Iraq’s upcoming parliamentary elections have allocated 9 seats out of 329 for minority groups, but the voting mechanism for these quota seats has reignited controversy among minority communities who fear it deepens the systematic manipulation of their representation. Despite the nine seats being ostensibly tied to specific electoral districts, the ballot design means that any voter in Iraq—unlike in general elections which are bound to designated electoral districts—can determine who fills them, not just members of those minorities or the district itself.

Context: Iraq allocates quota seats for five Christian MPs and one each for Yazidis, Shabaks, Mandaeans, and Feyli Kurds. These seats are geographically distributed across specific governorates: Christian seats span Baghdad, Nineveh, Erbil, Duhok, and Kirkuk, while the other four are tied to a single province each. However, the voting mechanism has stripped the quota system of its protective intent. Rather than restricting voting to members of the relevant minority, any registered voter anywhere in the country can vote for these seats, regardless of their religious or ethnic affiliation or geographic location. In the 2021 elections, the pro-Iran Christian Babylon Movement won four out of five seats, with the fifth going to a pro-KDP candidate. The other four minority seats, including the Yazidi seat, were captured by pro-Iran groups.

Analysis: This mechanism has drawn widespread criticism and legal scrutiny. In 2022, Iraq’s Supreme Federal Court ruled that the one-seat allocation for Yazidis and Shabaks, despite their sizable populations, violated constitutional equality. Separately, Christian leaders, including Chaldean Patriarch Louis Sako, have called for reforms that would limit voting for quota seats to members of the minority community only, arguing that the current system enables external actors to “hijack” minority representation. Though part of Sako’s push stems from his rivalry with pro-Iran Babylon Movement leader Rayan Al-Kildani.

Recent amendments to the electoral law in 2023 left this fundamental flaw untouched. The result is a system in which quota seats provide symbolic inclusion but no electoral sovereignty. Minority candidates endorsed or backed by dominant Arab or Kurdish parties often prevail, while independent or community-rooted voices are drowned out. What was intended as a safeguard has effectively become a channel through which political blocs consolidate power.

Looking ahead to the 2025 elections, this dynamic is expected to intensify. Of the nine quota seats, the KDP and Shiite-backed groups are positioned to dominate most contests. In Nineveh, the province with the most minority seats (Christian, Yazidi, and Shabak), Shiite-aligned lists are likely to control the Shabak and Christian races, while the KDP is expected to focus its efforts on reclaiming the Yazidi seat, capitalizing on the large number of displaced Yazidi voters now living in Duhok who retain voting rights in Nineveh, though pro-Shiite groups still have a higher chance of taking the Yazidi seat as well.

The overall map of quota seats is likely to largely resemble the 2021 outcome. The KDP is expected to retain the Erbil Christian seat, work systematically to regain the Duhok seat, and focus its efforts in Nineveh solely on the Yazidi quota, where it has a stronger chance. The Christian and Shabak quota seats in Nineveh are likely to remain under Shiite-backed groups. In Kirkuk and Baghdad, the Christian seats are also expected to remain with Babylon, while Baghdad’s other seat and Wasit’s quota contests are similarly projected to favor Shiite-aligned factions.

The system’s impact has become fundamentally paradoxical: what was designed to empower minorities has instead institutionalized their political dependence. For some within these communities, the distortion has become so pronounced that they argue having no quota at all might be less damaging than a framework that allows dominant factions to control their representation. Without tokenized seats, they contend, minorities might have more space to cultivate genuine grassroots activism, free from the influence of externally backed candidates.