A detailed accounting of strikes from late February through late March 2026 reveals a campaign concentrated on Iran’s closest Iraqi proxies, with Hashd al-Shabak, Kataib Imam Ali, and western border factions absorbing sustained strikes across the Nineveh Plains, Kirkuk corridor, and the Syrian frontier.

The air campaign that has accompanied the broader U.S.-Israeli military operation against Iran has not struck Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces evenly. A detailed review of confirmed and reported strikes from late February through late March 2026 shows a clear hierarchy of targeting, with Kataib Hezbollah and its network absorbing the largest share of attacks, followed by a cluster of factions along the western border with Syria, and then a broad but shallower pattern of strikes on local PMF formations stretched across the disputed territories from the Nineveh Plains to Kirkuk and Tuz Khurmatu.

Across the full dataset of recorded incidents with explicit casualty figures, well over 70 militia personnel have been killed and large numbers wounded, with the true toll almost certainly higher because several entries in the western Anbar belt and from late March do not carry clean casualty breakdowns, and some reports from Jurf al-Sakhar and al-Qaim remain disputed.

Kataib Hezbollah (KH) and its immediate network emerge as the most heavily targeted formation in the campaign. KH-linked sites were struck repeatedly in Jurf al-Sakhar, south of Baghdad, inside Baghdad city, at Camp Saqr, in the Jadriyah district, at Nahrawan, in Fallujah, at Akashat, al-Qaim, Akkaz, and Tuz Khurmatu, as well as at KH-linked Brigade 63 positions around Kirkuk, Daquq, and Amerli. In raw frequency, that amounts to roughly two dozen reported strike incidents or targeted sub-sites when the Brigade 63 entries are included. The confirmed toll attributable to KH and its network stands at a minimum of 23 killed and approximately 40 wounded, though the true figure is likely higher. KH also absorbed some of the highest-profile single blows of the campaign inside the capital: the 14 March al-Arsat strike, the 16 to 17 March Jadriyah strike, and a 4 March vehicle strike south of Baghdad.

After KH, the most persistently struck single local formation is Hashd al-Shabak, also known as Quwat Sahl Nineveh, the Shabak PMF formation operating across the Nineveh Plains. This group was hit repeatedly at Bartella, Khazna Taba, Khorsibat, al-Mowafaqiya, and Ain al-Safra, for a total of nine to ten separate incidents. What distinguishes the Shabak formation is that it absorbed a very high operational tempo of attacks but comparatively lighter recorded losses than the western Anbar factions. The clearest confirmed toll is one killed and three wounded in the 19 March Khazna Taba strike, while many of the remaining attacks are recorded as causing material damage without fatalities.

Kataib Imam Ali appears repeatedly in the Kirkuk governorate corridor, with roughly six distinct reported incidents concentrated around Qayyarah and Dibis. The most consequential was the 10 March Dibis strike, where between four and six fighters were killed and between three and 18 wounded, making it one of the bloodier confirmed single-faction attacks in the dataset. Follow-on strikes on 15 March and 17 March indicate that the group remained under sustained pressure even after that initial heavy blow.

In the western border belt stretching from al-Qaim to Akashat and the Iraqi-Syrian frontier, two factions stand out for the lethality of the strikes they absorbed. Saraya al-Khorasani was struck repeatedly around Akashat, al-Qaim, the Martyr Haider checkpoint, and positions along the border itself, with five to six reported incidents or targeted sub-sites. Its worst losses came on 16 March, when strikes on Brigade 18 positions killed at least eight fighters and wounded others, with more casualties likely in follow-on hits. Ansar Allah al-Awfiya appears in fewer entries, but the losses are heavier. The decisive example is the 12 March al-Qaim strike on three Brigade 19 sites, described as one of the deadliest single attacks in the entire dataset, with more than 20 reported killed depending on outlet. That concentration of force suggests the campaign was not only frequent along the border but at times highly lethal against specific formations.

Asaib Ahl al-Haq does not appear as frequently as KH in the target set, but it suffered a significant early blow. The key entry is the 1 March strike in Muqdadiya, where four fighters were killed and between two and eight wounded. Later AAH-linked positions in Wasit, Salah al-Din, Kirkuk city, and Daquq were also struck, but most of those subsequent incidents either carry unclear tolls or involve shared casualties that cannot be broken down by faction. AAH is therefore not the most frequently targeted group in the dataset, but it is one of the formations that took an early and consequential hit.

Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba appears in a smaller number of strikes, mainly at al-Nibai and Tarmiyah, totaling roughly two clear incidents, with three wounded reported in the al-Nibai attack. Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada was struck multiple times around Mosul, Rashidiya, Shirikhan, and Bartella, but appears to have suffered repeated attacks with relatively limited clearly reported deaths. The same is broadly true for Badr Organization-linked positions, although the 11 to 12 March Kirkuk city strike on a Badr-linked Turkmen unit reportedly led by Abu Ali Bek did produce one killed and seven wounded.

The more local and mixed formations across the Kirkuk and Tuz Khurmatu corridor also figure in the dataset. Quwat al-Turkmen was struck at Taza Khurmatu and Daquq, Fawj Amerli at Tuz Khurmatu, Kataib Jund al-Imam at Baiji, Risaliyun at Sinniyah, Liwa al-Tufuf in western Anbar, Haras Nineveh at North Mosul, the Special Tasks Regiment in West Mosul, Tribal Mobilization in the Tharthar area, and Waad Allah at al-Adhba. The clearest losses among these groups are one killed and several wounded for Fawj Amerli; one killed and at least seven wounded for Risaliyun at Sinniyah; three wounded for Kataib Jund al-Imam at Baiji; and five wounded for the Special Tasks Regiment in West Mosul. These formations are not targeted as often as KH or Hashd al-Shabak, but their presence in the dataset illustrates how broad the target set became across the disputed territories.

One of the most significant findings is that some of the deadliest strikes in the campaign did not target a single militia at all, but rather composite PMF command structures. The clearest example is the 24 March strike on the PMF Anbar Operations headquarters in Habbaniyah, which killed at least 15 people, including Saad al-Baiji, Haider al-Mamouri, and Wathiq al-Fartousi, and wounded around 30. That attack matters because it shows the campaign was not limited to hitting brigade-level field sites but was also reaching up to higher-level PMF command and intelligence nodes.

Taken together, the pattern is clear. Kataib Hezbollah and KH-linked units were the most heavily targeted overall. Hashd al-Shabak was the most repeatedly struck local formation in raw frequency. Saraya al-Khorasani and Ansar Allah al-Awfiya took some of the heaviest lethal hits in the western border belt. Kataib Imam Ali suffered major losses in the Kirkuk corridor. Asaib Ahl al-Haq took an early significant blow but appears less frequently thereafter. And the 24 March Habbaniyah strike on the PMF Anbar Operations command demonstrated that the campaign’s reach extended well beyond individual brigade positions to the institutional architecture of the PMF itself.