A Strategic and Geopolitical Analysis of its Implications for the Kurdistan Region and Iraq.

1.

Until very recently, Assad was presumed to have won the Syrian civil war, and many had turned the page as Syrian rebels were squeezed into a diminishing stronghold. However, those who thought so ignored a fundamental principle of warfare: A determined enemy must be crushed completely. If one ember is left alight, no matter how dimly it smolders, a fire will eventually break out. More is lost through stopping halfway than through total annihilation – the enemy will recover and seek revenge. The rebels were thus able to buy time to regroup. The second half of this rule proved equally important: while ruthlessness might be necessary to survive in war, excessive brutality can backfire if seen as unnecessarily cruel or immoral. Assad violated both principles, and in retrospect, it was clear his precarious position needed only a trigger to collapse.

2.

Now five years later, the Middle East is undergoing seismic changes, largely triggered by the October 7 events of 2023, which proved as geopolitically significant as 9/11 or the Arab Spring for the region. The extent of foreign involvement remains unclear, but given the broader regional context, it is difficult to view the Syrian rebels’ actions as an isolated development. The level of coordination displayed by the rebels, coupled with their use of drones and other advanced technology, strongly suggests the involvement of external powers, particularly from Turkey. The rebels lack the technical expertise to independently develop or manufacture such drones, and their geographical constraints mean all material support must flow through Turkish territory. While reports of Ukrainian military training support are plausible, such assistance would necessarily require Turkish facilitation.

3.

This context is essential for understanding both the local and regional dimensions of the unfolding events. Having established this framework, we can now examine why Aleppo’s fall represents such a pivotal strategic shift:

– Aleppo was Syria’s largest city by population, serving as its industrial hub and most well-connected urban center. It is uniquely positioned as the only province where both of Syria’s international highways, the M4 and M5, intersect, making it the country’s critical transportation nexus. Strategically, control of this province provides the best platform for military operations both southward and eastward.

– Syria historically comprises three distinct regions: the Aleppo region, which was deeply integrated into the Ottoman Empire and which Turkey considers its strategic depth, extending naturally from Mosul and northern Iraq; the Badia, encompassing Deir Ezzor and the eastern Syrian desert, which shares cultural and tribal ties with Iraq’s Anbar province; and Damascus, firmly embedded in the Levant (traditionally known as al-Sham).

– The opposition’s control of Aleppo establishes a viable statelet that rivals both Assad’s Damascus-based government and the SDF-controlled northeast. This development not only revitalizes the rebels’ position but elevates them to equal status with Assad. Their position is potentially even stronger, as they now control the most economically viable and strategically significant portion of the country, particularly given their proximity to Turkey.

4.

Implications for the Kurdistan Region and Iraq:

– The Iraqi and Kurdish media are rife with both speculative and serious analyses regarding the interconnectedness of events in Syria and their impact on Iraq. Given the shared social fabric, geographic continuity, and involvement of regional actors, developments in Syria have direct and significant implications for Iraq.

– To illustrate the extent of this interconnection, consider the recent stalling of a landmark three-part legislative package in the Iraqi parliament. This package included an amnesty bill for Sunni prisoners, alongside bills addressing Kurdish land restitution and Shia Personal Status Law. Due to the unfolding situation in Syria, Shia factions expressed concerns about releasing Sunni prisoners, causing the entire package to be suspended.

– Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani further emphasized these links during a public call with Turkish President Erdogan, stating that Iraq could not accept the treatment of certain sects in Syria.

– Discussions have also emerged about potential U.S. plans to “reset” the region, focusing on empowering Sunni areas in Iraq and putting Shia rulers on the defensive as part of a broader strategy to weaken Iran. While such plans remain speculative, the collapse of the regional status quo is evident, paving the way for further changes.

– In the Kurdistan Region, media coverage has extensively focused on the displacement of Syrian Kurds following the SDF’s withdrawal from Aleppo. Images of thousands of displaced Kurds have struck an emotional chord, drawing parallels with the loss of Peshmerga-held territories in Iraq’s disputed areas.

– The U.S. military presence in Syria is directly tied to its presence in Erbil, which serves as the primary logistics hub for American operations in the region. This connection underscores the deeply intertwined dynamics between the Kurdistan Region and SDF-controlled northeast Syria.

– The U.S. presence in Erbil also serves as a key indicator of the future prospects for Kurdish regions in both Syria and Iraq. Sandwiched between Turkey and Iran, the Kurdish areas are strategically positioned, and their fate is heavily influenced by external actors.

– Finally, the enduring importance of any actor—no matter how weakened—must not be underestimated. Returning to a foundational principle, unless an actor is completely eliminated or brought into a meaningful agreement, the potential for their resurgence remains. This applies to Kurdish factions, which have solidified their role as key players in the region. For example, Turkey, despite claiming significant military victories against the PKK, still seeks negotiations. Turkey recognizes that groups like the PKK, which combine political and militant strategies, can leverage geopolitical shifts to regain influence. In such cases, the adage that “war is politics by other means” rings true—military weakening does not equate to political irrelevance.

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