In the Kurdistan Region, the stark differences in civic and cultural dynamics between Sulaimani and Duhok are well known. Public comparisons, however, are more often drawn between Erbil and Sulaimani—a framing that can be misleading. Erbil is the capital, home to government institutions and foreign diplomatic missions, giving it dynamics that naturally differ from other provinces. A more balanced comparison would be between Duhok and Sulaimani. Yet such comparisons are less common, partly because Duhok is often perceived as much smaller, and partly because its Bahdini dialect can feel linguistically and culturally distant from Sorani-speaking areas—especially from Sulaimani, where the differences are most pronounced.

In recent years, media has helped narrow these dialect barriers, and per-capita analysis allows for meaningful comparisons despite population differences. According to the Kurdistan Statistics Office, Sulaimani’s population is estimated at 2,152,595 (34.9% of the Kurdistan Region’s total) while Duhok’s stands at 1,648,611 (26.7%).

Recent protest data illustrates the contrast sharply. Between January and July 2025, Sulaimani recorded 158 protests and demonstrations out of a regional total of 260—61% of all protests—despite having only about 35% of the population. Duhok, by contrast, recorded just 9 protests, or 3.5% of the total, despite its 27% population share. Remarkably, Duhok had the same number of protests as Halabja, which accounts for only 1.9% of the region’s population. This raises the question: what explains Duhok’s extremely low level of civic activism?

An intriguing perception prevails outside Duhok province, particularly ironically in Sulaimani, where many believe Duhok’s residents are wealthy. This misconception stems from two persistent stereotypes. First, given Duhok’s deeply tribal structure, observers often conflate the ostentatious displays of certain tribal chieftains with the general prosperity of the province. Second, because the Barzani family originates from Bahdini-speaking areas, many assume they favor Duhok—also a Bahdini-speaking region—at the expense of Sorani areas. However, both empirical data and on-the-ground reports thoroughly contradict these assumptions. In reality, Sulaimani demonstrates clear superior economic performance compared to Duhok, yet perceptions suggest the opposite, largely because Sulaimani’s numerous protest movements create an impression of disadvantage relative to Erbil and Duhok—or so much of Sulaimani’s population believes.

Ironically, KDP media contributes as much as the protesters in Sulaimani to this perception, with its outlets frequently casting Sulaimani’s economic and infrastructure situation in a negative light. However, the KDP’s objective differs from that of the protesters: their goal is to reinforce a narrative that Erbil and Duhok are prospering in order to highlight their governance successes, while simultaneously focusing on Sulaimani’s problems to create an unfavorable comparison.

The economic disparity between Duhok and Sulaimani becomes clear when examining data from the socio-economic survey and census conducted in December 2024. Average monthly income in Sulaimani reaches 259,000 Iraqi dinars, while in Duhok it stands at only 177,000. Monthly expenses average 300,000 dinars in Sulaimani versus 266,000 in Duhok, resulting in a considerably worse income-to-expense ratio in Duhok (0.66) compared to Sulaimani (0.86). Furthermore, unemployment afflicts 17.5% of Duhok’s population versus 13.6% in Sulaimani. The official poverty rate tells a similar story: 8.1% in Sulaimani compared to 15.3% in Duhok. Economic activity rates further underscore this gap, with Sulaimani achieving 49.8% compared to Duhok’s 43.3%. Despite earning more and enjoying greater economic activity, Sulaimani’s workforce averages 43 hours weekly, while Duhok’s residents work 63.6 hours. Family size, often correlated with development and education levels, also reveals disparities: Sulaimani averages 4.25 members per household compared to 6.06 in Duhok. Additionally, the percentage of house renters is higher in Duhok at 20.94% versus Sulaimani’s 17.87%.

Across virtually all economic and development indicators, Sulaimani substantially outperforms Duhok, yet protests occur at far higher per capita rates in Sulaimani. Paradoxically, surveying public perception in Sulaimani would likely reveal near-universal belief in their own neglect and Duhok’s supposed prosperity. Social media sentiment analysis, particularly on Facebook where opinions are more freely expressed, would provide educated insights into these perceptions. Conversely, Duhok’s residents often believe Sulaimani fares better precisely because its citizens demand their rights, compelling government responsiveness to their demands.

Beyond these perceptions lie more fundamental cultural and historical explanations for Duhok’s limited civic activism compared to Sulaimani. Erbil’s protest share roughly matches its population proportion, partially explained by its capital status, diverse demographics, and concentration of government institutions. Geography also plays a crucial role: moving eastward from centrally-located Erbil toward Sulaimani correlates with increasing protest frequency, while westward movement toward Duhok shows decreasing protest activity. Some attribute these dynamics to the political division between KDP and PUK zones, suggesting greater freedom exists in PUK territory. While partially accurate, this explanation overlooks underlying cultural and social dynamics that predate current security arrangements. For instance, Koya district in Erbil province, though PUK-controlled and culturally part of the broader Erbil social sphere, has historically experienced Sulaimani’s influence due to geographic proximity. Even before the Kurdistan Region’s establishment in 1992, Koya served as a hotbed of literature and art—hallmarks of Sulaimani culture—partially due to this proximity-driven cultural influence. Nevertheless, political security control cannot be entirely dismissed, as the KDP has generally employed more heavy-handed protest suppression tactics, though the PUK has similarly acted when protests threaten its interests.

Geographic factors extend beyond internal Kurdish dynamics. Sulaimani has experienced more direct Iranian influence, where complaint and protest culture are deeply embedded. Consequently, distance from the Iranian border correlates with diminished protest culture and civic disobedience. Historical factors prove equally significant: Sulaimani has long distinguished itself from Erbil and Duhok in political culture and civic engagement. This divergence traces back to the Baban Dynasty, which founded the city in the late eighteenth century. Unlike other Kurdish cities, Sulaimani lacked historical ties to any dominant tribe, fostering an intellectual and artistic atmosphere that became the epicenter of what might be termed a Kurdish Enlightenment. While Duhok maintains a robust tribal structure, Sulaimani has exhibited weak tribal influence since the Baban era.

Tribal structure profoundly affects cultural perceptions of authority and societal membership. In more tribal cultures, traditional concepts of honor remain strong, making complaint culturally less permissible or acceptable. Many residents remain connected to tribes where chieftains continue serving as intermediaries between the ruling KDP and tribal members. Though gradually weakening, this element still strongly influences provincial culture. Conversely, in Sulaimani, complainants and activists typically receive compliments and support for speaking out. These community-level perceptions of protest acceptability play crucial roles in shaping reactions to authority and determining protest frequencies across provinces.

This contrast in social norms—tribal deference versus civic assertiveness—helps explain why Duhok, despite poorer economic conditions, remains among the quietest provinces politically, while Sulaimani continues to dominate Kurdistan’s protest landscape.