In 2011, Ahmed Shar’a, then a recently released al-Qaeda prisoner, left Iraq for Syria, which had just entered the early stages of the Arab Spring. Now, in May 2025, he is set to return to Iraq—this time as Syria’s interim president—to attend the Arab Summit in Baghdad. His impending visit has deeply polarized Iraq’s political scene, splitting it into two camps: one advocating for engagement with the evolving Syrian reality and welcoming Shar’a, and another that vehemently opposes his presence. The controversy has become a litmus test for Baghdad—whether it can assert itself as a sovereign state or remain beholden to pro-Iranian Shiite factions that have long shaped Iraq’s post-2003 political order.

The upcoming Arab League Summit, scheduled for May 17, 2025, in Baghdad, follows a series of significant summits addressing regional crises, notably the ongoing Gaza war. This summit comes after events in Bahrain (May 2024), Riyadh (November 2023 and 2024), and Cairo (March 2025).

Iraq’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, tasked with logistical and protocol arrangements, views the successful hosting of the summit as crucial for enhancing Iraq’s international reputation and bolstering joint Arab cooperation amid increasing isolation of Iran by the Trump administration and Israel’s aggressive stance on Iran’s nuclear program.

Domestically, the summit represents a critical political opportunity for Sudani, coinciding with an election year. As Sudani competes with prominent Shiite figures like former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, he views the summit as a strategic platform to position himself as a statesman on par with other Arab leaders, especially since his limited international connections distinguish him from Iraqi politicians who lived in exile.

While Arab summits historically serve ceremonial purposes rather than decisive political action, Sudani is attaching significant political weight to the event. Furthermore, hosting the summit enables Iraq’s government and various Shiite factions to signal their nation’s regained security, stability, and reintegration within the broader Arab political framework, a message particularly crucial for pragmatic Shiite groups seeking alternatives to Iran’s overwhelming influence.

The Controversy over Ahmed Shar’a’s Invitation

The most contentious issue ahead of the summit is the invitation extended to Ahmed Shar’a. A former al-Qaeda affiliate who spent years in U.S. custody in Iraq, Shar’a later emerged in Syria under the nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Jolani. There, he led Jabhat al-Nusra before forming Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), aligning with Ayman al-Zawahiri and espousing jihadist Salafism—an ideology fundamentally hostile to Shiism. His legacy is stained in Shiite memory as that of a militant who targeted their community.

In a move aimed at quelling criticism, Prime Minister Sudani confirmed via American media that Shar’a had indeed been invited. Justifying the decision, Sudani emphasized Iraq’s dual role as both host and active participant in regional conflict-resolution initiatives. He stressed that Shar’a, as Syria’s interim president, was invited under Arab League protocol and that his presence would allow him to articulate a vision for post-Assad Syria. Security and stability in Syria, Sudani argued, directly affect Iraq.

The backlash came swiftly. Shar’a’s invitation was formally delivered on April 27, 2025, by Iraqi Culture Minister Ahmed Fakak, a Sunni, during a visit to Damascus. Within days, opposition forces mounted a campaign against his attendance, citing his past ties to al-Qaeda and the group’s genocidal rhetoric against Shiites.

Opposition to Shar’a’s Attendance

The opposition among Shiite forces is multi-layered and politically charged:

The Dawa Party, led by Nouri al-Maliki, issued a statement insisting summit participants must be free from criminal accusations. Although the party offered no specific evidence implicating Shar’a, its stance is widely viewed as an electoral tactic to undermine Sudani.

Qais Khazali, head of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, warned that Shar’a’s presence could provoke consequences, hinting at potential arrest. His position aligns with Iran’s hostility toward the new Syrian government and fits into pre-election maneuvering.

Hezbollah Brigades spokesperson Abu Ali al-Askari described Shar’a as still being “Abu Mohammed al-Jolani,” dismissing any legitimacy he may now claim.

Shiite MPs from the Coordination Framework filed legal complaints accusing Shar’a of murder, including the killing of relatives. Some factions have gone so far as to imply that Shar’a’s life could be at risk if he comes to Baghdad—framing it as a security issue.

Iran’s hand is evident. Following Assad’s fall, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called on Syrian youth to resist the new regime. Since then, Iran has sought to delegitimize Shar’a and is leveraging its Iraqi proxies to block his normalization.

Underlying Motives Behind the Objection

Among pro-Iranian Shiite factions, opposition to Shar’a stems from several motives:

• Sectarian animosity: Shar’a is seen as having actively targeted Shiites post-2003 and as limiting Shiite influence in Syria.

• Geopolitical alignment: His alignment with Turkey and Qatar makes him suspect in the eyes of the Iran-led axis.

• Electoral rivalry: Sudani’s outreach to Sunni factions and independence from Iran has turned him into a threat for rival Shiite blocs.

• Rumors of coup coordination: Some reports suggest pro-Iran factions in Iraq are collaborating with Baathist remnants in Syria, including Maher Assad, to topple Shar’a.

• Regional axis tensions: Critics accuse Sudani of aligning with the Qatari-Turkish axis against the Saudi-UAE-Jordan camp. This intensified after Sudani’s unannounced visit to Doha, where he appeared publicly with both Shar’a and the Qatari Emir.

Pragmatic Shiite Position and Sunni Support

In contrast, more pragmatic Shiite figures—such as Ammar al-Hakim and Haider al-Abadi—support Shar’a’s participation to ensure the summit’s success and accommodate shifting regional realities. Hakim has stated that Shar’a has immunity and that Iraq must engage diplomatically.

Sudani, for his part, has sought to frame the engagement with Shar’a not as personal endorsement but as part of state-to-state relations. To avoid political backlash, he has delegated relations with Damascus to Iraq’s intelligence services. Head of Intelligence Hamid Shatri has already made two visits to Syria to lay the groundwork while shielding the prime minister from direct exposure.

Sudani’s allies argue that pragmatic interests must guide statecraft. Coordination with Damascus is necessary for managing shared borders, countering ISIS, protecting Shiite shrines, and restoring oil infrastructure.

Sunni parties, meanwhile, largely support Shar’a’s attendance. Some are aligned with the Turkish axis, while others view Shar’a’s government as a Sunni counterweight to Iran’s regional influence. They argue that Shar’a fought U.S. forces rather than Shiites, and note he was in prison during the peak of Iraq’s sectarian war. Some even downplay his operational role in al-Qaeda, characterizing his work as more propagandistic than militant.