As the Iraqi parliamentary elections slated for November 11 approach, the two ruling Kurdish parties – the KDP and PUK – are expected to secure a large majority of the seats in the Kurdistan Region. Governance performance, traditional patronage networks, and tribal kinship have long been studied as drivers of their entrenched dominance. But a newer factor is rapidly recalibrating voting patterns in the Kurdistan Region: the emergence of ‘private sector’ patronage networks.

Context: Since 2019, when Masrour Barzani assumed the Kurdistan Region premiership, the KRG has pursued an aggressive wave of privatisation across a range of public services. In practice, many of these contracts have been awarded to companies owned by, or closely linked to, the Prime Minister, his family, or their allies, as well as to PUK-affiliated businesses in the Sulaimani area.

Some of the most prominent examples are North Light Holding and Ster Group, both associated with Masrour Barzani, which dominate major private sector projects in Erbil and Duhok, and the Qaiwan Group in Sulaimani. Each of these entities employs thousands of staff directly or through subcontracting. Employees are often steered not only to support the ruling parties in general, but in some cases to back specific candidates, as intra-party electoral arithmetic becomes more important under the current electoral system.

Analysis: This analysis does not aim to exhaustively map company ownership structures. Rather, it examines how this new layer of politically connected private capital is reshaping voting dynamics and reinforcing ruling-party dominance in the Kurdistan Region.

There are dozens of large firms tied in various ways to the Barzani family or owned by the PM and his brothers: Lalav, North Light, and Ster Group directly by the PM; Golden Eagle Global and Zom Diaries by his youngest brother Mustafa Barzani; Lanaz refinery and its subsidiaries by his brother Mansour Barzani, each employing hundreds to thousands. Here, the focus is on North Light Holding, which has become a key vehicle for transferring what were once public services into a tightly controlled ‘private’ sphere.

North Light’s official CEO, Sarwar Pedawi, is widely known to be a long-standing surrogate for the Prime Minister’s business interests. Pedawi previously headed Ster Group, which today remains an expansive and influential commercial empire in its own right. While Ster Group continues to operate across multiple sectors, North Light has emerged as the principal vehicle for channelling government-related public services and KRG-adjacent projects into the “private” sphere. The overlap in leadership reinforces the perception that North Light is an extension of the same network rather than a separation from it, but with a more direct role in managing the transfer of public functions and contracts into politically connected corporate hands.

Several core public functions have been outsourced to North Light subsidiaries. Medical testing services and cancer medication distribution in Erbil and Duhok, previously carried out by public institutions, have been handed to Bidco, a North Light company. Quality control and checkpoint inspection services across KDP-controlled areas have similarly been allocated to another subsidiary, New Standard. These moves concentrate both profit and leverage over everyday life in the hands of a politically connected holding group.

North Light Holding and its subsidiaries have also become central to the current election campaign’s project rollout. Many of the high-visibility infrastructure and development initiatives inaugurated or promoted by Masrour Barzani in recent months in Erbil and Duhok are implemented by North Light Living, a North Light subsidiary. Examples include new road projects such as the Lalish–Sheikhan–Etit–Baadre route in eastern Duhok, and the Korê–Shaqlawa–Qandil and Haji Omran roads in Erbil province, as well as parks and public spaces like Sarhaldan Park in Duhok, which has featured in visits by KDP President Masoud Barzani.

Despite the PM’s other real estate ventures, such as Lalav Group (which has received dozens of development contracts across Erbil and Duhok), North Light has expanded into property development with major projects including Beverly Hills, Erbil Garden, and a cancer hospital in Erbil. This holding alone employs thousands who understand they work for a company affiliated with the prime minister. They are either directly encouraged to vote for the KDP or do so because their economic interests align with the party’s success, substantially expanding the KDP’s patronage network. This dynamic was reflected in the KDP’s unprecedented vote counts in Erbil and Duhok during Kurdistan’s regional elections, despite deepening economic hardship, particularly the ongoing salary crisis.

This shift in voting patterns is significant because these employees represent a directed, stable voting bloc that turns out reliably, especially important as overall voter turnout declines. These workers, along with security forces (another crucial voting bloc), have been increasingly mobilized by PM Masrour Barzani for public displays at project launches and groundbreakings. These events display hundreds of workers, as in the case of the newly advertised Erbil green belt project, where many of the “volunteers” appear to be drawn from KDP security forces. One individual profiled on social media, for instance, was a member of the KDP’s Zeravani forces who said he liked to “volunteer” in his free time to help his city.

Beyond simple patronage, the design of this model maximises the benefits accruing to the KDP – and especially to Masrour Barzani. Many of the projects are public services on paper, such as the green belt around Erbil. But they are also large, profit-oriented ventures that generate revenue for the companies involved. In the green belt case, for example, oil and pistachio trees are being planted, with the products to be sold later. The projects thus combine multiple functions: they create visible public goods, generate profit, expand the patronage network, and provide jobs for supporters.

The core problem lies in the monopolisation of business opportunities and the expansion of patronage in a way that risks rendering elections increasingly meaningless. This enables political leaders to control who benefits economically, creating powerful incentives to support the status quo. Over time, such concentration of opportunity and influence risks completely hollowing out electoral competition: when access to employment, services, and investment depends on proximity to the ruling parties’ business networks, the playing field is heavily skewed even before considering their dominance over security and intelligence institutions.

A similar formula has been increasingly adopted by the PUK in Sulaimani. PUK-linked companies such as Qaiwan Group, alongside a growing number of newer firms active in real estate, industrial projects, checkpoint scanning, and cross-border trade, form the backbone of an expanding private sector patronage network. Since the consolidation of party control under Bafel Talabani and his brother Qubad Talabani, these networks have grown more centralised and more closely integrated into the party’s political strategy. This was reflected in the PUK’s performance in Sulaimani in the 2024 regional elections and is likely to shape its approach to the upcoming Iraqi parliamentary elections as well. The party is also attempting to extend this model into Kirkuk, though its diverse demographics and more competitive environment make replication more complex.

Taken together, these trends suggest that ‘private sector’ patronage has become a critical, and increasingly decisive, pillar of political power in the Kurdistan Region, reinforcing ruling-party dominance through a fusion of economic dependency, service provision, and electoral mobilisation.