For the past week, a protest camp has been set up in front of the UN office in Sulaimani. The two groups leading this movement, including a hunger strike, have warned that they will escalate their actions if their demands are not met. To understand these protests and Sulaimani’s increasingly distinct political culture, several key factors must be considered:

1. The groups behind these protests played a crucial role in the Federal Court’s ruling in February 2024, which mandated that salaries of KRG employees be paid regularly and directly through Iraq’s state-owned banks via the Tawtin system. This system effectively bypasses the KRG and ensures direct salary distribution. However, KRG PM Masrour Barzani has strongly opposed this arrangement.

Following the KDP’s diplomatic reconciliation with Iran and Iraqi Shia groups in May 2024, the issue has remained unresolved, with the Iraqi Prime Minister avoiding intervention to maintain favorable relations with the KDP. The situation has grown more complex as the majority of Kurdish political groups, which combined those groups are holding a parliamentary majority in Kurdistan, now support salary domiciliation through Iraqi state-owned banks, contrary to the KDP’s position. The PUK’s alignment with these groups, combined with Iraq’s upcoming election year, has made supporting the KDP’s stance politically costly within Iraqi Shia circles, leading to renewed pressure for implementing the domiciliation system.

2. While there is some truth to KRG PM’s spokesman’s claim that some hunger strikers have ties to Iraqi factions, particularly Rayan al-Kildani, leader of the pro-Iran Christian militia Babylon, now a PUK ally – this relationship requires nuanced analysis. The protesters themselves do not deny their interactions with figures like Al-Kildani; in fact, their meetings and photographs with him have been public. Their argument is straightforward: they are willing to work with any Iraqi groups that support their cause, viewing such alliances as a necessary strategy to amplify their demands. Additionally, some critics argue that hunger strikers may have personal political ambitions—potentially seeking future parliamentary seats or government positions. This concern is rooted in past experiences, particularly following the March 17, 2011, protests, when some activists were later co-opted into the political system, notably within the Gorran movement. Many former Gorran members who once championed reform are now seen as enablers of Masrour Barzani’s administration. However, not all activists have followed this path, and among today’s protesters, the prevailing view is that seeking political influence is not inherently wrong—as long as it does not come at the expense of their core demands.

3. Sulaimani has long been distinct from Erbil and Duhok in terms of political culture and civic engagement. This divergence dates back to the Baban Dynasty, which founded the city in the late 18th century. Unlike other Kurdish cities, Sulaimani was not historically tied to any dominant tribe, fostering an intellectual and artistic atmosphere that became a center of what can be described as a sort of Kurdish Enlightenment. More recently, since the establishment of the KRG as a political entity, Sulaimani has been under the control of the PUK for most of its political history. This has reinforced its divergent culture, setting it apart from Erbil and Duhok. For example, while Erbil is a Sorani-speaking city, it is culturally closer to Duhok, which speaks Bahdini, due to two key factors: 1. Erbil, like Duhok, has a strong tribal structure, whereas Sulaimani has a long history of weak tribal influence, dating back to the Baban era. 2. Erbil has been significantly shaped by Turkmen culture, which prioritizes stability and commerce over political activism. Thus, the protests in Sulaimani cannot simply be attributed to PUK manipulation. Rather, they reflect a deeply rooted tradition of civic activism that often pressures the PUK leadership to adjust its policies. While Bafel Talabani may attempt to replicate the Barzani model of centralized power, he lacks the means to do so, and Sulaimani’s culture does not support such a system.

4. Sulaimani’s distinct political and civic culture, combined with increasing public frustration over corruption, has fostered widespread resentment toward the KRG. Many residents no longer see the regional government as a protector of Kurdish interests but rather as a self-serving elite that exploits nationalist rhetoric to justify its grip on power while ordinary citizens struggle. This resentment has led to a significant shift in public sentiment. Many people in Sulaimani would now rather receive their salaries directly from Baghdad—even if it weakens the KRG as an institution—than continue to endure economic hardship under a corrupt system. The ruling class, insulated from these hardships, continues to enrich itself while everyday citizens bear the consequences of economic mismanagement and political maneuvering.

This is no longer just a matter of financial security—it is a rejection of a system that people see as exploitative and indifferent to their suffering. The protests in Sulaimani are, at their core, a manifestation of this collective anger, signaling a broader crisis of legitimacy for the KRG and an emerging political reality where traditional power structures are being openly challenged.