Following Israel’s military strikes on Iran, Iranian officials have conveyed stern warnings in phone calls to both the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), cautioning that any use of their territories by Iranian Kurdish opposition groups—or any form of assistance to such groups—would trigger severe retaliation, The National Context has learned.

Context: Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi recently held his first phone call with Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani since Israel began its military campaign against Iran. In a separate call, another senior Iranian official reportedly warned PUK leader Bafel Talabani of harsh consequences should he assist anti-regime Iranian Kurdish factions.

Analysis: The initial wave of Israeli strikes created uncertainty about the Iranian regime’s stability, prompting Iranian Kurdish opposition groups, including PJAK, Komala, and KDPI, to go on high alert. These groups have begun issuing coordination calls, signaling their readiness to exploit potential openings within Iran’s Kurdish regions.

The Barzani-Araghchi discussion emphasized strict implementation of the Iran-Iraq security agreement, which mandates the disarmament of Iranian Kurdish opposition groups operating from the Kurdistan Region. Tehran’s readout specifically highlighted preventing “exploitation” aimed at “destabilizing border areas.”

Sources familiar with the matter say Iranian intelligence observed increased movement among Iranian Kurdish groups in the Kurdistan Region, prompting Tehran’s swift outreach to Nechirvan Barzani. Iran harbors similar concerns about the PUK, particularly in light of Bafel Talabani’s recent visit to the United States, where he met with American security officials.

One well-informed source claims Iranian officials threatened Talabani directly—warning they could unleash the PKK and even elements within the PUK against him if he collaborates with Iranian Kurdish militants. The same source added that Tehran warned that any such move would result in bombing campaigns targeting not only Erbil but expanding to Sulaimani as well.

Iranian Kurdish Political Spectrum

Interactive Analysis of 16 Political Organizations

📊 Click or use Tab and Enter on the dots to explore each organization.

Communist
Class Struggle

Socialist
Social Democracy

Democratic
Federalism

Nationalist
Autonomy

Separatist
Independence

Religious
Reform

Source: This is based on The National’s Context’s comprehensive research of sources including party websites, official statements, academic studies, and media reports.

Meanwhile, today, for five consecutive days, drones have been intercepted over Erbil, with a drone near Sulaimani also shot down for the first time. However, the drones’ specifications suggest they serve more as warning signals than actual targeting attempts.

According to one source, Iran’s primary concern centers on a potential Israeli-coordinated strategy involving Iranian Kurdish groups stationed in the Kurdistan Region. Tehran fears that Israel’s bombing of Kurdish border areas was designed to clear territory for Iranian Kurdish infiltration, creating a domino effect where initial territorial losses could cascade across the country, ultimately triggering regime collapse.

Following Iranian warnings, Iranian Kurdish opposition groups in refugee camps have been placed under intensive security measures, with their movements and communications severely restricted. While Iranian threats partly explain this clampdown, the reduced fog of war may have also diminished their calculations about dramatic regime collapse.

Unconfirmed reports circulating in Kurdish and Israeli media claim that the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) has already established a foothold inside Iran. However, this appears unlikely given the group’s limited size—numbering only in the mid-hundreds, most of whom are based in a camp near Erbil—and current IRGC deployments. Open-source footage also indicates that Iranian air defense systems remain active and on high alert along the border with the Kurdistan Region.

While it is plausible that a small number of militants may have crossed into Iran prior to the Israeli offensive, the scale and operational impact is unlikely to be anything serious and appears more intended as a psychological tool. Unlike larger and more entrenched groups such as PJAK, KDPI, or Komala, PAK lacks deep-rooted networks inside Iran and has limited capacity to operate independently beyond symbolic gestures.

It is also worth noting that PAK is widely considered a proxy of the KDP, with its leader, Hussein Yazdanpana, based in Erbil. The group’s few hundred fighters were stationed along KDP-controlled frontlines between Erbil and Kirkuk from 2017 until the implementation of the 2023 Iraq–Iran–KRG security agreement, which forced their relocation to camps further north in Erbil. Moreover, PAK remains significantly smaller and less influential than more established Iranian Kurdish factions such as PJAK, KDPI, or even Komala—each of which commands thousands of fighters and maintains more deeply embedded networks.

Barzani’s Dilemma: While both the KDP and PUK are treading carefully, the KDP faces a unique challenge: PJAK—a key Iranian Kurdish armed group—is outside KDP control and operates from Qandil and nearby mountains, not from KRG-administered camps. Some sources say PJAK is quietly positioning itself to fill any void in Iranian Kurdish areas, aiming to establish facts on the ground much like it did in Syria following the civil war.

Unlike other groups that have shown openness to working with Israeli intelligence, sources indicate that PJAK has avoided such ties. Some even believe the PKK’s presence near the Iranian border is designed not to support an incursion, but to block other groups from moving in. Either scenario poses a serious dilemma for Barzani: if PJAK seizes the initiative, the KDP’s zones could end up flanked on both the eastern and western sides by PKK-aligned forces.

To counter potential PJAK advantages, KDP sources now suggest that Turkey is manipulating PJAK through imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, who is engaged in peace negotiations with the Turkish state. The PKK has publicly announced its decision to disarm and dissolve as part of these negotiations.

By linking PJAK to this process, the narrative appears designed to discredit the group—either to undermine its legitimacy among Kurds or to trigger an Iranian response that curtails its movements. However, the claim of Turkish backing lacks credibility. PJAK’s core area of activity lies in Iran’s Urmia province, a Kurdish-Azeri region where the Azeri population is ethnically Turkic and closely aligned with Turkey. These Azeris are deeply hostile to Kurdish armed groups and form a natural ally base for Ankara. Supporting PJAK—an organization seen as threatening to Azeri interests—would run counter to Turkey’s regional posture. If anything, Turkey is far more likely to back Azeri actors in the region than a Kurdish militant group like PJAK.