The ongoing power struggle between Iraq’s two highest judicial bodies—the Supreme Judicial Council and the Federal Supreme Court—has reignited over the General Amnesty Law, which was passed by the Iraqi Parliament on January 21, 2025. This law was part of a package of three significant laws passed simultaneously: the Personal Status Law Amendment, championed by Shia factions; the Property Restitution Law, backed by Kurdish factions; and the General Amnesty Law Amendment, benefiting Sunni factions. The latter two bills were put forward as a quid pro quo to secure Kurdish and Sunni support for the Personal Status Law Amendment. However, on February 4th, the Iraqi Federal Court suspended the Sunni-backed Amnesty Law.

Although this suspension automatically extends to the Personal Status Law and Property Restitution Law, as they were passed together in a single legislative package, the ruling – which was an interim injunction – only addressed the amnesty law. The court justified its ruling by stating that the amnesty law violates the constitution, as it allows for the retrial of convicted individuals, including those guilty of serious crimes, contradicting the original intent of the legislation.

The court’s ruling prompted vehement responses from Sunni leaders, particularly Muhammad Halbusi, who strongly denounced the Federal Court as illegitimate. He called for “massive demonstrations to shake the pillars of injustice” and urged the public to reject Chief Justice Jassim Abboud Al-al-Umayri’s authority over state institutions.

The Supreme Judicial Council, led by Faiq Zaidan, immediately pushed back. In direct defiance of the Federal Supreme Court’s ruling, it mandated that courts must implement all three laws—including the General Amnesty Law. Within 24 hours of the Federal Court’s ruling, the Supreme Judicial Council, under Faiq Zaidan’s leadership, convened an extraordinary session to scrutinize the Federal Court’s interim injunction that had halted the implementation of these laws.

In their legal reasoning, the Supreme Judicial Council asserted that interim injunctions constitute temporary procedural measures lacking the permanent and binding legal force inherent in final judicial rulings. Grounding their position in constitutional law, the Council invoked Article 129 of the Iraqi Constitution, which explicitly circumscribes the conditions under which laws may be suspended – requiring either a definitive ruling of unconstitutionality or formal repeal by the legislature. Based on this jurisprudential interpretation, the Council instructed all Iraqi courts to proceed with implementing the three recently enacted parliamentary laws.
A day later, the Federal Supreme Court reaffirmed that its rulings, including temporary injunctions and interim orders, are final and binding on all governmental authorities.

This is not the first clash between Iraq’s two top judicial bodies, which are locked in a battle for authority and influence. In June 2024, the Court of Cassation – also headed by Faiq Zaidan, who by virtue of his position as Chief Justice of the Court of Cassation automatically chairs the Supreme Judicial Council – attempted to curtail the Federal Supreme Court’s power by declaring that it had overstepped its constitutional mandate. The Court of Cassation argued that the Supreme Judicial Council oversees all courts, including the Federal Supreme Court.

In a five-page ruling, the Court of Cassation sought to redefine the Federal Supreme Court’s authority, directly challenging past controversial rulings. The Federal Supreme Court, in response, insisted that its rulings are final and binding on all institutions.

The power struggle manifests along two distinct but interconnected axes. First, it is a personal rivalry between the two chief justices—a contest for institutional preeminence, with each seeking to assert judicial supremacy. Second, it reflects a broader power struggle within Iraq’s pro-Iran Shia political establishment, where competing factions vie for greater influence and control over key state institutions.

The Personal Factor: Zaidan vs. al-Umayr

Reports of tensions between Federal Court Chief Justice Jassim Abboud al-Umayri and Supreme Judicial Council President Fa’iq Zaydan have been well-documented. This personal dimension carries particular significance as evidenced by the June 2024 five-page ruling, which revealed Zaidan’s perspective that the Federal Court falls under his Judicial Council’s authority. While the Iraqi Constitution establishes the Federal Supreme Court as an independent judicial body with administrative and financial autonomy, not subordinate to the Supreme Judicial Council, the Federal Court has increasingly ventured into controversial jurisdictional territory, particularly given that its own constitutional legitimacy rests on contested grounds.

However, the ongoing dispute cannot be separated from their personal history. Jassim Abboud al-Umayri, before becoming head of the Federal Supreme Court in 2021, was head of the Judicial Supervision Authority—a position that made him subordinate to Zaidan, who has led the Supreme Judicial Council since 2017. Many initially viewed al-Umayri as Zaidan’s protégé, expecting him to act as an extension of Zaidan’s influence within the Federal Supreme Court.
The selection process for the head of the Federal Supreme Court further reinforced Zaidan’s perception of his authority over al-Umayri. The appointment is made by a four-member committee composed of the heads of the Supreme Judicial Council, the Federal Supreme Court, the Public Prosecution Service, and the Judicial Oversight Service—three of whom belong to the Supreme Judicial Council. This structure likely contributed to Zaidan’s belief that the Federal Supreme Court was under his jurisdiction, while al-Umayri, once in power, sought to assert the court’s independence.

To understand al-Umayri’s rise to power, it is crucial to examine the circumstances surrounding his elevation to Chief Justice of the Federal Supreme Court. As president of the Judicial Oversight Service, he was one of four officials on the selection committee, a position he strategically leveraged to support his own candidacy. His predecessor, Medhat al-Mahmoud, had been closely aligned with Nouri al-Maliki’s interests, and al-Umayri himself was also politically tied to Maliki. Together, the two already controlled 50% of the votes in the selection process, meaning they needed just one additional vote to secure al-Umayri’s appointment—an outcome that effectively cemented Maliki’s continued influence over the Federal Supreme Court. 

At the time, Zaidan saw al-Mahmoud’s departure as an opportunity to expand his own influence over the Federal Supreme Court, believing that without al-Mahmoud’s seniority, he would be able to assert greater control over the court. However, this expectation proved to be a miscalculation. Since taking office in 2021, al-Umayri has gradually chipped away at Zaidan’s dominance, strengthening the Federal Supreme Court’s institutional position and tilting the balance of power in its favor. This shift has been particularly evident since 2022, as the Federal Supreme Court has become increasingly assertive, issuing a series of major rulings that have reinforced its authority and challenged the Supreme Judicial Council’s reach.

Political Alignments and the Iran Factor

The other significant aspect of this struggle is the political alignment of the two men. While both chief justices are aligned with pro-Iranian interests, their positions within this political orbit manifest differently. Zaidan is known for his deep-rooted ties to Iran, but he does not operate as a subordinate to any single Shia politician. He maintains direct ties with senior Iranian authorities and serves as one of the most crucial guardians of Iranian interests at the strategic level. Given that the role of head of the Supreme Judicial Council is constitutionally equivalent in status to the President, Prime Minister, and Parliament Speaker, Zaidan sees himself as an autonomous power center, not beholden to any particular political figure. His elevated status within this network is evidenced by his high-profile appearances in Iran, notably his prominent seating position at the funeral of former Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi – a ceremonial privilege traditionally reserved for Iran’s most trusted proxies, where he was positioned ahead of other attending Iraqi officials, signifying his hierarchical importance.

In contrast, al-Umayri’s connection to Iran operates through intermediary channels, primarily through his association with Iraqi Shia politician Nouri al-Maliki. While al-Maliki maintains strong ties with Iran, he simultaneously pursues his own political interests within Iraq, which occasionally diverge from other pro-Iranian factions.
The dispute over the General Amnesty Law has exposed internal divisions within Iraq’s pro-Iran camp. Iran had given its initial approval for the law, as it was part of a broader political deal that helped break the parliamentary deadlock and facilitated the election of Mahmoud al-Mashhadani as the new Sunni Parliament Speaker, a figure seen as close to Iran. However, the selection of al-Mashhadani was not just a prelude to passing such laws—it was also a signal from Iran that it was willing to accommodate Sunni demands to maintain political stability.

Despite the broader pro-Iranian camp’s support for the legislation – which would benefit thousands of Sunni prisoners – as part of a strategic compromise, al-Maliki stood alone among major politicians in opposing it. The timing of this opposition coincides with Iraq’s election season, introducing additional political calculations: al-Maliki is leveraging public frustration among Shia constituents regarding the amnesty law, particularly by highlighting concerns about the potential release of individuals with alleged ISIS connections. The Federal Court’s intervention to suspend the amnesty law came shortly after al-Maliki’s public denunciation. The subsequent intervention by the Supreme Judicial Council to reinstate the law appears aimed at preventing further political instability, particularly in light of widespread threats of street protests from Sunni political leaders.

At a strategic level, key figures within the pro-Iranian camp, including those in Tehran, view the Federal Court’s ruling as potentially destabilizing to the current political order. This concern is heightened by two external factors: the changing regional dynamics following Assad’s fall and the return of Trump, both of which are already placing existential pressure on Iran’s regional influence. The view among these strategic actors is that provocative judicial decisions that might trigger large-scale Sunni protests could lead Iraq into an unpredictable period of instability, potentially undermining the significant influence the pro-Iran Shia camp has established in post-Saddam Iraq.

However, al-Maliki and his allies within the Federal Court appear to be pursuing a different strategy, calculating that reinvigorating their popular appeal through such controversial stands might provide better protection than measured strategic patience – an approach they argue has already cost Iran significantly. It’s worth noting that al-Maliki views himself not merely as a proxy but as a fundamental pillar of this regional alliance, a position supported by his substantial financial resources and popular support base.

Thus, at its core, this political confrontation represents not a clash between opposing regional blocs, but rather a strategic divergence within the same camp regarding how best to preserve and expand their influence.