Iraq is heading toward critical parliamentary elections on November 11, 2025, at a moment of extraordinary internal and regional turbulence.

The vote, which will see 28 million eligible voters choose 329 representatives under the individual proportional system, comes as Iraq faces rising external pressures: renewed US-Iran negotiations, escalating Israeli threats, and mounting debates over how to engage with Syria’s newly reshaped political order.

While elections in Iraq have always been pivotal in reconfiguring the country’s fragmented power centers, this cycle stands apart.

A confluence of destabilizing factors—fractures within the Shiite political house, Sadr’s boycott, the politicization of armed groups, regional realignments, and the weakening of Iran’s position—threatens to make the November 11 vote not just a contest for parliamentary seats, but a deeper test of Iraq’s stability and future direction.

Intra-Shiite Divisions

1. Sadr’s Boycott

So far, Muqtada al-Sadr and his movement have decided to boycott the elections, citing a refusal to participate alongside “corrupt” figures. Beyond mere non-participation, the Sadrists aim to actively depress turnout by retrieving biometric voter cards and encouraging abstention, ensuring that non-participation is officially recorded. These measures could destabilize the Shiite political balance, weaken the legitimacy of elected representatives, and further erode an already fragile voter turnout.

For context, in the 2021 general election, the official participation rate was 41% among those who renewed their registration—translating to an effective non-turn out of 59%. When considering all eligible voters, estimates place overall participation below 30%, implying a boycott rate of around 70%. Given the Sadrists’ large, ideological, and mobilized base, their boycott could drive participation rates even lower, resulting in a parliament even less reflective of the Shiite street—similar to the current session, from which they withdrew after the election.

Moreover, if turnout collapses and boycotts rise, the fragmented winning lists may find it difficult to form a unified government, potentially plunging Iraq back into the deadlock experienced after 2021, when government formation was stalled for over a year. Under such circumstances, state institutions would further weaken, external interference could intensify, and security disturbances or mass protests—particularly among non-participants—might erupt.

Although Sadr’s boycott could initially benefit some Shiite factions by increasing their seat share, it raises strategic concerns. Sadr positions himself as an alternative to the political establishment and is distancing himself to expand his popular base. This worries Shiite rivals whose public trust has eroded through prolonged involvement in governance. Furthermore, Sadr’s withdrawal leaves other Shiite forces solely responsible for making difficult decisions on sensitive issues such as relations with the United States and Syria—decisions that could alienate the Shiite public and later be exploited by Sadr for political gain.

2. Al-Sudani’s Candidacy and the Formation of His List

Prime Minister Muhammad Shia al-Sudani has officially confirmed at the “Sulaimani Fourm” that he will contest the elections and seek reappointment. His announcement ended a lengthy internal Shiite debate regarding the appropriateness of an incumbent using his position to campaign—an issue raised by rivals such as former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who argued that Sudani should resign before running to prevent an unfair advantage.

Sudani’s candidacy, with control over the budget, government machinery, and media, could significantly alter the Shiite power equation, mirroring the success of provincial governors in Basra, Karbala, and Wasit during the 2023 local elections. These governors leveraged their positions to dominate in their constituencies.

There is growing speculation that Sudani may form an electoral alliance with these “strong three” governors—Nusaif al-Khattabi (Karbala), Asaad al-Idani (Basra), and Jamil al-Mayahi (Wasit)—as well as a bloc of parliamentarians and smaller civil and political forces. A widely circulated photograph of Sudani with the three governors in August 2024 fueled these rumors. Given that these three provinces account for approximately 50 seats—nearly one-third of the 180 seats from Shiite-majority provinces—such an alliance could be formidable.

An internal investigation by the Shiite Coordination Framework estimated that Sudani could independently secure around 10 seats, and together with allied forces, could reach up to 60 seats—one-third of Shiite representation in parliament.

The forces currently seen as leaning toward Sudani include Ammar al-Hakim’s Wisdom Movement, Haider al-Abadi, Popular Mobilization Forces chief Falih al-Fayyad, Labor Minister Ahmed al-Asadi, and various newer organizations. Some reports even suggest that Hadi al-Amiri and the Badr Organization could join his coalition.

3. Fragmentation of Shiite Lists

The Shiite Coordination Framework will contest the elections through five or six separate lists rather than as a single bloc. Outside Sudani’s alliance, Haider al-Abadi and Ammar al-Hakim are collaborating; Qais al-Khazali’s Asaib Ahl al-Haq will run independently; Maliki’s State of Law coalition is running alone; and factions within the Popular Mobilization Forces, along with parties like the Islamic Supreme Council, may form one or two additional alliances.

Though the fragmentation is likely temporary—with plans to reunite post-election—contesting separately during a period of regional upheaval leaves the Shiite house vulnerable at a critical juncture.

4. Participation of Armed Groups

Some Shiite armed factions, particularly within the “Resistance Axis” such as the Hezbollah Brigades, are campaigning for what they term “political jihad” in the elections. This marks a shift stemming from recent military setbacks suffered by Iran’s regional allies and reflects Iran’s efforts to consolidate influence through electoral politics rather than armed struggle.

5. Retreat into Sectarian Rhetoric

Following Assad’s fall and the ascendancy of Sunni armed groups in Syria, calls for establishing a Sunni autonomous region in Iraq have gained renewed momentum. In reaction, some Shiite forces have revived sectarian rhetoric, advocating for a “Shiite state” and slogans like “Shiite oil for Shiites.” This marks a retreat from previous commitments to Iraqi national unity, reflecting both frustration and the weakening of the Shiite political position.

Regional Conditions

1. Iran-US Negotiations

The resumption of US-Iran negotiations has raised pressing questions about the fate of Iran’s allied Shiite factions in Iraq. Observers note that Iraq—particularly the Popular Mobilization Forces—may not escape the repercussions of any future US-Iran agreement.

With Donald Trump back in the White House, there is renewed pressure to curtail Iranian influence across the Middle East. US officials now treat Iraq as an extension of the “Iran file,” signaling diminished tolerance for Iranian proxies.

Reports suggest Iran may be using its regional militias, including those in Iraq, as bargaining chips in its negotiations with Washington, seeking sanctions relief and concessions on its nuclear program. Whether these reports are accurate or part of psychological warfare, the reality remains that Iranian-aligned forces in Iraq are increasingly exposed. Groups like Hezbollah Brigades, Harakat al-Nujaba, and Asaib Ahl al-Haq are designated terrorist organizations by the US and now face heightened scrutiny, particularly after Israeli accusations at the UN that they were involved in anti-Israel operations.

Should US-Iran talks collapse, Iraq risks being caught in the crossfire of a broader regional conflict, with the Shiite political-military apparatus in Iraq being especially vulnerable.

2. The Syrian Shadow over Iraqi Shiites

Another divisive issue within the Shiite political arena is how to engage with the new Syria. Except for Sadr, most Shiite factions view the rise of the “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” (HTS)–aligned interim Syrian government with deep suspicion, given its roots in Salafi-jihadism and its hostility toward Shiism.

Despite these concerns, Prime Minister Sudani—representing the Shiite Coordination Framework—engaged directly with Syria’s interim president Ahmed Sharaa and HTS leader Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, via Qatari mediation. Sudani confirmed that Sharaa was invited to the Arab Summit scheduled in Baghdad in May.

This has ignited fierce controversy. Maliki’s State of Law, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and other Shiite factions have launched a campaign to block Sharaa’s visit, citing his alleged involvement in anti-Shiite violence during Iraq’s post-2003 insurgency. They are rallying 50 parliamentary signatures to prevent his arrival.

Proponents, however, argue that inviting Sharaa aligns with Iraq’s national interests and regional integration strategy, especially as Iraq seeks Gulf and Turkish investment to offset Iran’s declining influence.

Critics warn that Sharaa’s support from Turkey and Gulf states—countries accused of interfering in Iraq’s 2025 elections with money and intelligence operations—poses a long-term threat to Shiite power.

Official records indicate Sharaa (under the alias Amjad Muzaffar Naimi) was detained by US forces in 2005 and held in Bucca prison until 2010 but later released due to lack of evidence. Sharaa maintains that his activities targeted US forces, not Iraqis.

Nevertheless, Sudani faces a political dilemma: accommodating regional allies by hosting Sharaa could alienate his Shiite base ahead of elections—a risky tradeoff.

The November 2025 election represents one of Iraq’s most sensitive political junctures, unfolding amid profound regional shifts in Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. The Shiite political camp, weakened by Iran’s declining regional clout and its own internal fragmentation, now faces the challenge of navigating US-Israel-Iran tensions, a transformed Syria, and internal populist pressures—without the unity it once possessed.

This disarray provides an opportunity for Sunni and Kurdish political forces—if they can avoid replicating the Shiite camp’s internal divisions and manage their own rivalries in the volatile electoral environment.