With Iraq’s parliamentary elections scheduled for November 11, 2025, the Shiite actors which have been the main pillar of the post-Saddam order in Iraq are competing amid the most significant evolving geopolitical landscape since assuming power post-2003. Given the central role they play in shaping the Iraqi state, it is essential to understand the electoral dynamics within the Shiite political sphere.

According to the Election Commission, over 29 million Iraqis are eligible to vote, doubling the electorate since the 2005 elections. Currently, 343 parties hold permits, with 118 confirming participation and 60 undergoing registration processes. Despite constitutional requirements (Article 49) stipulating one parliamentary seat per 100,000 citizens, the parliament maintains 329 seats, comprising 320 general competition seats and nine minority quotas. Although justified by cost and operational challenges, this decision represents a constitutional discrepancy.

Election Conditions and Atmosphere

Several influential factors shape the 2025 electoral landscape:

– Prominent Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr, who won the previous election (73 seats), is boycotting. To reinforce the political weight of his boycott, Sadr has encouraged his followers to renew their biometric voter registrations en masse, only to abstain later. This strategy aims to undermine the election’s popular legitimacy by ensuring that the abstention is visible and quantifiable. In mixed Sunni-Shiite areas, Sadr’s absence may also shift the balance in favor of Sunni candidates—a concern even among his Shiite rivals.

– The fall of the Assad regime and the weakening of Iran’s regional influence have fueled optimism in Sunni political circles. Many believe this opens a path to roll back Iranian influence in Iraq especially since the last parliamentary session was artificially constructed due to the redistribution of Sadr’s seats among pro-Iran groups. Some Sunni figures are even discussing the possibility of reclaiming the premiership, especially given the current calm in Sunni-majority provinces. This has triggered a defensive reaction from Shiite leaders, who argue that the premiership is not just about numerical majority but a historical entitlement earned through sacrifices in the fight against ISIS.

– There is rising anxiety among Shiite factions about external interference, specifically from countries like Turkey and Qatar. Nouri al-Maliki has warned of a state allegedly offering $1 million per seat to buy influence in the next parliament with plans to “buy” 100 parliamentary seats. While his rhetoric may be aimed at mobilizing his base, concerns about vote buying are widespread. Reports suggest biometric voter cards are being sold for up to 500,000 dinars in Baghdad and between 75,000–300,000 in Mosul. The Election Commission denies the scale of such practices but promises investigations.

– While boycotting the vote, Sadr issued a fatwa permitting his supporters to accept money and gifts from candidates, on the condition that they neither vote for them nor surrender their biometric cards. He argues that this money belongs to the people, not the politicians. This directive may significantly inflate campaign costs for Shiite parties and render parts of their spending ineffective.

– Voter registration trends indicate waning enthusiasm in Shiite strongholds. As of late May 2025, eight million eligible voters had not updated their biometric data. In contrast, turnout for voter card renewal is high in Sunni-majority provinces like Anbar. Shiite parties fear this disparity reflects growing disillusionment among their base, driven by poor governance and discontent with Iranian-linked political forces.

Shiite Lists: Unity and Competition Dynamics

The pro-Iranian Shiite-led Coordination Framework will temporarily fragment across multiple lists, except in Sunni-majority provinces. This internal competition among Shiites centers on redistributing political positions and resolving the Prime Minister succession question. Given the inherently unstable nature of power distribution among Shiite factions, significant potential exists for internal shifts and realignments within Shiite representation. This strategy aims to measure individual political strength, with eventual reunification planned post-election to consolidate their power, maintain Iranian backing, and manage internal power distribution.

Current indications suggest the ruling Coordination Framework will divide into over 10 separate electoral lists. Competition intensity is heightened by the participation of prominent Shiite figures as list leaders, particularly given the shift to provincial-level constituencies rather than the previous election’s 83 smaller districts.

Baghdad province exemplifies this dynamic, housing nearly one-quarter of Iraq’s population (10 million residents) and offering 69 parliamentary seats plus 2 quota positions. This concentration creates substantial opportunities for electoral competition and vote mobilization efforts.

Key Shiite Alliances and Lists:

1. Al-Sudani’s “Development and Construction” Alliance: This coalition represents current Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s bid for a second term, leveraging infrastructure and service delivery achievements in Baghdad and other cities. Al-Sudani’s decision to lead this list as the top candidate in the capital has generated considerable frustration among Shiite competitors.

Official alliance participants include al-Sudani’s al-Furatayn movement, Falih Fayyad’s al-Aqd al-Watani (representing the Hashd apparatus leadership), former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi’s al-Wataniya coalition, and various smaller tribal and civil society forces. The alliance officially aims to strengthen economic infrastructure, ensure stability, and improve Iraq’s international relations, though the primary objective remains securing al-Sudani’s reelection.

Alliance representatives project winning approximately 100 seats, though many observers consider this optimistic given the limited popular support of several component groups. As the incumbent government list, more realistic estimates suggest 60-70 seats, while skeptics anticipate even lower results due to the alliance’s reliance on smaller, less influential entities.

The precedent of Haider al-Abadi—who despite serving as Prime Minister during the ISIS conflict achieved disappointing results in 2018—serves as a cautionary example. However, al-Sudani may benefit from visible infrastructure projects completed during his tenure and the traditional electoral advantages enjoyed by government lists.

2. Maliki’s State of Law Alliance: Former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s coalition represents the primary challenge to al-Sudani’s rising prominence. The alliance comprises approximately 10 Shiite entities, prominently featuring the Islamic Dawa Party alongside forces such as al-Nahj al-Watani (Fadhila Party), Abu Alaa al-Walai’s Muntasirun movement (representing the Iran-linked Sayyid al-Shuhada Brigades), Yasser al-Maliki’s Basha’ir faction (led by the alliance head’s nephew and son-in-law), and Turkmen Islamist groups under Jasim Jaafar’s leadership.

The alliance’s central objective is facilitating Maliki’s return to the Prime Minister position. Al-Sudani’s emergence from Dawa Party ranks as an independent leader threatens Maliki’s interests and represents a significant political challenge. Maliki brings substantial advantages including proven electoral tactics, a stable popular base, extensive patronage networks, and eight years of prime ministerial experience that inform his alliance-building strategies.

3. Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq Movement (Sadiqun List): This list represents the Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq movement under Secretary-General Qais al-Khazali’s leadership. Originally emerging from the Sadrist movement and maintaining ties to the Iranian axis, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq seeks to emphasize its Iraqi credentials in this election cycle.

The organization has gained prominence through government participation, military capabilities, ISIS war contributions, media presence, and notable public figures. Beyond controlling Babylon province, the movement holds the Higher Education Ministry and maintains significant influence within al-Sudani’s government. Movement representatives characterize their independent electoral participation as promoting diversity rather than fragmentation, emphasizing shared objectives with other Shiite forces.

Strategically, the list includes tribal components from Salahuddin province (Tikrit), building on successful precedents where Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq previously elected both a female candidate (Nasak al-Zanki) and a Sunni male representative (Mohammed al-Baldawi) from that province.

4. Badr Organization List (Hadi al-Amiri): The Badr Organization’s electoral list leverages the armed group’s extensive patronage networks and leader Hadi al-Amiri’s credentials as a prominent Hashd al-Shaabi commander and veteran resistance figure. Al-Amiri initially planned to join al-Sudani’s alliance but withdrew, reportedly due to disagreements over supporting al-Sudani’s reelection bid.

Badr maintains a significant military presence within Hashd al-Shaabi, substantial Iranian connections, and extensive influence in the Interior Ministry and state security apparatus. The organization’s electoral strategy targets its employment and security sector base, though it faces challenges from competing Shiite military factions including Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and newer second- and third-generation forces formed after the ISIS conflict.

5. Hakim-Abadi Alliance (State National Forces): This moderate Shiite alliance builds on the partnership between the Hakim family legacy and former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s governance experience. Despite weak 2018 electoral performance, the alliance demonstrated improved results in 2023 provincial council elections, generating optimism for increased parliamentary representation.

The coalition plans to incorporate additional forces and personalities, particularly those aligned with October 2019 protest movements and civil society activism. The alliance emphasizes the Hakim family’s symbolic capital, Abadi’s administrative experience, and moderate positioning relative to hardline Coordination Framework elements while attracting prominent candidates and public figures.

6. Al-Mandlawi Alliance (Al-Asas): Deputy Parliament Speaker Mohsen al-Mandlawi’s political base encompasses new Shiite forces equivalent to civil opposition and dissenting movements as well as leveraging his Fayli origin to attract Fayli Kurdish votes. Official announcements identify 22 participating entities representing diverse Iraqi regions under the slogan “correcting the political process trajectory.”

Alliance components include entities affiliated with the Imam Ali Brigades operating under the “Iraq National Movement” designation—an armed faction within Hashd al-Shaabi’s structure.

7. Al-Eidani-Fayyad Alliance (Tasmeem): Basra Governor Asaad al-Eidani’s coalition leverages his prominence and influence in southern Iraq, incorporating social and economic figures with parliamentarian Amer al-Fayyad serving as list leader. Al-Eidani seeks to maintain independence within Shiite political space while capitalizing on his gubernatorial administrative position.

Reports suggest his independent participation aims to challenge al-Sudani for the Prime Minister position with potential Sadrist backing, given positive historical relationships. The alliance’s primary slogan emphasizes “achieving Basra’s rights” from the federal government, reflecting recent tensions with central government authorities and al-Sudani’s administration.

8. Supreme Islamic Council Alliance (Abshir Ya Iraq): Led by Supreme Islamic Council head Humam Hamoudi, this alliance officially pursues “correction for a better future” while opposing political “fragmentation.” The Supreme Islamic Council serves as the primary institutional supporter, though the organization has significantly declined in Shiite political influence following the departure of Badr and Hikma movement, reducing its role to largely symbolic parliamentary participation.

Shiite Coordination in Sunni Provinces: Multiple Coordination Framework lists have formed joint electoral coalitions in Diyala, Nineveh, and Salahuddin provinces to counter rising Sunni political influence. While legally and constitutionally permissible, this strategy represents a political risk by positioning Shiite forces outside their traditional popular bases in direct competition with Sunni candidates.

These efforts aim to capitalize on ISIS war contributions, create divisions among Sunni tribal constituencies, and purchase electoral support while benefiting from post-ISIS demographic and political changes. Specific alliances include the Salahuddin Alliance, Diyala First Alliance, and al-Hadba alliance in Mosul. Kirkuk discussions about establishing a Shiite front remain preliminary without clear organizational details.

The 2025 elections showcase a strategic, temporary fragmentation of Shiite political groups to gauge individual strengths, anticipating reunification post-election. Shiite factions remain wary of Sadr’s boycott impact, foreign interference through financial manipulation, and shifting regional dynamics post-Syrian regime collapse. The core internal competition centers around Baghdad, the key electoral battleground, where prominent leaders Maliki and al-Sudani vie intensely for dominance, reshaping Shiite political influence and positioning for future governance.