The current PKK-Turkish talks must be viewed within their regional and global context, as the PKK issue has long been regionalized and even globalized alongside internal Turkish and Kurdish politics. A confluence of factors now makes a settlement feasible. To understand the talks in their true perspective, we must examine the broader context:

The Geopolitical Context

The world has been gradually transitioning to a multipolar order, symbolized by Russia’s war in Ukraine and the October 7 attacks on Israel. A key characteristic of this transition is increasing global destabilization, as we’re already witnessing. With Donald Trump’s return to the presidency, as one European diplomat describes, we’ve re-entered an era of “survival of the fittest.” The Ukraine war has forced Europe to look inward as it grapples with deep structural problems: drastically reduced armies, decades of security dependence on the US, demographic challenges limiting manpower, and difficulties scaling defense production. Unlike much of Europe, Turkey has been preparing for this moment for at least two decades by building a robust defense industry and maintaining a more battle-ready military with substantially higher manpower. Indeed, this readiness was one factor behind Turkey’s notable invitation to the London summit, which can be interpreted as the first steps toward a new European security architecture.

This global shift coincides with major regional changes in the Middle East following October 7, when Hamas launched the most daring attack on Israeli soil by any Palestinian group since Israel’s founding. Since then, Israel has launched wars on multiple fronts with remarkable short-term successes, especially in decapitating much of Hezbollah’s leadership and military capability, forcing Iran into a defensive posture, and in the process losing Syria—a linchpin of Iran’s regional security strategy. However, viewing power beyond just brute force and placing it in a broader context makes Israel’s achievements less impressive: Assad has been toppled as a byproduct of Hezbollah’s collapse and Iran’s forced defensive posture, but Syria has not become safer for Israel. Assad has been replaced by an Islamist faction that likely poses more serious long-term threats to Israel, a group now backed by Turkey, which has greater potential for regional influence given its Ottoman legacy and Sunni identity. Meanwhile, Hamas is rapidly reconstituting itself. In the worst-case scenario proposed by the Arab League, another Palestinian group will govern Gaza. Israel’s overstretched military, coupled with an unpredictable U.S. administration under Trump showing little interest in Middle Eastern entanglements—a cornerstone of Israel’s strategic planning—further complicates its position. Israel will remain powerful but is constrained by demographics, surrounded by hostile actors, and insecure even with countries it has made peace with, such as the UAE, Jordan, and Egypt—hence blocking sophisticated weapons purchases by the US to these countries.

It is against this regional and global tableau that the Ocalan-Turkey peace talks are taking place.

When we merge this with the more localized picture within Turkey and Syria, a clearer image emerges: ironically, while Turkey is at the peak of its power since the republic’s establishment 100 years ago, the PKK, though militarily weakened, enjoys unprecedented political strength via the Kurdish political movement aligned with Ocalan which holds over 10% of parliamentary seats and increasingly plays the role of kingmaker, a major achievement compared to the status of Kurds when the PKK was established. Through this lens, Ocalan’s recent statement gains clarity. Additionally, Ocalan has been laying the groundwork for this moment for at least two decades. His ideological transformation in prison (from Marxist-Leninism to “Democratic Confederalism”) was always intended to lead to a new phase.

Interestingly, the PKK started waging armed struggle as a response to the 1982 military constitution, which suppressed Kurdish political participation, and now it is dissolving as the Turkish state pushes for a new constitution that opens politics to Kurds. This represents a full-circle moment in Turkish-Kurdish history.

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Why This Time Is Different

Furthermore, although there have been at least two previous attempts to resolve the Kurdish issue and reach a settlement with the PKK to lay down arms, this time is different for three key reasons:

1. Unlike the previous two attempts led by Erdogan and Ozal, who were political outsiders, this initiative has the blessing of the Turkish deep state and nationalist elements that have maintained a dominant role in the judiciary, army, and police.

2. This peace process began in complete secrecy, with talks between the Turkish state and Ocalan ongoing for a year before Ocalan’s statement was released, indicating substantial groundwork has been laid.

3. It comes amid seismic geopolitical changes both regionally and internationally.

Interestingly, while the world is experiencing what might be described as a once-in-a-century geopolitical storm that is radically reshaping the world order, much of the Kurdish reaction has been limited to a rather narrow interpretation of Ocalan’s letter and its immediate implications. One issue is that people are accustomed to viewing developments through an ethnocentric or nation-state lens, an approach Ocalan explicitly rejectes. He is not viewing this process through this prism; hence, interpreting the “achievements” for Kurds through such a lens will misguide, confuse, and disappoint.

Ocalan’s Vision: The Return to a Civilizational State

In his letter, Ocalan emphasized something significant: how the modern global system of nation-states over the last 100 to 200 years has divided Kurds and Turks. At the heart of his argument is how, for over 1,000 years, Kurds and Turks were allies, dating back to the Battle of Manzikert, where Turks expanded westward from Central Asia and the Caucasus into Anatolia. Ocalan stated that “Turks and Kurds found it necessary to remain in this voluntary alliance to maintain their existence and survival against dominant powers.”

It is worth noting that Ocalan is a strategic thinker and among the PKK supporters, he has a semi-divine role where it is unthinkable to deviate from his call. What Ocalan calls for is the return to a civilisational state, which appears to be what the world is moving back to. As scholars Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan argue, the emerging “multiplex” world order echoes the pre-1900 era, marked by multiple power centres and cultural diversity, diverging from the Western-centric dominance of the 20th century. In this civilisational state, Turkey can unleash new power which can in return make both Turks and Kurds more powerful and have more influence regionally. Given the Kurdish presence across the region, if Turkey indeed manages to find a formula to become part of its state, it unlocks new tools for the new Turkey’s power projection. But this new Turkey has to be reshuffled and fundamentally change what Turkey is, switching from an ethnicist understanding of citizenship to a civic one where it embraces and encompasses Kurds. From Ocalan’s letter, it appears he might be trying to argue that Kurds have worked and allied with Turks more than any other group over the past 1000 years and this “voluntary alliance,” as he calls it, was not only good for Kurds but also hugely benefited Turks and the Ottoman power projection in the Middle East and beyond. At the practical level, it remains to be seen how this will translate into reality, but consider this question: is it better for Turkey’s Kurds to carve out a Kurdish statelet with limited power, or to become owners and partners in a state that is a regional powerhouse with multi-regional reach? So Ocalan’s attempt appears to be a shift from fighting Turkey to shaping Turkey.

Turkey’s Military Evolution: A Position of Strength

Turkey’s position has evolved significantly over the decades. In the late 20th century, Turkey’s counter-PKK efforts were hampered by Western arms restrictions and embargoes based on human rights concerns, with operations against PKK camps often limited in scope and duration. However, beginning in the 2000s and accelerating in the 2010s, Turkey achieved remarkable military self-sufficiency through its domestic defense industry. The development of indigenous systems such as drones, surveillance systems, and smart munitions transformed Turkey’s capabilities against the PKK, enabling precision targeting and continuous surveillance that denied militants safe havens. The results were dramatic: by 2018-2019, militant casualties far outpaced Turkish losses at a ratio of more than three to one and Turkey drove the PKK conflict out of its borders to Iraq and Syria. This strategic transformation from Western military dependence to self-sufficiency has positioned Turkey to negotiate from strength, having already significantly diminished the PKK’s military threat through its own technological capabilities.

The Two Pillars: Domestic Reform and Regional Strategy

This new paradigm pivots on two foundational pillars. The first is unmistakable: domestic reforms within Turkey, encompassing a new constitution and expanded cultural rights for Kurds. These reforms hint at a profound shift—from the Westphalian nation-state model that has shaped Turkey’s 100-year republican history toward a more civilizational state, evocative of the pre-nation-state era, as the country enters its second republican century. The second pillar—concerning Syria and the fate of the SDF—remains less defined. Yet, connecting these pillars sheds light on Turkey’s overarching strategy, offering a fuller perspective on its objectives.

Turkey’s Complex Syrian Strategy

Turkey’s strategy in Syria appears to be multifaceted: integrating Syrian Kurds into a new Syrian state rather than directly eliminating them. However, the critical distinction is this: Even if Turkey accepts some form of political solution for Syrian Kurds, it will not permit the SDF to maintain its status as an independent military force. The Turkish state’s new domestic initiatives suggest a dual approach: first, separating the Syrian Kurdish question from the PKK issue to address them differently; second, with the PKK peace process underway, positioning itself not merely as an adversary of Syrian Kurds but as a “protector” of their interests within a reconstituted Syria. This strategy allows Turkey to present itself as negotiating for Kurdish rights within the new Syrian framework while simultaneously ensuring the dissolution of the SDF/YPG as an autonomous armed entity.

However, PKK-affiliated circles contest this interpretation. They argue that Ocalan would not have agreed to a settlement that excludes Syria or that permits the SDF to be absorbed into the new HTS-led government in Damascus. These groups maintain that Turkish media reports are simply psychological warfare. This perspective is not without historical precedent. In 2014, Cemil Bayık, speaking from Qandil, asserted: “Turkey cannot resolve the issue in the north by eliminating the status of Kurds in Rojava. If it wants a solution, it must accept the Kurds’ gains in Rojava.” Previous analyses suggested that preserving an autonomous Kurdish structure in Syria could serve as a quid pro quo for PKK disarmament. Even now, some pro-PKK factions believe that PKK disarmament has been negotiated in exchange for preserving the SDF’s position in Syria.

Logically, it seems implausible that any Imrali negotiation would exclude the Syrian dimension. The uncertainty lies not in whether Syria was discussed, but in precisely what arrangements were envisioned. The fact that Ocalan’s letter does not directly address status questions does not indicate that such matters were absent from the Imrali discussions. The call’s lack of explicit reference to the SDF might suggest that the Syrian dimension is either deferred, separated from the Turkish domestic component, or part of an unspoken interim solution. When considering scenarios of deferral or separation, the American factor becomes significant.

While some reports suggest the United States will neither withdraw from Syria nor abandon the SDF—citing Israeli preferences for a divided Syria to prevent empowering the new Islamist government in Damascus—the reality appears different. Trump has consistently advocated for withdrawal from Syria since his first term. His previous attempt to withdraw was derailed because he was politically more vulnerable and surrounded by advisors who favored maintaining the American presence. The current situation, however, differs substantially. Trump’s inner circle now largely embraces an “America First” isolationist ideology, and Republican opposition to his positions has diminished significantly. The dramatic shift in Republican stance on Ukraine following Trump’s change in rhetoric—despite Ukraine’s greater strategic importance—serves as a telling indicator. This precedent suggests that Republican lawmakers are unlikely to oppose a Syrian withdrawal as they did in 2017. Regarding the argument that Israel might oppose withdrawal because of its interest in keeping Syria divided, there is minimal evidence that this aligns with Trump’s priorities. The most likely concession Trump might make would be maintaining a limited troop presence in al-Tanf, at the Syria-Iraq-Jordan junction, primarily to monitor Iran and provide some security for Israel.

The broader regional and global context further complicates matters. Some analysts suggest that France might step in to protect and guarantee the SDF region’s survival, but this proposition lacks credibility. France simply does not possess the capacity to maintain such a presence in a region distant from its borders, particularly when NATO faces internal fractures and France remains preoccupied with the Ukraine crisis. Additionally, Europe increasingly needs Turkey as it reconfigures its security priorities in the face of a resurgent Russia—a Russia that the United States appears increasingly willing to accommodate, potentially to prevent a full-fledged Russia-China alliance and to redirect American focus toward China.

This complex backdrop makes Turkey’s new approach seem puzzling at first glance. However, there is a perspective that helps reconcile these apparent contradictions: Turkey and the United States have reportedly been engaged in quiet negotiations regarding the SDF-controlled regions of Syria for several weeks. These talks likely aim to establish an arrangement whereby Turkey would refrain from launching military operations against the SDF/YPG following an American withdrawal, allowing instead for a peaceful transition. In essence, the Syrian component of the broader settlement is not off the table—it is simply on hold, awaiting further developments in this complex, multilayered negotiation process.

Conclusion: A Strategic Win-Win?

From Turkey’s perspective, this peace initiative represents strategic statecraft: by reconciling with the PKK and integrating Kurds into its political framework, Turkey neutralizes a significant internal security challenge while simultaneously creating conditions for its emergence as a more formidable regional power. Turkey is not making peace out of desperation—it is making peace because it can now dictate the terms of Kurdish political participation within Turkey. This reflects a fundamental geopolitical principle: nations operating from vulnerability tend toward aggressive postures due to limited options, while those operating from strength can pursue political solutions because they possess strategic flexibility. From Ocalan’s standpoint, the PKK’s transformation represents not capitulation but strategic evolution—recognizing that Kurds can wield greater influence as stakeholders within an ascendant Turkish state than as an isolated militant movement operating on its margins. The year-long negotiations at Imrali appear to have crystallized around this central insight: that a reconfigured relationship offers mutual advantages to both Turkish state interests and Kurdish aspirations.