In October 2024, two months before the Assad regime’s collapse in Syria, Turkish ultra-nationalist leader Devlet Bahçeli shocked political observers by shaking hands with members of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party, formerly HDP). The gesture was particularly striking given Bahçeli’s previous rhetoric of branding even those who exhibited the slightest sympathy toward Kurdish politicians as “terrorist sympathizers.” For context, the timing coincided with the one-year anniversary of the October 7 events, when Hamas executed the most lethal attack in Israel’s history, marking an unprecedented assault by a Palestinian militant group.

At the time of Bahçeli’s initiative, his motives were unclear; his sudden outreach raised immediate questions. Why would the leader of Turkey’s most hardline nationalist party—who, after allying with Erdoğan in 2016, pressured him to abandon peace talks with the PKK—suddenly reverse course? Often characterized as the representative of Turkey’s deep state, Bahçeli’s moves gained new context following developments in Syria. The Assad regime, despite maintaining power for 13 years with Russian and Iranian support and appearing stronger than at any point since the 2011 uprising, suddenly collapsed without significant resistance.

As events continue to unfold, a theory has emerged linking Bahçeli’s initiative to broader regional transformations. According to this analysis, Assad’s fall was not a spontaneous collapse but an orchestrated transition, coordinated between Turkey, Russia, and the United States. Several factors support this interpretation: Russia’s immediate recognition of Ahmad al-Sharaa—formerly an HTS leader—as Syria’s new president, Putin’s direct phone conversation with him, and increasing signs of an agreement allowing Russia to retain its military bases along Syria’s Mediterranean coast. Notably, these developments coincided with Trump’s victory in the U.S. presidential election, leading to speculation that Russia strategically scaled back its role in Syria as part of a broader geopolitical trade-off, potentially securing concessions in Ukraine in return.

The theory places these developments within a crucial regional context: the Middle East’s stability had long rested on a power equilibrium between Iran and Israel, with Arab states and Turkey playing secondary roles. This balance was fundamentally disrupted following the October 2023 events, which led to the decimation of Iran’s regional proxy network – particularly the dramatic collapse of Hezbollah’s capabilities – severely weakening Iran’s regional deterrence.

The region has entered what might be termed a geopolitical “hungry gap” – borrowing from agricultural terminology describing the precarious interval between depleted old harvests and pending new crops. This metaphor aptly captures the current transition, as Iran’s decline creates a power vacuum that Turkey, among other regional powers, appears positioned to fill, though the shape of the new regional “harvest” remains uncertain.

This theory posits that Turkey’s renewed engagement with the PKK is not just a domestic initiative but part of a grander regional realignment. With the decline of Iran, Kurdish factions have solidified their status as formidable sub-state actors, and Turkey sees strategic value in engaging them rather than opposing them.

Under this framework, Turkey is reportedly seeking an understanding with the United States that would position Ankara as the primary patron of Kurdish political and military entities. This could lead to Syrian Kurds being granted a form of autonomy similar to Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, while the PKK would transition from armed insurgency to legitimate political participation in Turkey.

This theory gains further credibility based on Turkey’s recent diplomatic maneuvers. Ankara has allowed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) commander Mazloum Abdi to meet with Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) leader Masoud Barzani. It has also permitted key DEM Party figures who serve as Öcalan’s liaisons, Perwin Buldan and Sırrı Süreyya Önder, to engage with both Barzani and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Bafel Talabani. These developments suggest that the Kurdish-Turkish dialogue extends beyond Turkey’s domestic sphere and is part of a broader regional arrangement.

However, the theory acknowledges several variables that could alter or refine this grand plan: Erdoğan appears reluctant to fully commit to the initiative without securing tangible political benefits, such as guarantees for his continued rule beyond 2027. Additionally, it remains unclear whether the PKK’s leadership in Qandil will accept a deal largely influenced by Abdullah Öcalan, who remains a dominant but not uncontested figure within the movement.

Since no concrete agreements have been reached, this theory remains speculative. However, it provides a potential big-picture explanation for Turkey’s renewed peace push, situating it within the sweeping geopolitical shifts following October 7 and Iran’s regional decline.  As new developments unfold, the validity of this theory—whether entirely accurate, partially correct, or entirely speculative—will become clearer.