Following the PKK’s recent congress, which adopted a resolution for disarmament and eventual self-dissolution in response to a call from their imprisoned leader Abdullah Öcalan, the process has now entered a crucial stage involving weapon handover. According to Turkish reports, the process comprises five phases, with the current one being the most logistically intensive.

Turkish media have provided detailed insights into how this disarmament phase will unfold. They assert that tailored strategies are being implemented separately for Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran, reflecting unique logistical and structural challenges in each country. The Turkish side also emphasizes that this multi-faceted approach includes the PKK’s regional offshoots, notably PJAK in Iran and the YPG in Syria.

Importantly, the reports deny any role for third-party or international actors such as the UN. Instead, the entire disarmament operation will reportedly be conducted and verified by Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MİT), in coordination with the respective countries where PKK fighters are based.

Within Turkey, the number of remaining PKK militants is estimated to be low, making that front the most straightforward. In contrast, Iraq, where much of the PKK’s core leadership is based and where the group operates fortified strongholds such as Qandil, Gara, and Matina, presents a more complex challenge. According to pro-government columnist Abdulkadir Selvi, these bases will be evacuated as part of the process. However, PKK spokesperson Zagros Hiwa, speaking to the pro-PKK outlet Sterk TV, rejected claims of disarmament or base evacuation, insisting, “Before we can talk about laying down arms, we must discuss the withdrawal of Turkish occupation forces from the Kurdistan Region.”

Despite this resistance, Turkish intelligence appears heavily involved in guiding the process forward—mirroring how Erdoğan and AKP officials previewed the PKK congress days before it took place.

Turkish ultranationalist leader and key Erdoğan ally Devlet Bahçeli hinted at potential legal steps that may accompany the disarmament push. These include easing conditions for the release of certain Kurdish political prisoners and ending the practice of removing elected Kurdish mayors—a reform explicitly committed to by President Erdoğan. Additionally, improvements to Öcalan’s prison conditions may soon follow, notably the normalization of visitation rights.

Turkish media estimates suggest around 8,000 to 10,000 armed PKK militants currently operate across the four affected countries, predicting a disarmament timeline of approximately four months. President Erdoğan confirmed coordination with the Iraqi government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in facilitating this phase.

Notably, multiple pro-government columnists simultaneously reported near-identical details about the five-stage disarmament process and related specifics, strongly indicating a coordinated effort to disseminate these narratives. This includes assertions that Iran is being consulted to extend disarmament efforts to PJAK.

For PJAK, Turkey is reportedly in contact with relevant actors to devise a mechanism for their inclusion in the disarmament effort. Given Iran’s history of providing the PKK with critical support at various junctures, Tehran’s cooperation is considered essential. Notably, Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani visited Iran today, with the PKK disarmament and PJAK’s future reportedly among the key agenda items.

As for Syria, the situation is more complicated. The reports claim that the March agreement between Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi is tied to the broader disarmament process. The agreement allegedly outlines the integration of SDF fighters into the Syrian army, but with a critical caveat: Turkey insists the fighters disarm and join individually—a condition rejected by Abdi, who has long demanded that the SDF be incorporated as a unified bloc.

The agreement itself is deliberately vague, likely to allow for future negotiations. This unresolved issue could become a flashpoint. Nevertheless, it would be surprising if the PKK would agree to complete disarmament without parallel assurances regarding the SDF’s future—potentially through backchannel guarantees.

Both Turkey and the Syrian government deny the existence of any such agreement. The Syrian government recently rejected a Kurdish unity conference that advocated federalism—signaling continued resistance to Kurdish autonomy.

Further complicating matters, the Syrian government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa now enjoys the support of both Turkey and Saudi Arabia, bolstering his position against the SDF, especially as U.S. forces continue their slow withdrawal. Though a small American presence may remain, the Trump administration’s posture clearly favors Ankara and Riyadh, further undermining the SDF’s negotiating position.

Given these complexities, it remains uncertain precisely how the PKK’s disarmament will proceed. However, Öcalan’s insistence on disarmament and Bahçeli’s recent signals of imminent legal reforms suggest the process may accelerate, potentially concluding within months.