—tomatoes and cucumbers have tripled in price in the SDF region.

Despite the stalemate and the looming deadline, President Al-Sharaa’s government does not appear eager for a direct military confrontation with the SDF. Damascus faces multiple challenges, including the unresolved crisis in Sweida and a worsening economic situation. The recently passed U.S. Senate Cease Repeal Act, which emphasizes minority protection and avoiding military escalation with Israel (though framed as “neighbors”), also complicates the regime’s calculus. For Al-Sharaa, maintaining an ambiguous status quo may be preferable to risking a protracted conflict that could destabilize his grip on power. He is unlikely to accept the SDF’s demands but also reluctant to initiate a full-scale military campaign. Ankara, however, may not wait.

Turkey is more impatient to resolve the SDF question. The likely scenario, if Turkey deems the extent of progress unacceptable, involves Turkey unilaterally resuming its air campaign through drone strikes to degrade SDF capabilities rather than launching a full-scale war. Turkey’s strategy may follow a gradual, piecemeal approach—as with Afrin in 2018, Ras al-Ayn in 2021, and the December 2024 push for Manbij and Tal Rifaat.

Underestimating Turkey’s willingness to act would be a strategic error; Ankara considers the SDF a core national security issue and may accept significant risks to achieve its objectives. Its leverage is reinforced by broader geopolitical dynamics — from its relationship with the U.S. to shifting Middle Eastern alliances and its dealings with Europe.

Crucially, the deadline for implementing the March agreement was largely set under U.S. and Turkish patronage. If Damascus–SDF negotiations show tangible progress, Ankara might tolerate a limited settlement, especially given its sensitive domestic “Kurdish opening” and ongoing talks with the PKK. Escalation, therefore, is not inevitable — but it remains an ever-present lever.

Whatever comes next, a real breakthrough between Damascus and the SDF remains unlikely. The most probable scenario is continued status quo absent major geopolitical shifts favoring one party.