KDP-PUK negotiations stall over parallel power structures as region faces mounting economic and security challenges.

More than 100 days have elapsed since the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) elections, yet the formation of a new cabinet remains at an impasse. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), who secured the first and second positions respectively in the elections, remain deadlocked over power-sharing arrangements and the alleged existence of a shadow government.

According to well-placed sources, several critical points of disagreement continue to stall negotiations:

1. The PUK has demanded one of the two top positions—either the prime ministership or the presidency of Kurdistan. However, the KDP has firmly rejected this demand. Both roles are currently held by the KDP, with Masrour Barzani serving as prime minister and Nechirvan Barzani as president. Control over both offices is crucial for maintaining the internal balance of power within the Barzani family, particularly given the rivalry between the two cousins. For now, their competition remains contained largely due to the presence of family patriarch Masoud Barzani, whose influence has helped keep tensions in check.

2. Another major point of contention is the allocation of key ministries. The PUK has insisted on controlling the Ministry of Interior, with informed sources indicating that Derbaz Kosrat Rasul is being considered for the role. Meanwhile, his brother, Shalaw Kosrat Rasul, is positioning himself for the Parliament Speaker’s post—should the PUK secure it. If this arrangement materializes, it would effectively tie the distribution of these two key positions to the Rasul family, although it remains unlikely that they will secure both posts simultaneously.

 Both Derbaz and Shalaw are the sons of veteran PUK leader Kosrat Rasul, who remains one of the most influential figures within the party, second only to the Talabani family in terms of power. Despite his retirement, Kosrat Rasul continues to wield significant influence, particularly due to his control over two brigades within the PUK’s armed forces. His sons, however, are now closely aligned with PUK leader Bafel Talabani, solidifying their position within the party’s power structure.

3. Another major point of contention centers on the shadow government structure: Prime Minister Masrour Barzani has established a parallel governance system through a network of advisors and consultants who effectively oversee policy domains that mirror official ministries. This shadow administration has steadily eroded the authority of formal ministries, reducing them to largely ceremonial institutions. While the official ministries face chronic budget constraints, these parallel structures enjoy considerable authority and direct access to a special budget under the Prime Minister’s control. This funding reportedly draws heavily from unofficial oil revenue streams, which has served to consolidate the shadow government’s influence while leaving formal ministries financially hamstrung.

In the ongoing negotiations for the new KRG cabinet, the PUK has made the dismantling of this parallel structure a key demand. They insist on removing ministerial advisors and officials who effectively operate as an alternative government, arguing for a return to legally defined ministerial roles and responsibilities. The KDP, however, has firmly rejected this proposal, maintaining that the Prime Minister’s constitutional authority includes the right to appoint advisors with executive powers, viewing this as a fundamental prerogative of the Council of Ministers’ leadership.

Two additional procedural issues remain unresolved:

First, the PUK insists on a joint parliamentary confirmation process, where both the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister would face a simultaneous vote of confidence and take their oaths of office together. The KDP, conversely, advocates for separate voting and swearing-in procedures for these positions.

Second, the PUK seeks to include a ‘mutual dependency clause’ in the government formation agreement, stipulating that the resignation of either the Prime Minister or Deputy Prime Minister would trigger the dissolution of the entire government. The KDP has rejected this provision, viewing it as an unnecessary constraint on governmental stability.

Given these dynamics, and based on an assessment of the parties’ positions, the absence of a KDP-PUK agreement could significantly delay cabinet formation for the foreseeable future.

While some KDP officials have privately suggested they could secure sufficient parliamentary support to form a government without the PUK, the parliamentary arithmetic presents a different reality. The numbers make it highly improbable for the KDP to achieve the required simple majority (50%+1) needed for government approval.

Several key parties have already ruled out joining the government:

The Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) (7 seats) has publicly announced that it will not be part of the next government. Although speculation arose following party leader Salahadin Bahauddin’s visit to Turkey—with rumors suggesting that Ankara had convinced them to reconsider—the party ultimately stood by its decision to remain in opposition.

The Kurdistan Justice Group (KJG) (3 seats) has taken an even more radical stance, not only refusing to join the government but also declining to participate in parliamentary sessions altogether.

The New Generation Movement (NGM) (15 seats), the Halwest faction (2 seats), and the Change Movement (Gorran) (1 seat) have all officially declared that they will not take part in the government.

The combined parliamentary strength of these parties amounts to 28 seats, effectively reducing the number of potential coalition partners for the KDP.

The remaining wild cards in this political equation are the People’s Front and the Kurdistan Region Alliance of Communist and Socialist Parties. The People’s Front currently holds 2 seats but is actively working to expand its parliamentary presence to potentially 4 or 5 seats by attracting defectors from other factions through various political inducements. The Kurdistan Regional Alliance maintains a single seat, and its position remains ambiguous.

This parliamentary configuration makes it mathematically challenging, if not impossible, for the KDP to form a government without PUK support, despite suggestions to the contrary from some KDP officials.

Given these circumstances, two primary scenarios emerge:

Scenario One: The most likely outcome is that the KDP will be unable to form a government without PUK participation, leading to a prolonged period of political deadlock. Initially, it was expected that the new cabinet would be formed after the Iraqi elections, but shifting political dynamics have disrupted this timeline. Additionally, unconfirmed reports suggest that next month, the Trump administration may announce a series of policy decisions with significant implications for Iraq and, by extension, the Kurdistan Region. These developments could further complicate government formation or reshape the broader political landscape in Kurdistan, introducing new variables into an already fragile situation.

Scenario Two: The less probable but still possible scenario involves the KDP attempting to form a government without PUK participation through a series of agreements with smaller parties. This scenario would require securing unexpected alliances or engaging in vote-buying—a difficult but not impossible task. This approach would mirror the 2020 scenario, where the KDP could establish a government while deliberately leaving PUK-allocated positions vacant, creating a pressure campaign that would eventually force the PUK to accept participation under less favorable terms. In such a scenario, the PUK would be left with two difficult choices: either remain in the opposition, risking further marginalization, or reluctantly enter a government where they have little actual influence—a structure effectively designed and controlled by the KDP.

This approach, however, would likely escalate tensions and further entrench political divisions within the Kurdistan Region, potentially destabilizing governance at a time when internal cohesion is already under strain. Unless a breakthrough is achieved, Kurdistan risks slipping into a prolonged period of political inertia and intensifying factional disputes, further straining governance at a time when economic and security conditions are deteriorating. With no clear resolution in sight, the region faces the prospect of deepening instability, compounding existing crises and undermining efforts to restore political and institutional functionality.