The impending retirements of Abu Fadak al-Muhammadawi, Chief of Staff of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), and Abu Zainab al-Lami, head of the PMF Security Agency, have ignited discord within Iraq’s Iran-aligned Shiite factions. The controversy stems from a contentious article in the proposed “PMF Service and Retirement Law,” which has stalled in parliament and exacerbated internal divisions. Yesterday’s parliamentary session, intended to address the issue, was abruptly canceled, leaving the matter unresolved despite a personal intervention by Hadi Amiri, leader of the Badr Organization. Tehran, closely monitoring the situation, views the PMF as a critical pillar of its influence in Iraq—a stance underscored by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s warning to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani a month ago to safeguard the militia coalition. This warning comes in the wake of escalating regional tensions, including the shifting dynamics in Syria and U.S. threats to crack down on Shiite militia groups if they are not brought under tighter control.

Parliament Cancels Its Session

The Iraqi Parliament withdrew its agenda for yesterday’s session and canceled the meeting. According to parliamentary sources, the session was called off following a visit by Hadi Amiri, leader of the Badr Organization, who sought to resolve disputes over the PMF Service and Retirement Law. Amiri met with Deputy Speaker Mohsen Mendlawi and leaders of the Coordination Framework, the coalition of Iran-aligned Shiite factions.

Disagreements persist within the Coordination Framework, which includes figures such as Nouri al-Maliki, Hadi Amiri, Qais Khazali, Falih Fayyad, Haider al-Abadi, and Ammar al-Hakim. The primary point of contention is an article in the proposed PMF Service and Retirement Law that would enforce the retirement of approximately 4,000 fighters from the so-called “Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis generation.” Abu Mahdi, the PMF’s former deputy chief, was killed alongside Qasem Soleimani, commander of Iran’s Quds Force, in a U.S. drone strike near Baghdad airport—an event that marked a significant setback for the PMF and Iran’s influence in Iraq.

The session’s cancellation comes shortly after Hadi Amiri and Falih Fayyad, head of the PMF Commission, convened a meeting with PMF commanders to discuss the law’s implications. However, no consensus was reached.

• 

  PMF (Popular Mobilization Forces)

  Main Command

  • 

    Falih Fayyad

    Chairman of PMF Commission

    • 

      Abu Fadak al-Muhammadawi

      Chief of Staff

    • 

      Abu Zainab al-Lami

      Head of PMF Security

  • 

    Hadi Amiri

    Leader, Badr Organization

  • 

    Qais Khazali

    Leader, Asaib Ahl al-Haq

  • 

    Akram al-Kaabi

    Leader, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba

  • 

    Abu Alaa al-Walai

    Leader, Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada

The Retirement Controversy: Abu Fadak and Abu Zainab

The disputed article could force even Falih Fayyad into retirement, prompting alarm among PMF commanders who see the law as part of a broader government strategy—possibly under U.S. pressure—to dismantle the militia’s core armed groups. The Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee had previously prepared the draft law for a vote, but amendments proposed by some lawmakers led to its withdrawal for revisions. Committee member Ali Bandawi defended the law, arguing it supports PMF members by securing benefits for martyrs’ families, the wounded, and active personnel.

However, Abu Mithaq Masari of the Badr Organization highlighted the law’s potential to retire over 3,500 elite PMF members who exceed the legal age limit, including Abu Fadak and Abu Zainab—figures he deems indispensable, often referred to as “Hajis” within the militia. One proposed workaround—to retire these officials and rehire them as contractors—remains divisive within the Coordination Framework. Proponents of their retention argue that contract status would strip them of authority, advocating instead for permanent roles. The Sudani government, meanwhile, insists on enforcing a mandatory retirement age of 60, offering advisory positions to placate retiring commanders. This compromise has failed to satisfy those determined to preserve their political and operational influence.

Critics within the PMF suspect the Sudani administration is exploiting the law to integrate the militia fully into Iraq’s state security apparatus, thereby curbing its autonomy—a move some interpret as aligning with U.S. interests. For now, PMF commanders face a stark choice: accept the changes or risk losing their leverage entirely.

Khamenei’s Message to Sudani

The PMF, an umbrella group comprising over 70 Shiite armed factions loyal to Iran, is at the center of a broader geopolitical struggle. Given the PMF’s external allegiances, any decision affecting its structure inevitably invites Tehran’s intervention.

During Sudani’s recent visit to Tehran, he met with Ayatollah Khamenei, who explicitly instructed him to safeguard and strengthen the PMF—an unexpected directive, particularly given that prior to Sudani’s trip, Ismail Qaani, commander of the Quds Force, had visited Baghdad. Shiite political sources indicate that Iran is determined to maintain its influence in Iraq, especially in light of the shifting regional landscape following the Israel-Hamas war.

To secure its long-term foothold, Iran is reportedly considering dissolving several PMF factions and transitioning them into political entities. This strategy would allow these groups to contest Iraq’s future elections while shielding them from potential Israeli or U.S. military actions. The recent escalation of disputes over the PMF law coincided with a visit to Tehran by Mahmoud Mashhadani, the Speaker of Iraq’s Parliament, where PMF-related issues were a key topic of discussion. Iranian officials have since increased their diplomatic engagements in Baghdad.

The PMF was established in 2014 in response to a fatwa from Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani calling for a popular mobilization against ISIS, which had seized control of one-third of Iraq’s territory. On November 26, 2016, the Iraqi Council of Representatives formally recognized the PMF as an official security entity under the prime minister’s authority.

According to data from the Policy Planning Center, Shiite fighters constitute approximately 85% of the PMF, with Sunni components making up the remaining 15%. Leadership within the PMF, however, remains exclusively Shiite.

Before his assassination in July 2020, security researcher Hisham Hashimi published a detailed study on the PMF, highlighting internal divisions within the force. Hashimi identified 67 Shiite factions, 43 Sunni factions, and 9 minority-affiliated groups operating within the PMF. Among the Shiite factions, 44 adhere to Khamenei, 17 to Sistani, and 6 to other Shiite authorities inside and outside Iraq.

Hashimi’s research estimated the PMF’s total manpower at 164,000, encompassing combat forces and logistical personnel. The Shiite component accounted for approximately 110,000 personnel, the Sunni component for 45,000, and minority factions for around 10,000. The PMF’s legal framework is anchored in Law No. 40 of 2016 and administrative orders issued in 2019, including Orders No. 237, 328, and 331.

As Iraq navigates this critical moment, the PMF’s future remains uncertain. Whether the retirement law signals a broader effort to restructure the force or an attempt to diminish its power, the outcome will have significant implications for Iraq’s security landscape and Iran’s regional influence.