Kurdish Parties Seat Modeling (Modified Sainte-Laguë 1.7)

Inside the Kurdistan Region: Expensive Seats
The allocation formula—using divisors of 1.7, 3, 5, 7, and so on—slightly favors larger parties, making additional seats in strongholds extremely expensive in raw votes.
In Erbil, where KDP currently wins nine of 15 general seats on the base model, adding a tenth seat would require approximately 40,917 additional votes—more than the entire vote total of several smaller parties. Meanwhile, KDP could lose one of those nine seats if its vote total dropped by around 36,610 relative to the 2024 baseline.
PUK, which wins three Erbil seats in the base projection, would need roughly 32,105 new votes to claim a fourth. Losing one would take a decline of about 19,580 votes.
In Duhok, KDP’s dominance is even more entrenched. The party wins nine seats, but a tenth would cost approximately 47,313 additional votes—nearly equal to the total votes cast for the third-place party in the province. KDP could lose a seat only if it shed around 42,333 votes. PUK, which wins no Duhok seats in the base model, would need to gain roughly 11,639 votes just to win its first.
Sulaimani shows the reverse dynamic. PUK dominates with eight seats, but claiming a ninth requires about 29,001 more votes. It could drop to seven seats with a loss of roughly 22,061 votes. KDP, holding two seats, needs approximately 21,368 additional votes for a third, and risks falling to one seat if it loses around 15,797.
These thresholds explain why, absent a major turnout surge or party realignment, the Kurdistan Region map is likely to remain close to the base projection. The mathematical barriers to seat gains are simply too high.

The Disputed Territories: Where Every Vote Counts
The real volatility, and the real opportunity, lies in the four disputed provinces.
In Kirkuk, the most hotly contested battleground, the base model allocates four seats to PUK and just one to KDP. But the margins are razor-thin.
KDP could win a second Kirkuk seat with only 9,335 additional votes—less than a quarter of what a second seat would cost in Duhok. PUK could claim a fifth seat with roughly 27,188 new votes. Going the other direction, KDP’s single seat becomes vulnerable with a loss of about 17,409 votes, while PUK risks losing its fourth seat if its total drops by around 14,068.
Even more striking: the final seat in Kirkuk is determined by a margin of just 129 votes between competing Arab and Turkmen lists. Small shifts in those communities—a list merger, a tribal alliance, differential turnout—can reorder the entire seat allocation without a single Kurdish vote changing.
Nineveh presents similar opportunities. The base model gives KDP six seats to PUK’s two. KDP could gain a seventh with approximately 19,270 more votes and risks losing one with a decline of about 6,052. PUK could win a third seat with roughly 11,057 additional votes, but its second seat would be at risk if it lost around 13,788.
Here too, the last seat hangs on about 299 votes between two non-Kurdish lists, meaning Kurdish parties could benefit from Arab coalition dynamics they don’t directly control.
Diyala offers PUK a single seat in the base model. Winning a second would require approximately 15,687 more votes. Losing the existing seat would take a decline of only 3,605 votes—making it one of PUK’s most vulnerable positions.
Salahaddin is the most complex case. PUK’s presence comes through the Al-Jamahir list rather than direct competition. The district’s last-seat margin sits at roughly 1,335 votes between two Arab lists, meaning any change in how the affiliate arrangement is handled—or in Arab alliance configurations—could shift PUK’s effective total without any change in underlying Kurdish turnout.

Read more:

Iraqi Parliamentary Election System: How Seats Are Allocated?

Tribes, Alliances, and Margins: Inside Kirkuk’s Tight Parliamentary Race

Iraqi Parliamentary Election: Kurdistan Region Seat Projections for Major Political Forces

Why This Model Works—and What It Can’t Tell You
Our approach differs from traditional polling in two important ways. First, it doesn’t try to predict voter behavior. Instead, it maps known voting patterns onto new electoral rules to show structural advantages and vulnerabilities. Second, it makes the math transparent: every seat gain or loss threshold is calculable, not estimated.
The model holds 2023–2024 vote totals constant but reflects 2025’s actual list configurations. In Kirkuk, for example, we show the same aggregate Arab and Turkmen vote pool from 2023, but distribute it across this year’s alliances: the Arab Alliance backed by Khamis Khanjar (but weakened by Nuaimi tribal defections), Taqaddum consolidating networks from tribal chief Mohammad Obaid and various defectors, Azm regaining Nuaimi support, and the new Hasm list drawing dispersed backing.
In Nineveh, we present the 2023 National Contract vote under Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s current Reconstruction & Development banner, reflect Sheikh Abdullah al-Yawar’s strengthened position with Nineveh for its People, show Hadbaa as the Coordination Framework’s consolidation vehicle, and maintain Hasm as a competitive force.
This methodology explains why our base projection is more than an academic exercise—it’s a realistic “first look” at what November 11 is likely to produce.
The Modified Sainte-Laguë formula’s 1.7 divisor anchors strongholds. KDP’s dominance in Erbil and Duhok, and PUK’s in Sulaimani, are difficult to dislodge because challengers must leapfrog not just the final quotient but an entire stack of them. At the same time, intense inter-Arab competition in Kirkuk, Nineveh, and Salahaddin leaves last seats finely balanced—creating opportunities for Kurdish parties through targeted mobilization or strategic alliance shifts precisely where the cutoffs sit.

The Interactive Tool: Test Your Own Scenarios
The model we’ve built allows readers to move beyond our base projection and test alternative scenarios. What happens if KDP gains 12,000 votes in Sulaimani? If PUK adds 18,000 in Duhok? If two Arab lists merge in Nineveh?
The interactive visualization recalculates seat allocations in real time using the same Modified Sainte-Laguë formula that will determine the actual results. Users can adjust vote totals for any party in any province and immediately see how seats shift—making visible the hidden mechanics of electoral math that will shape Iraq’s next parliament.
All thresholds we cite assume other lists remain unchanged and represent the minimum vote shift needed either to push one more quotient above the current cutoff or to drop a party’s weakest winning quotient below the best non-winner. Minority quota seats remain outside the Sainte-Laguë calculation and are tracked separately.
The framework can process any counterfactual: a PUK surge in Duhok, a KDP push in Kirkuk, a list merger in Nineveh. Each scenario returns precise seat reassignments and shows exactly how much movement is required, and where, to alter the map.

What to Watch on Election Day
Our base model suggests KDP will enter the new parliament with 27 seats to PUK’s 19—a narrowing from the previous 31–17 split. Within the Kurdistan Region, the projection is KDP 20 to PUK 11 (Erbil 9–3, Duhok 9–0, Sulaimani 2–8), with most remaining seats going to opposition parties like New Generation, Halwest, KIU/Yekgirtu, and Komal. In the disputed territories, the base calculation runs PUK 8 to KDP 7.
But those numbers could shift—quickly—in three scenarios:
First, concentrated vote gains in the tight disputed-territory races, where adding fewer than 10,000 votes in the right province can flip a seat.
Second, structural changes like list mergers, affiliate redesignations, or asymmetric boycotts that move the effective quotient at critical cutoffs.
Third, differential turnout. Because the 1.7 divisor rewards larger vote totals, the party that better mobilizes its base in closely divided districts gains a mathematical edge beyond the raw vote advantage.
The model doesn’t predict which of these will occur. It simply maps what the math will do when they happen—and makes clear that in 2025, Iraqi Kurdistan’s political future may turn less on broad popularity than on several thousand votes in half a dozen precisely identified places.