Iraq’s prominent Sunni cleric Rafi’ al-Rifa’i, widely known as the “Grand Mufti of Iraq,” returned to Baghdad after 11 years in exile, marking a significant shift in the country’s sectarian power dynamics. His red-carpet reception by National Security Adviser Qasim al-Araji, despite fierce opposition from pro-Iran Shiite militias, signals growing Sunni confidence following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria and Iran’s weakening regional influence.

Context: Al-Rifaʿi commands significant influence among Sunnis in Baghdad, Anbar, and beyond, was a leading voice in the 2013 protests across Sunni-majority provinces against the government of then prime minister Nouri al-Maliki, and he was among the most vocal critics of Iran-aligned militias. He fled to Erbil amid the ensuing crackdown. On 8 October 2025, National Security Adviser Qasim al-Araji received him in the VIP hall at Baghdad International Airport with a red-carpet reception, then escorted him in a large convoy to the Umm al-Tubl Mosque in western Baghdad. Although he holds no formal state office, the title “Grand Mufti of Iraq” stems from a Sufi tradition that predates the 2003 U.S. invasion. He assumed the role in 2007, succeeding Sheikh Jamal Abd al-Karim al-Dabban.

Analysis: The return has triggered a sharp backlash from Iran-aligned Shiite forces, which denounced al-Rifaʿi as “a terrorist who incites against the political process and the security services” and moved quickly to file legal cases. For instance, Asifa Abbas Qader, a Kataib Hezbollah official, dismissed his return as “a suspicious political deal at the expense of the martyrs’ blood,” though National Security Adviser Qasim al-Araji denied this allegation, stating that al-Rifa’i is covered by the general amnesty law passed by parliament on 21 January 2025. Meanwhile, Diaa al-Nasiri, an official from Nouri al-Maliki’s coalition, filed a complaint accusing al-Rifa’i of inciting sectarianism and provoking violent incidents that caused deaths and injuries. A wave of similar attacks and legal complaints has followed.

By contrast, Sunni political and religious leaders welcomed the move. The Iraqi Fiqh Council, the highest Sunni religious authority, sent a delegation to greet al-Rifaʿi, discuss his return, and explore renewed coordination on religious and national issues, according to its 9 October statement.

This development is part of a broader geopolitical trend following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. Since then, Iraq’s Sunnis have found new strength and feel reinvigorated, placing them in their strongest position since the U.S. invasion in 2003. The fall of Assad means Iraq’s western flank is now ruled by a Sunni-led power, giving Iraq’s Sunnis greater leverage and new tools in Iraq’s power struggle that they lacked when the core Sunni areas were geopolitically sandwiched between Iran and its allied forces.

Sunni politicians have become markedly more outspoken. Muhammad al-Halbousi has raised the prospect of Sunnis claiming the presidency and has predicted they could outpoll Shiite blocs in Baghdad. Khamis al-Khanjar, often described as close to Qatar and Turkey, adopted an unusually blunt tone in meetings with Shiite leaders and refused their requests to help calm the Sunni street in the months after Assad’s collapse, as those leaders feared a region-wide, Sunni-led mobilization that could weaken Shiite-led rule.

Shiite leaders, for their part, have made visible concessions as their regional position has frayed. The Grand Mufti’s highly choreographed return is emblematic, given his role in the 2013 Sunni protests. Even prominent Sunni leader and former Iraqi Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi is reported to have been invited to return after he was forced to flee following accusations and charges of aiding terrorist attacks; indeed, al-Hashemi himself has said that he “hopes to return to Baghdad once adequate protection is ensured.”

Another striking development is that Asaib Ahl al-Haq has taken a step that seemed unthinkable a year or two ago by allying with Saddam Hussein’s Bu Nasir tribe, including backing a tribal candidate in Salahaddin. In parallel, the government has moved to “de-occupy” al-Awja (Saddam’s hometown), which for years served as a militia stronghold, and to reopen the town, facilitate the return of Bu Nasir notables, and start reconstruction.

Taken together, these moves look like a defensive recalibration by Shiite factions worried about losing their grip as Iran’s regional influence ebbs and a Sunni resurgence, unprecedented in post-2003 Iraq, gathers pace. The public message is inclusivity, “everyone is welcome, even our critics,” while the practical aim is to manage Sunni re-entry into the political center on terms the Shiite-led order can absorb.

At the same time, much of this appears coordinated with Tehran. The pairing of loud denunciations with permissive state action suggests choreographed role-playing designed to preserve Shiite primacy; the noise amounts to political theater, especially ahead of the 11 November elections. As regional realignment continues, other exiled Sunni figures—including Tareq al-Hashemi and former Nineveh governor Atheel al-Nujaifi—are likely to return after the vote as part of a strategy of calibrated concessions aimed at preserving the core of the current Shiite-led order while defusing Sunni grievances.